Doe v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided October 9, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-00217·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 JANE DOE, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00217-JLS-AHG 13 Plaintiff, ORDER:

14 v. (1) DENYING IN PART JOINT 15 WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY INC., et al., DEADLINES, and 16

Defendants. 17 (2) ISSUING FIRST AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER 18

19 [ECF No. 185] 20 Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines. 21 ECF No. 185. 22 Parties seeking to continue deadlines in the scheduling order must demonstrate good 23 cause. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with 24 the judge’s consent”); see also ECF No. 177 at 6 (Scheduling Order, stating that “[t]he 25 dates [] set forth herein will not be modified except for good cause shown”); Chmb.R. at 2 26 (stating that any request for continuance requires “[a] showing of good cause for the 27 request”). Courts have broad discretion in determining whether there is good cause. See, 28 e.g., Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992); Liguori v. 1 Hansen, No. 2:11cv492-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 760747, at *12 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2012). 2 “Good cause” is a non-rigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural 3 and statutory contexts. Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 4 2010). The good cause standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to amend the 5 scheduling order and the reasons for seeking modification. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 6 (“[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.... 7 If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”) (internal citation omitted). 8 Therefore, “a party demonstrates good cause by acting diligently to meet the original 9 deadlines set forth by the court.” Merck v. Swift Transp. Co., No. CV-16-01103-PHX-ROS, 10 2018 WL 4492362, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2018). 11 Here, the parties seek a six-month continuance of all scheduling order deadlines, 12 beginning with the fact discovery cutoff, which is presently set for December 2, 2025. ECF 13 No. 185. The parties represent to the Court that Plaintiff was arrested on February 12, 2025, 14 and was incarcerated until August 25, 2025. ECF No. 185 at 5. Since “communication 15 between Plaintiff and her counsel was extremely limited” during her incarceration, 16 “Plaintiff was effectively unable to participate in discovery or supply information 17 necessary to respond to written discovery from Defendants.” Id. Thus, “discovery in this 18 matter has not progressed as expected pursuant to the Scheduling Order.” Id. 19 The parties, therefore, request the six-month extension to “allow the parties 20 sufficient time for discovery and other pre-trial preparation,” but do not expand further. Id. 21 For example, the parties do not explain what specific discovery has been completed and 22 what specific discovery is outstanding. The parties acknowledge that Plaintiff was released 23 from jail on August 25, 2025, but do not assert that any discovery has been completed in 24 the month and a half that has lapsed since her release. The parties also do not explain why 25 the three months of discovery after her release—as Plaintiff was released on 26 August 25, 2025, and fact discovery does not close until December 2, 2025—is 27 insufficient. The Court also notes that the parties’ Joint Case Management Conference 28 Statement was filed on May 19, 2025,—while Plaintiff was incarcerated—yet makes no 1 mention of her incarceration, let alone suggests it as a barrier to discovery. ECF No. 175. 2 In fact, the parties represented in their Joint Statement that “Plaintiff has responded to 3 discovery from Defendant ESA.” Id. at 13. The Court held a Case Management Conference 4 on May 28, 2025,—while Plaintiff was incarcerated—and issued a Scheduling Order that 5 contemplated that fact, as counsel had subsequently informed the Court. ECF Nos. 176, 6 177. The Court also notes that the parties failed to provide a sufficient declaration from 7 counsel, as required by the Court’s Chambers Rules. Chmb.R. at 2 (requiring that the joint 8 motion for continuance include a “declaration from counsel seeking the continuance that 9 describes the steps taken to comply with the existing deadlines, and the specific reasons 10 why the deadlines cannot be met”) (emphasis added). Instead, counsel merely restates the 11 dates that Plaintiff was incarcerated and copies the identical sentences from the motion that 12 communications were limited and discovery had not progressed as expected. ECF 13 No. 185-1. Aside from being required, a sufficiently specific declaration would have been 14 helpful to the Court in resolving the many omissions noted above. 15 Upon due consideration, the Court does not find that the parties have shown 16 diligence. There is nothing before the Court to show that the parties have “act[ed] diligently 17 to meet the original deadlines set forth by the court.” Merck, 2018 WL 4492362, at *2. 18 Therefore, the Court does not find good cause for a continuance and DENIES the parties’ 19 joint motion. ECF No. 185. 20 To further settlement discussions, however, the Court will slightly modify the case 21 schedule, including the upcoming Mandatory Settlement Conference presently set for 22 November 5, 2025. The Court reiterates to the parties that they must act diligently to 23 meet the deadlines set forth by the Court. The Court issues the following First Amended 24 Scheduling Order: 25 1. A Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) originally set for 26 November 5, 2025, is RESET for January 16, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. before Magistrate 27 Judge Allison H. Goddard via videoconference. The parties should expect that the MSC 28 will last all day. 1 a. The Court requires the personal attendance of all named parties, party 2 representatives with full1 settlement authority, including claims adjusters 3 for insured defendants, and the primary attorney(s) responsible for the 4 litigation at the conference. Since Plaintiff Jane Doe’s attendance is 5 mandatory, to protect her confidentiality, she is permitted to attend the 6 videoconference with her camera turned off and her display name changed. 7 b. Plaintiff must serve on Defendants a written settlement proposal, which 8 must include a specific demand amount, no later than December 18, 2025. 9 The defendants must respond to the plaintiff in writing with a specific 10 offer amount prior to the Meet and Confer discussion. The parties should 11 not file or otherwise copy the Court on these exchanges. Rather, the parties 12 must include their written settlement proposals in their respective 13 Settlement Conference Statements to the Court. 14 c. Counsel for the parties must meet and confer in person, via 15 videoconference, or by phone no later than January 5, 2026. 16 d. Each party must prepare a Settlement Conference Statement, which will 17 be served on opposing counsel and lodged with the Court no later than 18 January 8, 2026. The Statement must be lodged in .pdf format via email 19 to efile_goddard@casd.uscourts.gov (not filed). The substance of the 20

21 1 The Court reminds the parties that parties and party representatives with full and complete 22 authority to enter into a binding settlement must be present at the MSC. Full authority to 23 settle means that a person must be authorized to fully explore settlement options and to agree at that time to any settlement terms acceptable to the parties. Heileman Brewing Co., 24 Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989).

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Doe v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2025).

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