Minot v. Paine

99 Mass. 101
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMarch 15, 1868
StatusPublished
Cited by135 cases

This text of 99 Mass. 101 (Minot v. Paine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (Mass. 1868).

Opinion

Chapman, C. J.

Under the will of Mrs. Lee, the shares in question were held by the trustee to pay over the net income thereof, as often as convenient, to Mrs. Paine, during her natural life, for her sole and separate use, &c.; and, on her death, to transfer and convey the same in fee to such persons, and on such terms, as Mrs. Paine, by her last will and testament, executed after her majority, may direct and appoint; and, in default of such will executed after her majority, or if she shall die a minor, then to her issue, if any, surviving her; and, in default of such issue or such will, then to the issue surviving her of the said George L. Schuyler; the trustee having full powers of sale and conveyance and change of investments in the management of the trust estate.

[106]*106The fact that the shares in the Western Railroad Corporation were received by the trustee as part of Mrs. Lee’s estate, and that the shares in the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company were purchased by him as an investment, is not material to the present case.

In addition to the cash dividends which were declared by the directors of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, a dividend of twenty per cent, in stock was made in September 1867, and received by the trustee, which he sold for $5000, being twenty-five per cent, above the par value of the shares. And, in July 1867, the directors of the Western Railroad Corporation made a stock dividend, three shares of which came to him.

The question presented to the court is, whether these stock dividends, or either of them, are to be treated by him as income, belonging to Mrs. Paine, the tenant for life ; or as capital, to be kept for the legatees of the stock in remainder, and of which Mrs. Paine is entitled to receive the income during her life.

The dividend made by the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company is stated in the vote of the directors to be made to represent expenditures for improvements on the road, the construction of the Burlington Bridge, &c.; and the pleadings admit that it -was made from the net earnings of the road, for the permanent improvement of the road, and additions to the road, and the purchase of property now belonging to the road which yields a net income; and that the dividend made by the Western Railroad Corporation was made from its net earnings for purposes substantially similar. The votes are stated in the 1 ill; but it is not necessary to refer to them more particularly.

The court do not regard the fact that the dividends were made from the net earnings of the roads as material. The net earnings of a railroad corporation remain the property of the company as fully as its other property, till the directors declare a dividend. A shareholder has no title to them prior to the dividend being declared. In most of our prosperous railroad corporations, the directors apply a considerable portion of their net [107]*107income to the laying of additional tracks, the building of new depots, the increase of their rolling stock, and sometimes to the purchase of land which they deem important to the accommodation of their business, or to other permanent improvements of the road; and they have discretionary power to do so. Tt is true that they may abuse their power, and refuse to make any dividends, though their net income may be large; and apply their funds to the permanent improvement of the road, tind thereby deprive a life tenant of all benefit from the shares, and reserve the whole income for the benefit of the remainderman. But in the present case it is not alleged that there* has been any abuse of power; and it need not be decided whether, in case of such abuse, the trustee can protect the interests of the tenant for life in any other manner than by selling the shares and investing the trust fund in some other way by which he may obtain a reasonable income.

It is obvious that, if the directors had made no stock dividend, but had invested the income in permanent improvements, making no increase of the number of shares, the improvements would have been capital, belonging to the legatees in remainder. So, if they had thus invested it, and, instead of increasing the '.number of shares, had increased their par value, the shares would have been mere capital, and not income, as to the shareholders, though increased in value by the application of the net income of the road to that purpose. So, when they increase the number of shares, each share of all the stock in the corporation is in its nature capital. The new shares take their place among the old ones; and each of the old shares thereby becomes a less proportion of the whole stock than it was before, and is entitled to a less proportion of dividends declared than it was before. It may be that dividends are less per cent, than they would otherwise have been, and in such case the old stock is diminished in value, and the interest of the remainder-man is injuriously affected. But, on the other hand, the effect may be, by increasing the business of the road, to increase the dividends and the market value of the old stock.

But neither courts nor trustees can investigate such matters [108]*108with accuracy; and in many cases no investigation can be made. A trustee needs some plain principle to guide him; and the cestuis que trust ought not to be subjected to the expense of going behind the action of the directors, and investigating the concerns of the corporation, especially if it is out of our jurisdiction. A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital. The court are of opinion that this rule is more in conformity with the legal and equitable rights of shareholders than any other that has been suggested. It is also in conformity with the decisions of the court, so far as the subject has been considered.

In Reed v. Head, 6 Allen, 174, the cash dividends made by a land company were held to belong to the tenant for life, though they were derived from the sale of its real estate, which was its capital; this being its only method of earning dividends. On the other hand, where a gas light company increased the number of its shares, the right of a trustee to subscribe for new shares, which was a valuable right, was held to be the property of the legatee in remainder, and the sum realized by the sale of the right was directed to be invested for his benefit, the income to be paid to the legatee for life. Atkins v. Albree, 12 Allen. 359.

The subject has been much discussed by other courts; and, as it has been fully and ably argued, and is practically very important, it may be well to refer to the authorities.

The earlier English decisions have been unsatisfactory to the profession, and to the English courts. In Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. 800, the bank had advanced to the government one million sterling, and had received for it £1,125,000 of five per cent, annuities. These were distributed among the stockholders. The testator bad devised his bank stock to the plaintiff, subject to an annuity for life. Lord Chancellor Loughborough held that the dividends out of the £1,125,000 were accretion to the capital and belonged to the remainderman, and that the tenant for life was entitled to receive only the income which it might earn, He said the same thing had been done when the bank increased their dividends, on the ground that there had been a gradual [109]*109saving.

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Bluebook (online)
99 Mass. 101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/minot-v-paine-mass-1868.