MACY, Justice.
Appellant John R. Doidge appeals from an order denying his petition for review of the decision by the Personnel Division of the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control (DAFC) not to grant him a hearing after Appellee Board of Charities and Reform (the Board) removed him from the position of superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital.
We affirm.
Doidge presents the following issues for our review:
Did the district court err[ ][ ] in failing ■ to find that Appellant retained his status as permanent employee when he was appointed to the superintendent position at the Wyoming State Hospital[?]
If the answer to the first issue as stated above is in the affirmative, the next issue is whether or not Appellant was afforded procedural due process when the State denied Appellant’s request for a hearing, and where documents were submitted in violation of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
Doidge was hired on October 15,1984, as a staff psychologist at the Wyoming State Hospital. On November 1, 1985, he attained permanent employee status according to the personnel rules for executive branch employees.1 The Board appointed [882]*882Doidge to the position of superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital on November 1, 1987. After Doidge had served as superintendent for approximately one year, the Board notified him that he was being dismissed. The Board did not reinstate Doidge as a staff psychologist, but it did inform him that he could apply for that position.
On November 3, 1988, the Personnel Division of DAFC received a petition for review from Doidge, claiming that he was a permanent employee whose employment was terminated without the benefit of a hearing as required by the personnel rules. In his petition, Doidge requested that he be afforded procedural rights guaranteed to permanent employees by the personnel rules and that he be reinstated as a staff psychologist.2
In a letter dated December 15, 1988, the personnel administrator for the Personnel Division of DAFC informed Doidge that he was not entitled to a hearing because he voluntarily vacated his permanent position as staff psychologist and because Wyo. Stat. § 25-l-201(b)(i) (1977) gave the Board authority to remove the superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital without cause. On January 12, 1989, Doidge filed a petition for review in the district court, reit[883]*883erating his allegations that he was a permanent employee and that he was denied the procedural due process granted to permanent employees by the personnel rules. Doidge requested that the court find the Board’s action unlawful, remand the matter back to the Board for a formal hearing, and award him back pay for the period of time between his discharge and the date of a formal hearing.
On May 31,1989, the district court issued an order denying Doidge’s petition for review. The court’s decision letter stated that Doidge did not retain his permanent employee status when he accepted the appointment as superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital and that, therefore, the Board could dismiss him as superintendent without a hearing.
We review a district court decision concerning an appeal from an administrative action or inaction which adversely affects a person according to the standards prescribed in W.R.A.P. 12.093 and Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1977). Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866 (Wyo.1990); Cook v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181 (Wyo.1989); Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming v. Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo.1989). Section 16-3-114(c) states:
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
When the issue on appeal is a conclusion of law, we will affirm the agency’s decision if it is in accordance with law. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866.
Doidge contends that he was entitled to have a hearing before the Board terminated his employment with the Wyoming State Hospital because he was a permanent employee under the personnel rules. We disagree. The Board has authority to discharge the superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital without cause. Section 25 — 1—201(b)(i). Whether Doidge retained his permanent employee status as a staff psychologist after the Board appointed him to the position of superintendent depends upon the construction and application of the personnel rules promulgated by DAFC. This Court has stated that rules and regulations adopted pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo.1981); Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d 965 (Wyo.1979).4 [884]*884We have also held that we will defer to an administrative agency’s construction of its rules unless such construction is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of the rules. Croxton v. Board of County Commissioners of Natrona County, 644 P.2d 780 (Wyo.1982).
Doidge has failed to show that the personnel administrator’s interpretation of the personnel rules was clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of the rules. Instead, Doidge argues that this case is analogous to Spurlock v. Board of Trustees, Carbon County School District No. 1, 699 P.2d 270 (Wyo.1985).
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MACY, Justice.
Appellant John R. Doidge appeals from an order denying his petition for review of the decision by the Personnel Division of the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control (DAFC) not to grant him a hearing after Appellee Board of Charities and Reform (the Board) removed him from the position of superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital.
We affirm.
Doidge presents the following issues for our review:
Did the district court err[ ][ ] in failing ■ to find that Appellant retained his status as permanent employee when he was appointed to the superintendent position at the Wyoming State Hospital[?]
If the answer to the first issue as stated above is in the affirmative, the next issue is whether or not Appellant was afforded procedural due process when the State denied Appellant’s request for a hearing, and where documents were submitted in violation of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
Doidge was hired on October 15,1984, as a staff psychologist at the Wyoming State Hospital. On November 1, 1985, he attained permanent employee status according to the personnel rules for executive branch employees.1 The Board appointed [882]*882Doidge to the position of superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital on November 1, 1987. After Doidge had served as superintendent for approximately one year, the Board notified him that he was being dismissed. The Board did not reinstate Doidge as a staff psychologist, but it did inform him that he could apply for that position.
On November 3, 1988, the Personnel Division of DAFC received a petition for review from Doidge, claiming that he was a permanent employee whose employment was terminated without the benefit of a hearing as required by the personnel rules. In his petition, Doidge requested that he be afforded procedural rights guaranteed to permanent employees by the personnel rules and that he be reinstated as a staff psychologist.2
In a letter dated December 15, 1988, the personnel administrator for the Personnel Division of DAFC informed Doidge that he was not entitled to a hearing because he voluntarily vacated his permanent position as staff psychologist and because Wyo. Stat. § 25-l-201(b)(i) (1977) gave the Board authority to remove the superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital without cause. On January 12, 1989, Doidge filed a petition for review in the district court, reit[883]*883erating his allegations that he was a permanent employee and that he was denied the procedural due process granted to permanent employees by the personnel rules. Doidge requested that the court find the Board’s action unlawful, remand the matter back to the Board for a formal hearing, and award him back pay for the period of time between his discharge and the date of a formal hearing.
On May 31,1989, the district court issued an order denying Doidge’s petition for review. The court’s decision letter stated that Doidge did not retain his permanent employee status when he accepted the appointment as superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital and that, therefore, the Board could dismiss him as superintendent without a hearing.
We review a district court decision concerning an appeal from an administrative action or inaction which adversely affects a person according to the standards prescribed in W.R.A.P. 12.093 and Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1977). Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866 (Wyo.1990); Cook v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181 (Wyo.1989); Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming v. Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo.1989). Section 16-3-114(c) states:
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
When the issue on appeal is a conclusion of law, we will affirm the agency’s decision if it is in accordance with law. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866.
Doidge contends that he was entitled to have a hearing before the Board terminated his employment with the Wyoming State Hospital because he was a permanent employee under the personnel rules. We disagree. The Board has authority to discharge the superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital without cause. Section 25 — 1—201(b)(i). Whether Doidge retained his permanent employee status as a staff psychologist after the Board appointed him to the position of superintendent depends upon the construction and application of the personnel rules promulgated by DAFC. This Court has stated that rules and regulations adopted pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo.1981); Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d 965 (Wyo.1979).4 [884]*884We have also held that we will defer to an administrative agency’s construction of its rules unless such construction is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of the rules. Croxton v. Board of County Commissioners of Natrona County, 644 P.2d 780 (Wyo.1982).
Doidge has failed to show that the personnel administrator’s interpretation of the personnel rules was clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of the rules. Instead, Doidge argues that this case is analogous to Spurlock v. Board of Trustees, Carbon County School District No. 1, 699 P.2d 270 (Wyo.1985). In that case, this Court held that a school principal who was a tenured teacher before he became a principal did not lose his tenure as a teacher when he was discharged from the position of principal. We explained that Spurlock retained his tenure because
there would be a simple procedure to circumvent a teacher’s tenure: make him a principal and then discharge him. It is desirable — and even important — to have people with extensive classroom teaching experience in administrative positions. It would be difficult to fill administrative positions with experienced teachers if the teachers would have to give up tenure upon accepting administrative positions.
Id. at 272. We held that the school board had to adhere to the procedural rights guaranteed to tenured teachers before it could discharge Spurlock.
The questionable policy employed to justify the Spurlock decision does not apply in this case. We affirm the personnel administrator’s decision that Doidge did not retain his permanent employee status when he accepted the appointment to serve as the superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital. Because he served as superintendent of the Wyoming State Hospital at the will of the Board, Doidge was not entitled to a hearing before the Board terminated his employment.
Affirmed.