Donald R. Huston v. A. Mardesich, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedNovember 24, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-02203
StatusUnknown

This text of Donald R. Huston v. A. Mardesich, et al. (Donald R. Huston v. A. Mardesich, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donald R. Huston v. A. Mardesich, et al., (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 MGD 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Donald R. Huston, No. CV-23-02203-PHX-JAT (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 A. Mardesich, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Donald R. Huston, who is currently confined in the Central Arizona 16 Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility (CACRF), brought this pro se civil rights action 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding the alleged lack of treatment for a detached retina. 18 Defendant Mardesich moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 46.) Plaintiff was informed of 19 his rights and obligations to respond pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th 20 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Doc. 49), and he opposes the Motion. (Doc. 66.) 21 I. Background 22 On screening the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that 23 Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment medical care claim in Count One against Defendant 24 Health Service Administrator (HSA) A. Mardesich in her individual capacity based on the 25 allegation that Defendant instituted policies that delayed Plaintiff from receiving healthcare 26 and led to blindness in one eye. (Doc. 5.) The Court directed Defendant to answer the 27 claim and dismissed the remaining claim and defendant. (Id.) 28 1 II. Legal Standards 2 A. Summary Judgment Standard 3 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 4 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 6 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 7 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 8 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 9 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 10 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 11 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 12 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 13 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 14 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 15 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 16 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 17 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 18 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 19 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 20 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 21 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 22 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 23 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 24 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 25 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 26 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 27 B. Eighth Amendment 28 To support a medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must 1 demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 2 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are 3 two prongs to the deliberate-indifference analysis: an objective standard and a subjective 4 standard. First, a prisoner must show a “serious medical need.” Id. (citations omitted). A 5 “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 6 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin 7 v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX 8 Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citation 9 omitted). Indications that a prisoner has a serious medical need include “[t]he existence of 10 an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment 11 or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s 12 daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1059–60. 13 Second, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s response to that need was 14 deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. “Prison officials are deliberately 15 indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally 16 interfere with medical treatment.’” Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 17 1990) (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988)). Deliberate 18 indifference may also be shown where prison officials fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain 19 or possible medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. “In deciding whether there has been 20 deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs, [courts] need not defer to the 21 judgment of prison doctors or administrators.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 22 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989)). 23 Even if deliberate indifference is shown, to support an Eighth Amendment claim, 24 the prisoner must demonstrate harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see 25 Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200 (delay in providing medical treatment does not constitute Eighth 26 Amendment violation unless delay was harmful). 27 28 1 III. Facts1 2 CACRF is a private prison in Florence, Arizona, operated under contract with the 3 Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry (ADCRR) by GEO Secure 4 Services (GEO). (Doc. 47 (Def.’s Statement of Facts (DSOF)) ¶¶ 1, 3.) At the time 5 relevant to the Complaint, Defendant was employed as a medical services provider and 6 HSA for GEO. (Id. ¶ 3.) 7 On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff saw an outside provider, Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
Donald R. Huston v. A. Mardesich, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donald-r-huston-v-a-mardesich-et-al-azd-2025.