Donna Kara v. Robert Stone

689 F. App'x 562

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2017
• Docket: 15-15650
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Joseph Eugene Piovo, through personal representatives Ariel Barel and Donna Kara, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing Piovo’s action alleging a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Piovo’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Piovo did not present a federal question on the face of his amended complaint. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998) (plaintiff must present a federal question on the face of a properly pleaded complaint); see also Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Piovo’s action without granting further leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant leave to amend).

We reject as unsupported by the record Piovo’s contentions that the district court was biased, faded to comply with court rules, erred in staying discovery, held Pio-vo’s pleadings to an improper standard, or otherwise erred in its analysis of Piovo’s pleadings.

Piovo’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.

Piovo’s motion to strike (Docket' Entry No. 59) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.