D'Ooge v. Leeds

57 N.E. 1025, 176 Mass. 558, 1900 Mass. LEXIS 966
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedSeptember 21, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 57 N.E. 1025 (D'Ooge v. Leeds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
D'Ooge v. Leeds, 57 N.E. 1025, 176 Mass. 558, 1900 Mass. LEXIS 966 (Mass. 1900).

Opinion

Knowlton, J.

The petitioner is a trustee under the will of Elizabeth Lambert, by the residuary clause of which she directed him to hold three-sixths of the residuum as a trustee, and to pay over the income of it to certain persons for life, and on the death of the last survivor of them to pay over the principal to certain persons and corporations to be held by them absolutely. A part of the property which has come into his hands is twenty-two shares of the capital stock of the Adams Express Company. This company is not a corporation, but a joint-stock association organized under the laws of the State of New York and having a capital stock divided into transferable shares. It had accumulated from earnings a surplus amounting to more than twelve million dollars, which it had invested in securities and property, the income of which it had divided among its stockholders in cash dividends from time to time, together with the earnings of the original capital. On the ninth day of February, 1898, the board of managers of the company voted to distribute its surplus to the amount of $12,000,000 among its shareholders, by issuing bonds equal in amount to the capital stock of the company, in denominations of $1,000 and $500, so that each shareholder should receive in bonds an amount equal to his capital stock. Under this vote, the petitioner has received two bonds of $1,000 each, and $200 in money the proceeds of his fractional interest in another bond, and the question is whether they are to be [560]*560turned over to the life tenant as income or are to be held as a part of the principal.

Ordinarily when a testator leaves property to a trustee, the income of which is to be paid to one for life and the principal paid to another after the death of the life tenant, it is the duty of the trustee to take the whole property and use and invest it as a single fund, of which the income only is to be paid to the life tenant, and the principal is to be held for the remainderman. If the property, or a part of it, is of a kind which under the law is controlled and managed by another, so that the trustee can receive into his hands only what the managers turn over to the owners of the beneficial interest, questions of difficulty sometimes arise in determining whether the receipts are income or principal. Thére is much confusion in the decisions on these questions in the English courts. The judges apparently have desired to take the property as a whole and as the testator is supposed to have known it, and treat it as a single fund, that is, as capital, when the will takes effect upon it, and then determine whether that which afterwards comes into the hands of the trustee is income from it, or is a part of the principal fund. The questions have most often arisen in connection with property in corporations. In reference to such property, the rule in Massachusetts is now well established. Everything is made to turn upon the action of the corporation. “ A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital.” Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 108, Daland v. Williams, 101 Mass. 571. Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542, 550. Rand v. Hubbell, 115 Mass. 461. Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478. Adams v. Adams, 139 Mass. 449, 452. In considering the distribution to determine its character, substance and not form is regarded. The simple question in every case is whether the distribution made by the corporation is of money to be spent as income, or is of capital to be held as an investment in the corporation. While this arbitrary rule may sometimes defeat the intention of the testator, in most cases it accomplishes the result intended, and there were practical considerations as well as principles which required the adoption of it. The property of a corporation, in whatever way obtained, belongs, in the first instance, to the corporation and not to the stockholders. It [561]*561may be used and managed as the interests of the corporation require. Sometimes it is desirable to divide the greater part of the earnings as income as soon as they are received. Sometimes it is important to retain large accumulations of earnings as additions to the original property and to make them a part of the permanent capitalization. Often it is desirable to keep in the business a large surplus to provide for losses or other contingencies which cannot be foreseen. For these reasons, as well as because of ownership, it is well that corporations should be permitted to determine for themselves how much of their earnings they will divide as income and how much they will retain as capital.

Courts have often suggested the desirability of ascertaining whether the distribution in question is from a surplus accumulated prior to the creation of the trust, or from one accumulated during its continuance. Many decisions in England have been affected more or less by this consideration. See Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385, and Sproule v. Bouch, 29 Ch. D. 635, and cases cited. But in Massachusetts, and we think now in England, it is held to be impracticable in most cases to conduct such an inquiry in the courts with justice to the parties. It would often be impossible to tell what part of an apparent surplus on hand at a particular time was needed for the protection of the capital, or to determine just when the surplus was earned. The conditions which create expenses often come into existence a long time before the expenditures are made, and the returns of one period are often the fruit of effort or outlay made long before. In cases of corporations, therefore, our court does not inquire further than to ascertain whether the distribution is of money to be used as income, or is of capital to be continued in the business. This, too, is the rule in the Supreme Court of the United States. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549.

In the present case, although the Adams Express Company is not a corporation, it is like a corporation in the management of its property and business. The stockholders are all liable as partners for the debts of the company. But under the articles of association the business of the association is conducted and governed by a board of managers consisting of nine persons. The property and effects of the association are in the possession [562]*562and custody of the trustees, consisting of the president and two other managers who hold the legal title, and dividends are to be declared by the managers to such an extent as they may from time to time determine. It was also provided in these original articles that each share should be subject to the payment of assessments as might be necessary in cases of loss, and that “ a fund should be created out of the surplus profits of the association to protect the shareholders and provide for losses.” The proceedings of the company, which are before us, show that at the time of the distribution this surplus, to the amount of more than twelve million dollars, was being held and used under the requirements of the original articles of association as a fund “ to protect the shareholders and provide for losses.” In that way it was used in the business according to the original intention of the shareholders and according to their contract, as much as any part of the capital. It had been invested for the most part in long-time bonds and in good income-pro-: ducing stocks and securities, a schedule of which is before us.

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Bluebook (online)
57 N.E. 1025, 176 Mass. 558, 1900 Mass. LEXIS 966, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dooge-v-leeds-mass-1900.