DONALD EDWARD BLOOM, DEBORAH JANE BLOOM, and JOHN W. MOORE and v. JIGLIOTTI FAMILY TRUST And

Opinion

2026 WL 2358803

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

DONALD EDWARD BLOOM, DEBORAH JANE BLOOM, and JOHN W. MOORE, Appellants and Cross-Appellees,

v.

JIGLIOTTI FAMILY TRUST, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Supreme Court Nos. S-18965, S-19085

August 14, 2026

Superior Court No. 3PA-12-02262 CI

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, John C. Cagle, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Donald Edward Bloom, pro se, Willow, Deborah Jane Bloom, pro se, Willow, and John W. Moore, pro se, Willow, for Appellants and Cross-Appellees. Brian Duffy, Law Office of Brian T. Duffy, Anchorage, for Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices.

OPINION

ORAVEC, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Star page 1*1 A family trust owned property reachable by an access trail that crosses parcels owned by others. After a period of time and opposition by the parcel owners, the family trust filed a quiet title action. Although the trial court recognized the validity of the license granting access, it determined that the resulting easement was partially extinguished by prescription because the parcel owners had blocked the access trail. The family trust appealed. We affirmed the trial court but remanded for entry of final judgment.

On remand, over the parcel owners’ objection, the trial court entered a judgment granting the family trust access to its property via a route that bypassed the prescription. However, the court denied an award of attorney's fees to the family trust. The parcel owners now appeal, arguing that the easement described in the judgment quieting title was erroneous. The trust cross-appeals, arguing that it was the prevailing party and therefore the superior court erred when it denied its motion for attorney's fees.

We vacate the final judgment because it is inconsistent with the superior court's previous findings that the historical access easement was partially extinguished. We affirm the superior court in all remaining respects.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Background Facts Of Dispute

Henry Jones and Joseph Reid owned undeveloped property in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough.¹ In 1966, Jones and Reid entered into an agreement allowing Jones to construct a highway over Reid's land.² The license provided that if Reid ever sold his land, the sale would be “subject to the license.”³ At some time in early 1970, Jigliotti purchased Jones’ property; eventually, this property was transferred to the Jigliotti Family Trust (“the Trust”).⁴ Donald and Deborah Bloom (“Bloom”)⁵ purchased Reid's property in 1994, living in the cabin on the property; in mid- to late-1996, Bloom began construction of a home directly on the access trail leading to the Trust property.⁶ Bloom made permanent and expensive improvements, building a shop, clearing land around the access trail, and installing water, greywater, and sewer lines under the access trail.⁷

Bloom and the Jigliottis first encountered one another sometime in the mid-1990s. During one incident, Donald Bloom informed the family that they could not drive through Bloom's yard to continue along the access trail; instead, he permitted the group to park their car near the Bloom cabin and the group proceeded to the Jigliotti property on foot. There was a similar incident in the late 1990s, when the family saw that Bloom's home had been built on the access trail, and again, the Jigliottis walked to their property rather than driving on the access trail through Bloom's land. By 2011, the Jigliottis “decided to use the section-line easement [to access their property] because they knew about the issues passing through the Bloom property.” Later, when leaving the Jigliotti property by use of the access trail, Jigliotti family members and a real estate agent encountered Deborah Bloom, who asked what they were doing on the property. This pattern of confrontation continued thereafter.⁸

B. Proceedings

1. Trial and first appeal⁹

Star page 2*2 In 2012, the Trust filed a quiet title action in the superior court to confirm its right to use the access trail that crossed Bloom's property.¹⁰ The Trust alleged its access rights were granted by the 1966 license entered into by the original parcel owners. At trial, the Trust argued that “the access road serves as the only access to the property, the license agreement between the properties’ original owners is valid, and [Bloom] did not show that the access road easement was extinguished by prescription.” The Trust also contended that the easement was required because otherwise, it could not access its property. Bloom objected to the Trust's use of the easement, arguing that the easement grant was invalid; alternatively, if the grant was valid, it had been extinguished by prescription due to the Trust's failure to assert its rights over several decades.

The superior court granted partial summary judgment, confirming the validity of the 1966 license agreement, and determining it created an easement appurtenant for ingress and egress to the Trust property. However, after trial, the court found that the Trust's claim was barred by laches due to the Trust's unreasonable delay in asserting its rights to the easement. In the alternative, the superior court found that the Blooms had “partially extinguished the access road easement through prescription ... by building their home, out buildings, and ... other improvements on the easement.”¹¹ The court found that although the easement still ran through portions of the Bloom property, “it was extinguished once it reached ‘the cleared portion of the Blooms’ property ... not ... less than 25 feet from their house.’ ”¹²

The court also addressed the Trust's argument that it was entitled to an easement by necessity, because without the access trail, it would not be able to access its property.¹³ However, in addition to the access trail, there was a section-line easement that provided an alternative route for accessing the Trust property, and the Trust had not obtained or attempted to apply for the permits necessary to construct an access road there.¹⁴ Accordingly, the court found the argument premature and dismissed that claim without prejudice.¹⁵

The court dismissed the case at the conclusion of its findings of fact and conclusions of law. On reconsideration, the Trust requested permission to submit a proposed final judgment that affirmed the validity of the 1966 license up to the point of prescription, but no final judgment was issued.¹⁶

The Trust appealed,¹⁷ arguing that its easement was not barred by laches, that its easement was not partially extinguished by prescription, and that it was entitled to a final judgment.¹⁸ We declined to address the Trust's arguments about laches and contended instead with the superior court's findings on the merits that the easement was extinguished by prescription.¹⁹ Although we noted that there was “little evidence of the house's exact placement,” we held that the findings of fact supported the “conclusion that the easement to the access road was extinguished by prescription at the edge of the Blooms’ driveway.”²⁰

We also addressed the Trust's argument that it was entitled to a final judgment establishing the validity of the easement up to its prescription. We agreed that the parties were entitled to a judgment quieting title in accordance with the superior court's findings. We remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the superior court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.²¹

2. Proceedings on remand

Star page 3*3 On remand, the superior court instructed the Trust to submit a proposed final judgment. Bloom then filed a motion requesting that Bloom be permitted to submit a proposed final judgment; in the same motion, Bloom argued that Bloom was the prevailing party. The Trust filed a consolidated opposition to both motions, emphasizing that its proposed final judgment explicitly located the easement more than 25 feet from Bloom's house, in compliance with the superior court's findings affirmed by this court. This proposed final judgment attached as exhibits an easement description and easement map; neither of these attachments reflected a prescription of the easement. The Trust also filed a motion for entry of proposed judgment quieting title.

In response, Bloom primarily argued that the Trust's proposed easement would create a “new un-litigated route not identified in trial.” Bloom also opposed the Trust's motion for entry of proposed judgment quieting title, repeating the argument that the proposed easement location was not litigated. The superior court found that oral argument would be the appropriate means to address Bloom's objections.

Oral argument was held in June and November 2022. At the first day of oral argument, Bloom reiterated that the Trust's proposed judgment reflected an “unlitigated easement” that Bloom “never had a chance to defend against [ ].” In Bloom's view, the Trust had “argued vigorously ... for the specific location of that access way to be going over in between our house and our woodshed over our water line properties” but then submitted a proposed judgment that did not align with “the specific location that [the court] ruled was [ ] partially ended by prescription down to where it meets with our curtilage.” The court then ordered Bloom to file a proposed judgment. The proposed final judgment that Bloom submitted, if accepted, would have invalidated the 1966 license and partially set aside the original summary judgment order finding the license to be valid.

The court held the second day of oral argument to resolve the issue of where the easement should be placed and why the Trust proposed its particular location in the proposed final judgment.²² There, the Trust explained “that this access way was always under the license by the agreement from 1960, but it had taken [ ] different routes. So, that is what we're doing now is establishing a definite route that we don't have to argue about ... [T]here's plenty of room for the access road and staying further than 25 feet from the house.”

In its April 23, 2023, order on post-appeal pending motions, the superior court found that the proposed judgment submitted by the Trust was “most in line with the court's order on summary judgment upholding the validity of the license.” It reasoned that the superior court in the first trial “noted that the easement was extinguished in an area ‘limited to the Blooms’ house, outbuildings, and immediate surrounding area.’ ” That is, “the easement [was] terminated by prescription only where the Blooms’ house sits and a reasonable area around their house that shall be considered a driveway.” The court appeared to describe the prescription, in part, noting that “the cleared portion of the Blooms’ property up to their house shall be considered their ‘driveway’ and shall not be less than 25 feet from their house.”²³ The superior court dismissed several of Bloom's motions concerning the validity of the license, reasoning that this matter had already been litigated and affirmed by this court. The superior court then entered a judgment quieting title, determining the easement would pass by Bloom's house, but “[the easement] shall not be less than 25 feet from their house.”

3. Motions after entry of judgment to quiet title

Star page 4*4 On May 2, 2023, Bloom timely filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the superior court's decisions to reject their arguments about the validity of the license when issuing its order quieting title; the motion was denied June 1.²⁴ Also in May, the Trust filed a motion for attorney's fees. On July 14, Bloom then filed a motion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(1) and (6), and 77(b)(4) seeking relief from the judgment quieting title. This motion argued that the easement approved by the court presumed access through the Bloom property was necessary, but that there was a section line easement which rendered the approved easement unnecessary for access, and that the Trust did not explore permitting of the section line easement. The motion also argued that the license inappropriately established a public highway on private land.

The superior court issued an omnibus order on the pending motions following its entry of final judgment quieting title. As to attorney's fees, the court referenced an earlier motion for attorney's fees filed before the first appeal, and explained that the current motion was “a renewed motion for fees which in part have previously been denied.” However, the court also found that the Trust had prevailed on a portion of the matter, but not all of the matter, and denied an award of attorney's fees on that basis. The court also denied Bloom's motion for relief, reasoning that “the judgment entered was appropriate and within the bounds of the court's earlier findings and the Supreme Court's order.” The court found that the time for appeal of the order, the judgment quieting title, and the denial of motions for reconsideration began with the distribution of the omnibus order, on September 18, 2023.

Bloom then filed a request for judicial notice that the easement directly affected Borough-owned land, alleging that the easement was in violation of Matanuska-Susitna Borough ordinances. The request for judicial notice was denied by the superior court.

On October 2, the Trust filed a motion for reconsideration of the omnibus order finding that they were not the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees. The Trust also argued that the timelines set in the omnibus order for appeal were incorrect and “in direct conflict” with the “Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 204(a)(1) and (3).” This motion was denied.²⁵

In January 2024, Bloom filed a motion for extension of time to file an appeal. The motion was granted, and Bloom now appeals the final judgment quieting title and the omnibus order denying post-judgment motions. The Trust cross-appeals, arguing that it was the prevailing party in the litigation and entitled to attorney's fees.

III. DISCUSSION

In the appeal and cross-appeal, the parties set forth disparate arguments.²⁶ Bloom argues that the 1966 license is invalid, that the superior court should have taken judicial notice of Matanuska-Susitna Borough ordinances and codes, and that the final judgment in this case did not comport with our decision on remand. On cross-appeal, the Trust argues that Bloom did not file a timely appeal in this case, and that the superior court erred when it did not award attorney's fees to the Trust under Rule 82.

Star page 5*5 We will first address the timeliness of the appeal, the validity of the license, and Bloom's request for judicial notice about borough ordinances and codes. We will then address whether entry of judgment in the case after remand was proper. Finally, we will address the issue of attorney's fees.

A. We Granted Leave To File A Late Appeal And Will Consider Its Merits.

Whether a party timely filed its appeal is a question of law that we review de novo, using our independent judgment and adopting “the rule of law which is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”²⁷ Appellate Rule 204(a)(1) requires a party to file notice of an appeal within 30 days from the date of distribution of the judgment. Nonetheless, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, a motion to alter or amend findings of fact, or a motion to alter or amend the judgment will terminate the “running of time for filing an appeal.”²⁸ Further, under Appellate Rule 502(b)(2), the court may “validate an act done after the expiration of the time period” upon a showing of good cause. “And we may relax procedural requirements for pro se litigants in situations that do not involve gross neglect or bad faith.”²⁹

The issue of whether this appeal should be heard was resolved in January 2024, after Bloom filed a motion for a 60-day extension of time to file an appeal of the judgment quieting title and other post-appeal orders. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum and affidavit that described in detail serious medical and personal issues that prevented a timely filing. The opposition to this motion was due January 26, 2024, but no opposition was filed. Appellants’ motion for extension of time to file the appeal was then granted.

The Trust later filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal was filed late. This motion was denied as well. The Trust's cross-appeal brief is its third attempt to argue to this court that the appeal is untimely, and we reject this attempt as well.

Our review of the timeline in this case does not support a conclusion that Bloom acted in bad faith or filed late due to neglect. Bloom's initial motion seeking more time to file an appeal presented good cause for the requested delay and was supported by documentation. Although we have declined to extend leniency where a self-represented litigant's procedural failures stem from gross neglect,³⁰ Bloom's conduct here is distinguishable. We have previously noted “that the law favors deciding cases on their merits.”³¹ In light of Bloom's vigorous participation in the case reflecting an intent to appeal, self-represented status, personal issues that provided good cause for delay, and the Trust's failure to oppose the motion for extension of time to file a late appeal, we will consider the appeal on its merits.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err When It Dismissed Bloom's Motions Concerning The Validity Of The 1966 License.

Star page 6*6 Bloom contends that the superior court erred when it did not consider and favorably resolve arguments about the validity of the original 1966 license giving access to the Trust property. The superior court's omnibus order addressed Bloom's arguments, but found that arguments about the validity of the 1966 license were a “collateral attack on the court's [previous] Summary Judgment affirming the license,” and that such arguments “are barred by res judicata and the law of the case doctrine.” On appeal, Bloom reasserts arguments about the validity of the license but does not address the superior court's determination that arguments against the 1966 license are barred by the law of the case.

We apply de novo review to questions of whether the superior court correctly determined that a claim is barred by res judicata or the law of the case doctrine, although we will review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to decline to apply law of the case in extraordinary circumstances.³² We affirm the superior court's resolution of Bloom's arguments on the basis of law of the case.³³

Before the first appeal in this case, the superior court granted partial summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that the 1966 license was valid.³⁴ The Trust appealed other aspects of the superior court's findings and conclusions, but Bloom did not appeal the finding that the license was valid. When we decided the merits of the Trust's appeal, we affirmed the superior court and did not disturb its findings of fact and conclusions of law.³⁵ And although we remanded the case to the superior court for entry of judgment, we did not remand for reconsideration of the merits of the 1966 license.³⁶ Nonetheless, on remand, Bloom argued that the 1966 license was invalid, because the license appeared to establish an inappropriate public highway on private property. These arguments were a direct challenge to the superior court's previous finding that the license created a valid easement appurtenant.

Star page 7*7 The law of the case doctrine is a rule of judicial economy that bars relitigation of issues that were previously decided.³⁷ The doctrine “applies not only to issues explicitly addressed and decided in a prior appeal but also to issues directly involved with or necessarily inhering in a prior appellate decision as well as issues that could have been part of a prior appeal but were not.”³⁸ Here, the validity of the 1966 license was established in the initial proceeding and was integral to the superior court's holding — which was then affirmed on appeal — that the license established an easement that had been prescribed.³⁹ In the initial proceeding, Bloom did not make an argument that the license established an inappropriate public highway over private land. For that proposition now, Bloom does not point to developments in the law but to longstanding or inapplicable statutes and case law.⁴⁰ Nothing precluded Bloom from addressing these concerns in the initial proceeding, when the court considered the validity of the license.

Because the superior court determined the license's validity in the initial proceeding, and in the absence of extraordinary developments in the law that would justify reopening of the issues, the court did not err or abuse its discretion when it applied the law of the case doctrine and declined to reopen the issue on remand. We affirm the superior court.

C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Bloom's Request For Judicial Notice Of Documents Indicating That The Easement Directly Affected Borough-Owned Land.

The Matanuska-Susitna Borough was a named party to this case, but was dismissed from the litigation.⁴¹ Bloom argues now that it was error for the superior court to refuse to take judicial notice of several Matanuska-Susitna Borough codes, manuals, and other documents because those materials impact the use of Borough land. The basis for this purported error appears to be that the Borough should have somehow been involved in the use of its property because the access trail may be located on Borough land. The Trust opposes this argument, contending that whether the Borough should have participated is an issue for the Borough, not Bloom, to determine.

It is unclear whether Bloom intends to argue that the superior court should have taken judicial notice of the law, or whether Bloom sought more active participation by the Borough. Generally, we leave to the discretion of the trial court whether to take judicial notice, and will only reverse upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion and prejudice.⁴² Bloom has raised no prejudice argument on appeal. Because the matters on remand were limited — and in the absence of a cogent argument about prejudice — we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to take judicial notice of borough codes, manuals, and documents. To the extent Bloom argues the Borough should have participated in the case, the Borough was dismissed from this case before the first appeal,⁴³ and in the absence of more thorough briefing, we consider this argument waived.⁴⁴

D. The Final Judgment Is Not Consistent With The Mandate On Remand.

Star page 8*8 We now turn to the gravamen of this appeal: whether the superior court entered judgment consistent with our remand for that purpose. Whether the superior court “correctly applied our mandate on remand” is a question we review de novo.⁴⁵

In the first appeal, we affirmed the superior court's findings that: (1) the 1966 license created an easement appurtenant through the Bloom and Moore parcels to access the Trust property; (2) the easement was partially extinguished at the Bloom driveway's edge, which included the cleared portion of Bloom's property and could be no less than 25 feet from the Bloom house; and (3) the prescription included immovable outbuildings but not temporary structures.⁴⁶ What remains for our consideration, then, is whether the judgment entered properly reflects these findings. Put differently, did the judgment and related easement reflect the location of the easement up to the point the easement was extinguished by the location of Bloom's home and curtilage?

Bloom has two principal arguments. First, Bloom argues that the adopted easement presents access that is too wide in scope. Bloom's second argument regards the location of the easement as depicted on the judgment. Bloom contends that this was not a faithful adoption of the access established by the 1966 license but instead reflects a new or alternative route. Bloom argues that instead of adopting an easement that reflects the historic location of the easement up to the curtilage of their home, the court adopted a new route for the easement so that access would bypass the prescription. And Bloom complains that the final judgment adopts an easement different than the route for which the Trust advocated during trial. The Trust disputes this, and asserts that the final route is supported by the superior court's decisions on summary judgment, the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and our directive on remand.

As to Bloom's argument about the width of the easement, the original license did not define the width of the easement for ingress and egress. “ ‘[W]here the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the instrument the easement is specific and definite,’ and its terms control.”⁴⁷ However, where the easement is silent on an issue, the court may supply reasonable terms to fulfill the parties’ expectations.⁴⁸ In doing so, the court may establish a term that is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the easement.⁴⁹

Bloom argues that, when the court established the width of the access trail, it erroneously considered the standard minimum width of a highway under state law.⁵⁰ Bloom further argues that because a highway is established across public lands, the court should not have considered highway standards in establishing access over private lands. Yet Bloom acknowledges that public highways must have a minimum width of 100 feet,⁵¹ and the superior court established an access trail that is 60 feet wide. Bloom does not argue that an easement that is 60 feet wide is unreasonable or that an easement of that width is not reasonably necessary for the Trust's enjoyment of its rights. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the width of this easement.⁵²

Star page 9*9 Turning now to Bloom's arguments about the location of the access trail, we examine the superior court's final judgment and approved easement. The judgment reflects two easement descriptions and two associated plats. The first plat pertains to Moore's property. The second plat pertains to Bloom's property and reflects the words “Bloom residence,” but the Bloom home and curtilage is not otherwise identified or depicted by lines or other boundaries and appears to be considerably westward from the location of the easement. That is, it appears that the easement is not close to the area suggested for Bloom's house and curtilage.

In Reeves v. Godspeed Properties, LLC, we considered the partial termination of an easement due to the operation of a gold mine. ⁵³ There, we concluded that the easement was terminated “only where the gold plant sat. This means that the easement still exists in some form for its entire length but that part of it is narrower in width because of the gold plant's obstruction.”⁵⁴ Although the superior court had found that at least half the width of the easement was terminated by prescription, the only evidence of the location of the gold mine was aerial photographs and those did not depict the gold mine extending into the easement; we held that the finding of a prescriptive easement was clearly erroneous.⁵⁵

In this case, we previously affirmed that the Trust held an easement appurtenant, that the easement had been partially extinguished by prescription, and that prescription was bounded by the location of the Bloom home and curtilage where it interrupted the existing access trail.⁵⁶ On remand, we intended for the superior court to enter a judgment that reflected both the location of the historical easement and the point at which that easement was extinguished by Bloom's home and curtilage.⁵⁷ However, the easement attached to the final judgment neither established the historical access trail nor the location of the Bloom home and curtilage. Instead, the final judgment reflects a fully authorized access trail with no prescription whatsoever, which cannot be the case given the superior court's previous findings. Indeed, the Trust openly acknowledged that the historical access trail was a “different route” and the proposed easement established a “definite route that we don't have to argue about.”

When a prescriptive easement is established, defining the scope of the easement is important to give notice about what a landowner should expect to lose for failing to interrupt the prescriptive use.⁵⁸ This principle of notice is equally important when describing easements that have been partially extinguished by prescription.⁵⁹ In the proceedings on remand, the parties presented competing proposed easements that did not follow the superior court's findings. The Trust proposed an easement which did not reflect any prescription, but which appeared to be more than 25 feet from the general, yet undefined, area of the Bloom house. Bloom proposed a judgment under which the license was invalid, there was no access trail across the Bloom and Moore properties, and the Trust had access to its property by a section line easement only. Neither of these proposals comported with the superior court's findings affirmed on appeal.

Star page 10*10 The Trust argues that so long as the final approved access route was not within 25 feet of the Bloom home, the judgment complies with the superior court's findings.⁶⁰ This is incorrect. The “not less than 25 feet” limitation describes the boundaries of the prescription, not the proximity of the easement to the Bloom curtilage.⁶¹ Further, the superior court previously dismissed the Trust's effort to secure an alternate route across the Bloom property, and instead found that the easement allowing the access trail was partially extinguished.⁶² Where the judgment establishes an access trail that does not reflect a prescription, the judgment plainly is not consistent with our mandate on remand.

The superior court's initial determination clearly found that the historical access trail was prescribed to some extent by the location of the Bloom home. However, the judgment entered on remand is not clear with respect to where Bloom's house sits in relation to the historical access trail. That is, it remains unclear if Bloom's home and curtilage sit squarely on the access trail, blocking all reasonable access and extinguishing the easement, or if the home only rests partially on the trail, therefore narrowing the easement in that area.

We vacate the final judgment. On remand, the superior court must enter judgment that determines the location of the historical access trail and Bloom's prescription of that easement. Any resulting judgment and platting must describe and reflect the location of the easement and the related prescription such that there is notice of the rights of the respective estate holders.

E. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining To Recognize The Trust As The Prevailing Party For Purposes Of Awarding Attorney's Fees.

We turn now to the Trust's cross-appeal, in which it contends that the superior court erred in denying it attorney's fees. The Trust argues that the superior court declined to award attorney's fees on the assumption that attorney's fees previously had been denied. The Trust claims that it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under Civil Rule 82 as the prevailing party. Bloom contends that there is nothing in the record that identifies the Trust as the prevailing party and fees should not be awarded.

We review the superior court's prevailing party determination under the abuse of discretion standard,⁶³ and will set it aside only if the determination is manifestly unreasonable.⁶⁴ Under Rule 82, “[t]he prevailing party is the one who has successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one who is successful on the ‘main issue’ of the action and ‘in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.’ ”⁶⁵ Here, Bloom was unrepresented. Thus, the only party that may be entitled to attorney's fees would be the Trust, if it prevailed.

Star page 11*11 The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to recognize the Trust as a prevailing party. In the initial action, the superior court resolved the Trust's quiet title action by finding it barred by the doctrine of laches or, in the alternative, that the requested easement was partially extinguished by prescription. The first appeal did not reach the issue of laches but instead affirmed the superior court with regard to the partial extinguishment of the easement.⁶⁶

On remand, the superior court found that the Trust prevailed on some of the claims litigated but not all of them.⁶⁷ We agree. While the Trust prevailed on establishing a right to access, it did not obtain the final relief it requested: access through Bloom's property. Instead, the Trust established some access, but that access was partially extinguished by prescription. It was not manifestly unreasonable that the superior court found that the Trust had prevailed on only some of its claims and was not entitled to attorney's fees. We affirm.

IV. CONCLUSION

We VACATE the final judgment and REMAND. We AFFIRM in all remaining respects.

Footnotes

1

As summarized in Jigliotti Fam. Tr. v. Bloom, 497 P.3d 472, 474-75 (Alaska 2021).

2

Id. at 475.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Throughout the litigation, the parties have at times been referred to as “the Blooms” or just “Bloom.” For consistency, we use the name “Bloom” throughout this opinion to collectively refer to Donald and Deborah Bloom.

6

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 475.

7

The parties refer to this trail as either “the jeep trail,” the “historical trail,” or the “access road.” We will refer to it as the access trail.

8

See Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 475 (describing multiple confrontations between Bloom and the Trust and/or their agents: first occurred in 1994 or 1995; next in late 1990s; twice in 2011; once in 2012; and once in 2015).

9

We summarize these proceedings as set forth in Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 474-76.

10

Because the access trail ran over parcels owned by John W. Moore and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, the case named these parties as well. The Borough was dismissed from the case before the first appeal. Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 476, n.3. The record reflects that Moore was involved during the trial, and we note that he signed some pleadings below and signed Bloom's appellant brief here.

11

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 477.

12

Id. (alteration in original).

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 480.

17

Id. at 472.

18

Id. at 477-78, 480.

19

Id. at 477. In affirming the superior court's alternative ruling, we declined to consider whether it was error to rely on the laches doctrine.

20

Id. at 479-80.

21

Id. at 480.

22

It is unclear why the superior court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute about the appropriate location of the easement and prescription.

23

This statement about the driveway was added to the court's judgment quieting title.

24

In this motion, Bloom appeared to mistakenly believe that we had remanded to determine the legality of the license. The motion was not ruled upon within 30 days, so it was considered denied. Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(k)(4).

25

Pursuant to Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(k)(4), because this motion was not addressed within 30 days of filing, it was considered denied.

26

The parties dispute whether Bloom's Civil Rule 60(b) motion raised new issues not previously before the court. However, it appears that Bloom's 60(b) arguments were premised on the final route of the easement. Because we vacate the judgment establishing the final route of the easement as discussed infra at Section D, we need not address Bloom's 60(b) arguments.

27

Platz v. Aramburo, 17 P.3d 65, 68 (Alaska 2001).

28

Alaska R. App. P. 204(a)(3).

29

Briggs v. City of Palmer, 333 P.3d 746, 748 (Alaska 2014) (citing Alaska R. App. P. 204(a)(3)).

30

See, e.g., Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 644-45 (Alaska 1989) (recognizing that ignoring deadlines without justification was not excusable neglect).

31

Sheehan v. Univ. of Alaska, 700 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Alaska 1985).

32

Compare Williams v. Strong, 557 P.3d 745, 750 (Alaska 2024) (concluding that when claims were not directly involved with or necessarily inhering in a prior appellate decision such that they arguably could not have been part of the prior appeal, those claims are not barred by law of the case), with Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1016-17 (Alaska 2009) (suggesting that even “questionable decisions” on issues adjudicated in previous appeals in the same cause should not be reconsidered on remand or in a subsequent appeal except where there are exceptional circumstances presenting a clear error constituting manifest injustice), and with City of Valdez v. Prince William Sound Oil Spill Response Corp., 548 P.3d 616, 624 (Alaska 2024) (holding that issues previously adjudicated can only be reconsidered where there exist exceptional circumstances presenting clear error constituting manifest injustice, and the decision to apply the doctrine is discretionary).

33

We acknowledge that the superior court also referenced res judicata as a basis to reject arguments against the validity of the 1966 license. Res judicata applies in cases litigated to final judgment and works to bar a subsequent action in a dispute between the same parties arising from the same claim. Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 820 (Alaska 2006). Here, the Trust previously appealed the case in part because the court had failed to enter a final judgment. Jigliotti Fam. Tr. v. Bloom, 497 P.3d 472, 480 (Alaska 2021). Because this case lacked a final judgment, we need not further examine the requirements of res judicata.

34

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 476 (“The [superior] court addressed the validity of the 1966 license on cross-motions for summary judgment .... It confirmed the license's validity, deciding that it ‘created an easement appurtenant through the defendants’ land for ingress and egress to the Jigliotti property.’ ”).

35

Id. at 474.

36

Id.

37

Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1016 (Alaska 2009).

38

Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State, Com. Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Carlson, 65 P.3d 851, 859 n.52 (Alaska 2003)). See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 131 P.3d 471, 476 (Alaska 2006).

39

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 480 (“The Trust also contends that it is entitled to a judgment ... addressing the legality of the 1966 license and the validity of the easement up to the point on the Bloom's property where it is extinguished by prescription. We agree. As explained above, the court determined the validity of the 1966 easement on summary judgment.”).

40

For this argument, Bloom points to 43 U.S.C. § 932, AS 19.10.010 and AS 19.10.015. The former was repealed in 1976, and the latter two statutes were adopted in 1951. Bloom points to Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1961) and Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1996). Both cases are inapposite, addressing whether access over private land became a public highway, yet both cases were decided decades before this case. There was no extraordinary change in law that prompted Bloom's public highway argument on remand. See State Com. Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 65 P.3d at 859 (noting that law of the case doctrine may be set aside in the interests of justice where there are changed conditions due to development of principles of law).

41

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 476 n.3.

42

Australaska Corp. v. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence in Territory of Wash., 397 P.2d 966, 971 (Alaska 1965).

43

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 476 n.3.

44

See Wright v. Anding, 390 P.3d 1162, 1175 (Alaska 2017) (“ ‘Where a point is given only a cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be considered on appeal.’ This is true for pro se litigants as well as represented litigants.” (quoting Hagen v. Strobel, 353 P.3d 799, 805 (Alaska 2015))).

45

Ivy v. Calais Co., Inc., 397 P.3d 267, 272 (Alaska 2017).

46

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 479-80.

47

Wayson v. Stevenson, 514 P.3d 1263, 1275 (Alaska 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 286 (Alaska 1981)).

48

Wayson, 514 P.3d at 1275.

49

Id.

50

Bloom points to AS 19.10.015, enacted by ch. 35, § 1, SLA.

51

AS 19.10.015(a).

52

See, e.g., Labrenz v. Burnett, 218 P.3d 993, 1000 (Alaska 2009) (holding that an unambiguous easement established a 30-foot-wide driveway to one parcel).

53

426 P.3d 845, 847 (Alaska 2018).

54

Id. at 854.

55

Id. at 854-55.

56

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 479-80.

57

We note that, prior to the first appeal, the Trust advocated for a judgment that affirmed the validity of the 1966 license up to the point of prescription.

58

Price v. Eastham, 254 P.3d 1121, 1125-26 (Alaska 2011).

59

See, e.g., Reeves v. Godspeed Properties, LLC, 426 P.3d 845 (Alaska 2018).

60

The Trust also argues that it could not have addressed the “where” of the prescription. We disagree. Trained surveyors, like those used by the Trust when preparing its proposed easement documents, are equally able to plot the location of an access road, a fence, an encroachment, utilities, or a home with outbuildings.

61

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 477 (quoting judgment that easement was “extinguished once it reached ‘[t]he cleared portion of the Blooms’ property ... not ... less than 25 feet from their house’ ” (alteration in original)).

62

Id. at 479-80. Bloom was correct to note that the superior court previously dismissed the Trust's request for an alternate route on the Bloom property under a theory of easement by necessity, and that the superior court previously recognized the section-line easement that is still available to the Trust.

63

Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083, 1092 (Alaska 2008).

64

Id.

65

Id. (quoting Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Alaska 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

66

Jigliotti, 497 P.3d at 479-80.

67

To the extent the superior court erroneously found that the Trust's first motion for attorney's fees in the initial action had been denied in part, the error was harmless because the superior court then reached the issue on the merits as to whether the Trust had prevailed.

End of Document