[316] MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SHADUR, District Judge.
This Court’s lengthy April 10, 1990 memorandum opinion and order (the “Opinion,” 736 F.Supp. 845 1) disposed of, via summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 56, virtually all of the numerous claims asserted by 54 investors in one or more oil and gas limited partnerships. All that survived of this action was the claim brought under 15 U.S.C. § 77Z(2) (“Section 12(2),” referring to the internal section numbering of the Securities Act of 1933, the “1933 Act”). That statute, invoked in Count 4 of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, “attaches strict liability to any inclusion of an untrue statement of material fact or any omission of a material fact in a prospectus or oral communication used to offer or sell a security, so long as the plaintiff did not know of the untruth or omission” (Opinion at 876, citation omitted).
Section 12(2) alone remained in plaintiffs’ arsenal because that statute does not require a showing of intent to defraud on defendants’ part (a requirement on which other claims asserted by plaintiffs had foundered) and because material factual disputes remained as to alleged misstatements and omissions represented by the private placement memoranda (“PPMs”) for the oil ventures. Now, although plaintiffs and defendants have joined in approving a final pretrial order in preparation for trial, defendants have since moved for summary judgment on the surviving Section 12(2) claim and the parties have briefed that motion. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, the motion is granted and this action is dismissed in its entirety.
Statutes of Limitations: The Facts2
For the most part no further factual submissions by a movant seeking summary judgment can eliminate factual disputes that have been established by the opponent’s submissions.3 Hence defendants’ current motion takes the position that even assuming the existence of securities law violations (that is, even assuming that any factual disputes on that score were to be resolved against defendants), plaintiffs have waited too long to assert their claims.
This action was filed on October 3, 1986. To determine whether limitations had run by then on the Section 12(2) claims under the several limited partnerships, it is necessary to set out the facts as to each.
COPCO-1 was offered for sale on April 1, 1983, with PPM-1 calling for a closing date of July 1, 1983. By the latter date only 16.5 of the 30 available units in COP-CO-1 had been purchased, subscribed to and accepted. Opinion at 849 & n. 8 explains the circumstances under which COP-[317] CO itself purchased the remaining units after July 1, 1983 (at a time when drilling had already begun and the first well had been completed), with the units then being offered for sale to limited partners until mid-September 1983. By September 17, 1983 at the latest all the plaintiffs who participated in COPCO-1 had entered into and funded their commitments to invest in that project, and those commitments had been accepted.
Plaintiffs quarrel with that sequence of events, contending that as a technical matter the terms of the limited partnership agreement (and therefore of the securities offering itself) were not complied with. Their arguments are really bogus, given plaintiffs’ total silence on that subject for more than seven years. Everyone (including plaintiffs) treated the purchases as having been consummated back then in 1983, and the money of plaintiffs and other investors was then used in the oil venture without any contention that COPCO-1 had no right to do so.4 Even on the facts most favorable to plaintiffs in reasonably arguable terms, the latest date for the completion of all the sales was in mid-September 1983.
As for COPCO-2, COPCO-3 and COP-CO-4, plaintiffs admit the factual assertions set out in D. 12(m) ¶¶ 6-9. That absence of any factual quarrel in those areas confirms that all the units in those three drilling program limited partnerships had been purchased before the end of 1984.
So much, then, for the times at which the statute-of-limitation clocks potentially began to tick on the several securities transactions. What remains is to set out the facts as to the date of plaintiffs’ realization — or perhaps their imputed realization — of the material misrepresentations or omissions that they have now ascribed to the PPMs.
D. 12(m) HU 10-53, set out in Appendix 1 to this opinion (which is the entire D. 12(m) without accompanying exhibits), accurately set out (with one minor exception) the extent of early knowledge and concerns on the part of the most knowledgeable investors: first-named plaintiff Terrence Dono-hoe (“Donohoe”) and Jack Elder (“Elder”), Clarence Sopko and Bernard Medvill.5 When the underbrush is cut away from the P. 12(n) response, it is plain that plaintiffs do not really contest the material factual assertions by defendants, instead making an argument that plaintiffs themselves frame in these terms (P. 12(n) at 2-3 (emphasis in original)):
As the Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, this case is now markedly different than when first filed. The remaining claim under § 12(2) attaches strict liability to any inclusion of a misrepresentation of a material fact in or any omission of a material fact from a prospectus. Much of the discovery taken by the parties — which addressed defendants’ fraudulent scheme and mismanagement of the partnership — is no longer relevant to plaintiffs’ § 12(2) claims. Unfortunately, much of this evidence— evidence that relates to defendants’ mismanagement of the partnership — has been cited by defendants in support of their argument that plaintiffs’ § 12(2) claims are time-barred.
[318] This Court’s Opinion dismissed some of the misrepresentations and omissions plaintiffs attributed to defendants. The misrepresentations of material fact in, and material omissions from the prospectuses that remain subsequent to this Court’s Opinion — and will not be repeated here — are the only issues to be resolved. Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff Donohoe knew about defendants’ mismanagement of the partnership in late 1984 and early 1985 may be relevant as to when the statute of limitations began as to plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims — but has no relevance as to plaintiffs’ § 12(2) securities claims.
When read in that context, defendants’ statement falls far short of establishing that Donohoe or the other plaintiffs discovered the untrue statements in or omissions from the prospectuses or should have discovered them by the exercise of reasonable diligence before October 3, 1985, one year before they filed their complaint.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[316] MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SHADUR, District Judge.
This Court’s lengthy April 10, 1990 memorandum opinion and order (the “Opinion,” 736 F.Supp. 845 1) disposed of, via summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 56, virtually all of the numerous claims asserted by 54 investors in one or more oil and gas limited partnerships. All that survived of this action was the claim brought under 15 U.S.C. § 77Z(2) (“Section 12(2),” referring to the internal section numbering of the Securities Act of 1933, the “1933 Act”). That statute, invoked in Count 4 of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, “attaches strict liability to any inclusion of an untrue statement of material fact or any omission of a material fact in a prospectus or oral communication used to offer or sell a security, so long as the plaintiff did not know of the untruth or omission” (Opinion at 876, citation omitted).
Section 12(2) alone remained in plaintiffs’ arsenal because that statute does not require a showing of intent to defraud on defendants’ part (a requirement on which other claims asserted by plaintiffs had foundered) and because material factual disputes remained as to alleged misstatements and omissions represented by the private placement memoranda (“PPMs”) for the oil ventures. Now, although plaintiffs and defendants have joined in approving a final pretrial order in preparation for trial, defendants have since moved for summary judgment on the surviving Section 12(2) claim and the parties have briefed that motion. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, the motion is granted and this action is dismissed in its entirety.
Statutes of Limitations: The Facts2
For the most part no further factual submissions by a movant seeking summary judgment can eliminate factual disputes that have been established by the opponent’s submissions.3 Hence defendants’ current motion takes the position that even assuming the existence of securities law violations (that is, even assuming that any factual disputes on that score were to be resolved against defendants), plaintiffs have waited too long to assert their claims.
This action was filed on October 3, 1986. To determine whether limitations had run by then on the Section 12(2) claims under the several limited partnerships, it is necessary to set out the facts as to each.
COPCO-1 was offered for sale on April 1, 1983, with PPM-1 calling for a closing date of July 1, 1983. By the latter date only 16.5 of the 30 available units in COP-CO-1 had been purchased, subscribed to and accepted. Opinion at 849 & n. 8 explains the circumstances under which COP-[317] CO itself purchased the remaining units after July 1, 1983 (at a time when drilling had already begun and the first well had been completed), with the units then being offered for sale to limited partners until mid-September 1983. By September 17, 1983 at the latest all the plaintiffs who participated in COPCO-1 had entered into and funded their commitments to invest in that project, and those commitments had been accepted.
Plaintiffs quarrel with that sequence of events, contending that as a technical matter the terms of the limited partnership agreement (and therefore of the securities offering itself) were not complied with. Their arguments are really bogus, given plaintiffs’ total silence on that subject for more than seven years. Everyone (including plaintiffs) treated the purchases as having been consummated back then in 1983, and the money of plaintiffs and other investors was then used in the oil venture without any contention that COPCO-1 had no right to do so.4 Even on the facts most favorable to plaintiffs in reasonably arguable terms, the latest date for the completion of all the sales was in mid-September 1983.
As for COPCO-2, COPCO-3 and COP-CO-4, plaintiffs admit the factual assertions set out in D. 12(m) ¶¶ 6-9. That absence of any factual quarrel in those areas confirms that all the units in those three drilling program limited partnerships had been purchased before the end of 1984.
So much, then, for the times at which the statute-of-limitation clocks potentially began to tick on the several securities transactions. What remains is to set out the facts as to the date of plaintiffs’ realization — or perhaps their imputed realization — of the material misrepresentations or omissions that they have now ascribed to the PPMs.
D. 12(m) HU 10-53, set out in Appendix 1 to this opinion (which is the entire D. 12(m) without accompanying exhibits), accurately set out (with one minor exception) the extent of early knowledge and concerns on the part of the most knowledgeable investors: first-named plaintiff Terrence Dono-hoe (“Donohoe”) and Jack Elder (“Elder”), Clarence Sopko and Bernard Medvill.5 When the underbrush is cut away from the P. 12(n) response, it is plain that plaintiffs do not really contest the material factual assertions by defendants, instead making an argument that plaintiffs themselves frame in these terms (P. 12(n) at 2-3 (emphasis in original)):
As the Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, this case is now markedly different than when first filed. The remaining claim under § 12(2) attaches strict liability to any inclusion of a misrepresentation of a material fact in or any omission of a material fact from a prospectus. Much of the discovery taken by the parties — which addressed defendants’ fraudulent scheme and mismanagement of the partnership — is no longer relevant to plaintiffs’ § 12(2) claims. Unfortunately, much of this evidence— evidence that relates to defendants’ mismanagement of the partnership — has been cited by defendants in support of their argument that plaintiffs’ § 12(2) claims are time-barred.
[318] This Court’s Opinion dismissed some of the misrepresentations and omissions plaintiffs attributed to defendants. The misrepresentations of material fact in, and material omissions from the prospectuses that remain subsequent to this Court’s Opinion — and will not be repeated here — are the only issues to be resolved. Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff Donohoe knew about defendants’ mismanagement of the partnership in late 1984 and early 1985 may be relevant as to when the statute of limitations began as to plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims — but has no relevance as to plaintiffs’ § 12(2) securities claims.
When read in that context, defendants’ statement falls far short of establishing that Donohoe or the other plaintiffs discovered the untrue statements in or omissions from the prospectuses or should have discovered them by the exercise of reasonable diligence before October 3, 1985, one year before they filed their complaint.
What plaintiffs argue again and again in their individual responses to defendants’ 12(m) statements is that the knowledge and concerns evidenced and articulated by Do-nohoe and other plaintiffs amounted only to knowledge or to inquiry-notice of post-sale mismanagement, and not of pre-sale misrepresentations or omissions. As the later discussion of legal principles in this opinion reflects, that is simply wrong. But again what is important for current purposes is that the relevant facts asserted by defendants are not really controverted.
Included among the material facts in this respect are these:
1. Donohoe’s statement at a November 1984 meeting with Interbanc employee Curtiss Bergquist (“Bergquist”) that “It seems to me that the people that have collected all this money had other intentions than drilling these wells” (Donohoe Dep. 1346);
2. Donohoe’s January 1985 statement to Bergquist and Stan Cole that “I believed the whole program was a fraud and that it was a stall tactic” (id. at 82);
3. Elder’s statements to Donohoe after their April 1985 inspection of the COPCO fields that “We’re screwed,” “We’ve been had” and “This thing is a sham. I can’t believe I was so stupid to invest in it” (id. at 274); and
4. most conclusive and damning, the entire transcript of the July 24, 1985 meeting of plaintiffs’ Concerned Investors Committee, which had previously been formed by Donohoe and which was convened for an airing of the investors’ investigations and serious concerns (D. 12(m) Ex. N, reproduced as Appendix 2 to this opinion).
Although that does not represent an exhaustive listing of all the evidence that demonstrates without contradiction the matters that were then known or believed by more than one of the plaintiffs (and that are ascribable to all the plaintiffs in “reasonable diligence” terms), those listed items suffice to enable this opinion to turn to the controlling law on the subject.
Statute of Limitations: The Law
Two separate limitations periods apply to Section 12(2) claims. One is the drop-dead provision of Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m:
In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created ... under section 77Z(2) [Section 12(2)] of this title more than three years after the sale.
On that score Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.1987) confirms the unequivocal bar created by that portion of Section 13 (“It was understood that the three-year rule was to be absolute”). But Section 13 also includes a discovery provision that kicks in earlier (emphasis added):
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 711(2) [Section 12(2)] of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should [319] have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence ....
Again Norris, 818 F.2d at 1384 (citations omitted) (more recently reconfirmed in Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Investment Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1544 (7th Cir.1990)) provides added intelligence, this time as to the application of the discovery principle:
The rule of law applicable to this case therefore is, as the district court concluded, that the time to file suit begins to run when the investor either knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered the facts on which the suit is based. The investor need not actually know the facts or appreciate their significance; the “could have discovered” branch of the test is objective. And whether the investor actually exercised diligence also is irrelevant. The question is not whether she did, but whether diligence would have paid off. Failure to be diligent is no excuse, as [Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. ] Angélos [, 815 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.1987) ] holds.
Only the investments in COPCO-1 (and not those in the later oil ventures) are potentially subject to the three-year absolute bar of Section 13. For the reasons already set out in this opinion’s factual discussion, the filing of this action on October 3, 1986 — more than three years after the September 15,1983 outside date for the sales of the COPCO-1 interests — was time-barred as to those investments alone.
But even were that not the case, all the COPCO-1 as well as the COPCO-2, COP-CO-3 and COPCO-4 investors unquestionably waited too long to file this lawsuit. When it comes to what the investors could have discovered “by the exercise of reasonable diligence”:
1.All the plaintiffs may fairly be charged with the knowledge or potential knowledge that is directly ascribable to Donohoe — they can scarcely challenge the notion that Donohoe’s actual investigative efforts represented the exercise of “reasonable diligence.”
2. All the plaintiffs may also fairly be charged with the knowledge of other fellow investors. And when any individual plaintiff reasonably expressed himself or herself, based on such knowledge, in terms that confirmed that plaintiff’s belief in defendants’ misconduct such as to demand further inquiry or investigation, all the plaintiffs must be held to that same duty to exercise “reasonable diligence.”
3. Not later than the time of the July 1985 meeting of the Concerned Investors Committee, all the plaintiffs had available to them the kind of information that unquestionably mandated such further investigation. It is necessary only to read the transcript of that meeting (Appendix 2 to this opinion) to see that.
4. It is simply wrong for plaintiffs to mischaracterize, as they persistently seek to do, the statements and beliefs of Donohoe (and of some other plaintiffs)— by labeling what Donohoe and those other plaintiffs perceived as defendants’ “fraud” and “sham” and “con” activities and wrongdoing, among other pejorative labels — as though such labels were somehow limited to post-sale mismanagement rather than also bearing upon pre-sale misrepresentations and omissions. If the legal test were limited to actual knowledge rather than extending to what could have been learned through reasonably diligent investigation, such an argument might — just might — be tenable. But people armed with Donohoe’s and others’ knowledge and concerns had to be hopeless myopes, or to don impermissibly narrow-focused blinders,7 not to pursue active inquiry into the subject of defendants’ misconduct in connection with the sale of securities that ultimately generat[320] ed the complaint in this action.8
What the evidence compels instead is the conclusion that one or more plaintiffs certainly knew enough to start the Section 12(2) clock ticking by the time of the July 1985 meeting if not sooner.9 Instead of bringing suit within the statutory one-year period thereafter, they chose a different course of action: They tried to salvage the drilling ventures through their own efforts during that year. They were of course free to do that, just as any other injured party may choose to let the statute of limitations lapse without pursuing his, her or its claim. But having done so — and there being no evidence or contention that they were lulled into such delay by defendants’ conduct10 — they must suffer the consequences of their own fatal delay.
It follows that all the investors’ claims under Section 12(2) — whether stemming from their investments in COPCO-1, COP-CO-2, COPCO-3 or COPCO-4 — are barred by the one-year discovery provision of Section 13. It is therefore unnecessary to address the open factual issues that were identified in the Opinion, which have been rendered non-material (that is, non-outcome-determinative) by the untimeliness of this lawsuit.
Conclusion
Before today’s ruling, only one arrow shaft remained in plaintiffs’ litigation quiver — their Count 4 claim under Section 12(2). But on analysis it turns out that there are no genuine issues of material fact on that claim either, so that defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on that claim as well — the expiration of the statute of limitations has caused the remaining potential arrow to have no point (in the legal sense). Accordingly Count 4 and this action itself are dismissed with prejudice.
APPENDIX I
DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
NOW COME defendants Consolidated Operating and Production Corporation (“COPCO”), Jack Nortman (“NORTMAN”) and Morando Berrettini (“BERRETTINI”), by and through their attorneys Douglas P. Roller and Rooks, Pitts and Poust and pursuant to Rule 12(1), Local Rules for the Northern District of Illinois, present their statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue.
1. Each of the plaintiffs are among investors who purchased units or portions of units in one or more limited partnerships described by plaintiffs as COPCO Drilling Program 1983-1 (“COPCO 1”), COPCO Developmental Drilling Program 1983-2 (“COPCO 2”) COPCO Developmental Drill[321] ing Program 1983-3 (“COPCO 3”), and COPCO Developmental Drilling Program 1984 (“COPCO 4”) [Complaint, para. 4 and Exhibit A attached thereto].
2. Each of the programs were offered through a Private Placement Memorandum (hereinafter PPM-1, PPM-2, PPM-3, PPM-4 respectively).
3. COPCO 1 was offered for sale on April 1, 1983 (PPM-1, p. 2, attached hereto as Exhibit A).