Donald W. Sanders v. St. Louis, Missouri U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Trust Fund

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedDecember 17, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00132
StatusUnknown

This text of Donald W. Sanders v. St. Louis, Missouri U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Trust Fund (Donald W. Sanders v. St. Louis, Missouri U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Trust Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donald W. Sanders v. St. Louis, Missouri U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Trust Fund, (E.D. Mo. 2025).

Opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

DONALD W. SANDERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00132-SNLJ ) ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI U.S. ATTORNEY’S ) OFFICE and FEDERAL BUREAU OF ) PRISONS INMATE TRUST FUND, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Self-represented Plaintiff Donald W. Sanders brings this civil action seeking an Order from the Court directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons to “unencumber” his inmate trust fund. [Doc. 1]. The matter is now before the Court upon the motion of Plaintiff for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or without prepayment of the required filing fees and costs. [Doc. 2]. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion and assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). As Plaintiff is now proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on such review, the Court will dismiss the complaint for frivolity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Initial Partial Filing Fee Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six- monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s

account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. Plaintiff is a federal prisoner, incarcerated at the Beaumont Medium Federal Correctional Institution in Texas. [Doc. 2 at 1]. According to his motion to proceed without prepaying fees and costs, Plaintiff states that he receives money from family and friends each month in an amount “up to 100 dollars.” At the timing of filing, Plaintiff had $30 in his inmate account. [Id. at 2]. Despite informing the Court in August 2025 that he was awaiting a copy of his prison inmate trust fund statement, Plaintiff has not filed such statement in support of his motion. [Id.

at 1]. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee. Based on the financial information Plaintiff has submitted, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances.”). If Plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his claim. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well- pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the

district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits the claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must

demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The Complaint Plaintiff is a federal prisoner seeking declaratory judgment—specifically, Plaintiff requests an Order from the Court directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to “unencumber” his inmate trust fund account. [Doc. 1 at 1, 7]. As explained by Plaintiff in his

complaint and verified by Court records, Plaintiff was sentenced by this Court in February 2005 to 33 months in FBOP custody and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $73, 352.14. [Id. at 5]; see also United States v. Sanders, No. 4:04-cr-483-JCH, Doc. 21 (E.D. Mo.). Sometime Plaintiff’s inmate account at the county jail where he was detained. [Id.] When Plaintiff was

later transferred to a FBOP facility, the money was moved to his FBOP trust fund. According to Plaintiff, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in St. Louis, Missouri then sent a letter to the FBOP to “encumber” his trust fund in the amount of $1,031.31, stating that he had a “significant amount” of money and that it should be used to pay down his restitution. [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff states that the U.S. Attorney’s Office said it would be seeking a court order, but that they never did, and that this encumbrance has been going on for four and one-half years. However, Plaintiff also states that he did file an objection to the government’s request to the use the stimulus money towards his restitution, and that he never received a response. [Id.] Plaintiff asserts that the encumbrance on his trust account has caused him and his family

hardship, and he asks the Court to issue an Order removing it. [Id. at 6-7].

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Donald W. Sanders v. St. Louis, Missouri U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Trust Fund, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donald-w-sanders-v-st-louis-missouri-us-attorneys-office-and-federal-moed-2025.