Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Production Corp.

763 F. Supp. 315, 114 Oil & Gas Rep. 199, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4093, 1991 WL 63454
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 28, 1991
DocketNo. 86 C 7543
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 763 F. Supp. 315 (Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Production Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Production Corp., 763 F. Supp. 315, 114 Oil & Gas Rep. 199, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4093, 1991 WL 63454 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

Opinion

[316]*316MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHADUR, District Judge.

This Court’s lengthy April 10, 1990 memorandum opinion and order (the “Opinion,” 736 F.Supp. 845 1) disposed of, via summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 56, virtually all of the numerous claims asserted by 54 investors in one or more oil and gas limited partnerships. All that survived of this action was the claim brought under 15 U.S.C. § 77Z(2) (“Section 12(2),” referring to the internal section numbering of the Securities Act of 1933, the “1933 Act”). That statute, invoked in Count 4 of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, “attaches strict liability to any inclusion of an untrue statement of material fact or any omission of a material fact in a prospectus or oral communication used to offer or sell a security, so long as the plaintiff did not know of the untruth or omission” (Opinion at 876, citation omitted).

Section 12(2) alone remained in plaintiffs’ arsenal because that statute does not require a showing of intent to defraud on defendants’ part (a requirement on which other claims asserted by plaintiffs had foundered) and because material factual disputes remained as to alleged misstatements and omissions represented by the private placement memoranda (“PPMs”) for the oil ventures. Now, although plaintiffs and defendants have joined in approving a final pretrial order in preparation for trial, defendants have since moved for summary judgment on the surviving Section 12(2) claim and the parties have briefed that motion. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, the motion is granted and this action is dismissed in its entirety.

Statutes of Limitations: The Facts2

For the most part no further factual submissions by a movant seeking summary judgment can eliminate factual disputes that have been established by the opponent’s submissions.3 Hence defendants’ current motion takes the position that even assuming the existence of securities law violations (that is, even assuming that any factual disputes on that score were to be resolved against defendants), plaintiffs have waited too long to assert their claims.

This action was filed on October 3, 1986. To determine whether limitations had run by then on the Section 12(2) claims under the several limited partnerships, it is necessary to set out the facts as to each.

COPCO-1 was offered for sale on April 1, 1983, with PPM-1 calling for a closing date of July 1, 1983. By the latter date only 16.5 of the 30 available units in COP-CO-1 had been purchased, subscribed to and accepted. Opinion at 849 & n. 8 explains the circumstances under which COP-[317]*317CO itself purchased the remaining units after July 1, 1983 (at a time when drilling had already begun and the first well had been completed), with the units then being offered for sale to limited partners until mid-September 1983. By September 17, 1983 at the latest all the plaintiffs who participated in COPCO-1 had entered into and funded their commitments to invest in that project, and those commitments had been accepted.

Plaintiffs quarrel with that sequence of events, contending that as a technical matter the terms of the limited partnership agreement (and therefore of the securities offering itself) were not complied with. Their arguments are really bogus, given plaintiffs’ total silence on that subject for more than seven years. Everyone (including plaintiffs) treated the purchases as having been consummated back then in 1983, and the money of plaintiffs and other investors was then used in the oil venture without any contention that COPCO-1 had no right to do so.4 Even on the facts most favorable to plaintiffs in reasonably arguable terms, the latest date for the completion of all the sales was in mid-September 1983.

As for COPCO-2, COPCO-3 and COP-CO-4, plaintiffs admit the factual assertions set out in D. 12(m) ¶¶ 6-9. That absence of any factual quarrel in those areas confirms that all the units in those three drilling program limited partnerships had been purchased before the end of 1984.

So much, then, for the times at which the statute-of-limitation clocks potentially began to tick on the several securities transactions. What remains is to set out the facts as to the date of plaintiffs’ realization — or perhaps their imputed realization — of the material misrepresentations or omissions that they have now ascribed to the PPMs.

D. 12(m) HU 10-53, set out in Appendix 1 to this opinion (which is the entire D. 12(m) without accompanying exhibits), accurately set out (with one minor exception) the extent of early knowledge and concerns on the part of the most knowledgeable investors: first-named plaintiff Terrence Dono-hoe (“Donohoe”) and Jack Elder (“Elder”), Clarence Sopko and Bernard Medvill.5 When the underbrush is cut away from the P. 12(n) response, it is plain that plaintiffs do not really contest the material factual assertions by defendants, instead making an argument that plaintiffs themselves frame in these terms (P. 12(n) at 2-3 (emphasis in original)):

As the Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, this case is now markedly different than when first filed. The remaining claim under § 12(2) attaches strict liability to any inclusion of a misrepresentation of a material fact in or any omission of a material fact from a prospectus. Much of the discovery taken by the parties — which addressed defendants’ fraudulent scheme and mismanagement of the partnership — is no longer relevant to plaintiffs’ § 12(2) claims. Unfortunately, much of this evidence— evidence that relates to defendants’ mismanagement of the partnership — has been cited by defendants in support of their argument that plaintiffs’ § 12(2) claims are time-barred.
[318]*318This Court’s Opinion dismissed some of the misrepresentations and omissions plaintiffs attributed to defendants. The misrepresentations of material fact in, and material omissions from the prospectuses that remain subsequent to this Court’s Opinion — and will not be repeated here — are the only issues to be resolved. Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff Donohoe knew about defendants’ mismanagement of the partnership in late 1984 and early 1985 may be relevant as to when the statute of limitations began as to plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims — but has no relevance as to plaintiffs’ § 12(2) securities claims.
When read in that context, defendants’ statement falls far short of establishing that Donohoe or the other plaintiffs discovered the untrue statements in or omissions from the prospectuses or should have discovered them by the exercise of reasonable diligence before October 3, 1985, one year before they filed their complaint.

What plaintiffs argue again and again in their individual responses to defendants’ 12(m) statements is that the knowledge and concerns evidenced and articulated by Do-nohoe and other plaintiffs amounted only to knowledge or to inquiry-notice of post-sale mismanagement, and not of pre-sale misrepresentations or omissions. As the later discussion of legal principles in this opinion reflects, that is simply wrong. But again what is important for current purposes is that the relevant facts

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Related

Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Production Corp.
30 F.3d 907 (Seventh Circuit, 1994)
Rolo v. City Investing Co.
845 F. Supp. 182 (D. New Jersey, 1993)
Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Production Corp.
833 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
763 F. Supp. 315, 114 Oil & Gas Rep. 199, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4093, 1991 WL 63454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donohoe-v-consolidated-operating-production-corp-ilnd-1991.