Dominy v. United States

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 27, 2025
Docket7:25-cv-01279
StatusUnknown

This text of Dominy v. United States (Dominy v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dominy v. United States, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VINCENT DOMINY, Plaintiff, 25-CV-1279 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND UNITED STATES, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in FCI Otisville in Otisville, New York, brings this action pro se under the Federal Tort Claims Act. He alleges that he has been denied adequate medical care and pain management. By order dated February 13, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). BACKGROUND In this complaint against the United States, Plaintiff sets forth the following facts. In April 2023, Plaintiff began experiencing pain in his left ankle, and an x-ray showed that one of

the “screws” in the ankle had “fus[ed]” and become “deformed.” (ECF 1 ¶ V.) The Regional Medical Director (“RMD”) wanted to amputate Plaintiff’s leg from the knee down, which Plaintiff felt was “excessive.” The RMD set up an appointment for Plaintiff to see a specialist, but in September 2023, while Plaintiff was waiting for that appointment, he felt a “pop” in that ankle, followed by “extreme pain.” (Id.) An x-ray showed that the “rod” in Plaintiff’s leg had “broken.” (Id.) Plaintiff was given a wheelchair and crutches, but the appointment with the specialist was canceled, and he has not received any other treatment or pain medication. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $1.5 million in damages. (Id. ¶ IV.) DISCUSSION The FTCA provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims for damages

arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). “The FTCA’s purpose is both to allow recovery by people injured by federal employees or by agents of the Federal Government, and, at the same time, to immunize such employees and agents from liability for negligent or wrongful acts done in the scope of their employment.” Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2005).2

2 The Court also notes that an FTCA claim is available for tort claims but not for the violation of a constitutional right. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (“[T]he Before a federal court can entertain an FTCA claim, a plaintiff must comply with the FTCA’s procedural requirements. See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015). A claimant exhausts his administrative remedies by filing a claim for damages with the relevant

federal agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Such an administrative claim must be in writing, must specify the amount of damages sought, and must be filed within two years of the claim’s accrual. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). A claimant may challenge the agency’s final denial in a federal district court by filing an action within six months of the federal agency’s mailing of the notice of denial. See § 2401(b). If no written final determination is made by the federal entity within six months of the claimant’s filing of the administrative claim, the claimant may then bring a FTCA action in a federal district court even though no final agency determination has been made. See § 2675(a). This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.3 See Celestine, 403 F.3d at 82; see Phillips v. Generations Fam. Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2013)

(holding that a “claimant can only initiate his or her lawsuit once the claim has been denied by the agency or if the agency has failed to make a decision within six months after the claim was filed.”); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 (1993) (“Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Every premature filing of an action under the FTCA imposes some burden on the judicial system.”).

United States simply has not rendered itself liable under [the FTCA] for constitutional tort claims.”). 3 By contrast, “the FTCA’s time bars are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 420. Here, it is unclear from the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint whether he exhausted his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) before bringing this suit.4 Any claim under the FTCA therefore cannot proceed. District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects unless it would be futile to do so. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because it is unknown whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that asserts facts in support of his claim under the FTCA and to alleges facts demonstrating that he fully exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies (or waited at least 6 months after making his administrative claim) before filing this complaint. Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint. CONCLUSION Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards

set forth above.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyer
510 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Phillips v. Generations Family Health Center
723 F.3d 144 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Dominy v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dominy-v-united-states-nysd-2025.