Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp.

270 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11732, 2003 WL 21638227
District Court, D. Colorado·Decided July 9, 2003·No. CIV.A. 03-K-607·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

KANE, Senior District Judge.

Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. (“Dominion”) is a broadcast satellite operator that uses its Federal Communications Commission (FCC) license to operate a television-programming network known as “Sky Angel.” Sky Angel is a Christian-religious network broadcasting predominantly Christian theme programming. Defendants EchoStar Satellite Corporation and Echosphere Corporation (collectively “EchoStar”) operate a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) system that includes several satellites currently in orbit and operates its DBS service under the trade name “DISH Network.”

Dominion and EchoStar have been parties since 1996 to a leasing contract entitled “Direct Broadcast Service Transponder Lease, Channel Use and Programming Agreement” (the “Agreement”). By the Agreement’s terms, EchoStar leases eight transponders on EchoStar’s 61.5 degree orbit satellite to Dominion and Dominion, in turn, subleases back to EchoStar six of its frequencies together with FCC license rights, which permits EchoStar to use those six frequencies for its own broadcasting.

This is the second time these same parties have been before me in litigation arising under the Agreement which, it should be noted, includes a broad provision requiring the arbitration of such disputes. In the first action, 01-K-206, I affirmed a December 2001 Interim Award of Arbitration Panel, as clarified by written rulings issued in February 2002, which focused on EchoStar’s efforts to recoup from Dominion-only programming subscribers losses stemming from having extended equipment “subsidies” to them as part of Ech-oStar’s overall marketing strategy to secure business for its subscription services. 1

*1209 The instant action involves an entirely different aspect of the Agreement, namely, whether EchoStar’s acceptance of applications by FamilyNet and Daystar channels to broadcast their programming on EchoS-tar transponders violates Article VIII of the Agreement related to programming exclusivity (the “exclusivity provisions”) and, if so, whether such violation is actionable or preempted by applicable federal law. Dominion contends EchoStar’s actions violate the parties’ agreement that the programming carried by Dominion and EchoStar be “mutually exclusive,” namely, that Dominion is entitled exclusively to transmit “Christian Programs” to both Dominion and EchoStar subscribers and that EchoStar is entitled to transmit all other types of programming. Dominion seeks a declaration of the parties’ rights and responsibilities under the Agreement and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.

I conducted a hearing on June 24, 25, and 26. Following the hearing the parties submitted several briefs and motions (some as recently as yesterday afternoon) in addition to the written summations and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law I requested. After considering the pleadings on file, the evidence taken at the hearing, the written briefs and the parties’ separate proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and order in memorandum opinion form.

EchoStar denies FamilyNet is a “Christian Program” as that term is defined in the Agreement and, citing provisions of the Federal Communication Act (FCA) requiring direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers to reserve at least 4% of their channel capacity “exclusively for noncommercial programming of an educational or informational nature,” 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1), contends federal law preempts the Agreement with respect to the broadcasting of competing Christian programming and renders its broadcast of Daystar not actionable.

I agree with Dominion that EchoStar’s position is disingenuous. Overall I conclude that (1) Dominion’s position on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is favorable but (2) the relief requested is inappropriate given the parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the Agreement. Accordingly, I grant the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and refer the matter for arbitration (Dominion’s alternative request). I retain jurisdiction to monitor proceedings pending arbitration.

I. LEGAL STANDARD.

Under Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir.1980), the movant must establish the following in order to obtain a preliminary injunction:

• That the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues;
• That the threatened injury to the mov-ant outweighs whatever damages the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party;
• A showing that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and
• A substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will eventually prevail on the merits.

*1210 If the movant satisfies the first three of these requirements, it may establish the final “likelihood of success on the merits” requirement by showing questions “so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberative investigation.” Walmer v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir.1995).

If I enter an order granting an injunction, I must set forth the reasons for issuance in specific terms, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, and must describe in reasonable detail the acts or acts that are enjoined. Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(d). Typically, any injunction issued must also provide for “the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c).

In this case, however, the Agreement includes a provision explicitly recognizing that the “rights and benefits” of each of the parties under the Agreement are “unique” and that “no adequate remedy exists at law if any of the parties shall fail to perform, or breaches, any of its obligations.” Agreement § 12.3.1. Accordingly, the Agreement specifically provides that either party may “obtain an order or decree of specific performance, or a preliminary or permanent injunction [to enforce those rights] (without the necessity of posting or filing a bond or other security).” Id. (emphasis added). As discussed further below, this unique contractual language impacts my application of this legal standard in several respects.

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Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11732, 2003 WL 21638227 (D. Colo. 2003).

270 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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