Doe v. VGW Malta Ltd

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedNovember 28, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-03226
StatusUnknown

This text of Doe v. VGW Malta Ltd (Doe v. VGW Malta Ltd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. VGW Malta Ltd, (N.D. Ga. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION JOHN DOE, , Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:23-CV-3226-TWT VGW MALTA LTD, et al., Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER This is a putative class action case. It is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration [Doc. 4], the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [Doc. 11], and the Defendants’ Motion for an Order Directing the Plaintiff to Move for Leave to Proceed Anonymously [Doc. 16]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration [Doc. 4] is GRANTED; the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [Doc. 11] is DENIED; and the Defendants’ Motion for an Order Directing the Plaintiff to Move for Leave to Proceed Anonymously [Doc. 16] is DENIED as moot. I. Background

This case arises from the Plaintiff John Doe’s alleged use of certain virtual casino-themed games operated by the Defendants VGW Malta Ltd. and VGW Luckyland, Inc. (collectively, “VGW”). (Compl. ¶ 1). The Plaintiff claims that the games violate Georgia laws that prohibit casino gambling and seeks a refund of the purchases he made playing VGW’s games on behalf of himself and a class of Georgia residents who also made purchases playing the games. ( ¶¶ 10, 71, 78). VGW claims that the Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising from his use of the games and waived his right to bring class

claims. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Compel, at 1). The Plaintiff originally filed suit in Fulton County Superior Court on June 13, 2023, and VGW removed the case to this Court on July 20, 2023. VGW now moves to compel arbitration, and the Plaintiff moves to remand the case. II. Legal Standard Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they may only hear

cases that the Constitution and Congress have authorized them to hear. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). An action originally brought in state court may be removed by a defendant to federal court when the action satisfies the constitutional and statutory requirements for original federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Because of the limited authority of federal courts, “removal statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in

favor of remand.” , 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). When no federal question exists, diversity jurisdiction can be invoked where there is complete diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a), or where the class action jurisdictional standards are met under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d).

2 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “embodies a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” , 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). Section 2 of the

Act provides in relevant part: A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract . . . . 9 U.S.C. § 2. On a motion to compel arbitration, a court undertakes a two-step inquiry to determine (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question and, if they did, (2) whether legal constraints external to their agreement foreclose arbitration. , 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). Courts apply state contract law to questions regarding the validity, revocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements. , 428 F.3d at 1368. An arbitration clause may be unenforceable for the same reasons as any other contract, such as fraud or unconscionability. , 473 U.S. at 627. Or there may be statutory barriers to arbitration, such as a congressional intention to adjudicate certain substantive rights solely in a judicial forum. at 628. When an arbitration agreement clears both prongs of the FAA test, a court must either stay or dismiss the lawsuit and compel arbitration. , 544 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008).

3 III. Discussion VGW moves to compel arbitration, strike the Complaint’s class claims, and stay all further proceedings pending arbitration, or, in the alternative, to

dismiss the Defendant VGW Malta for lack of service. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Compel, at 1). The Plaintiff moves to remand the case to the Fulton County Superior Court. Because the motion to remand implicates subject matter jurisdiction, the Court begins its inquiry there. 9 U.S.C. § 4. A. Remand The Plaintiff claims that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

his claims because complete diversity does not exist between the parties and because the $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for class action claims is not met. (Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, at 5–16). He first contends that the citizenship of VGW Malta is in question because its corporate designation as a Ltd. company makes it a limited liability company subject to the state citizenship of its members. ( at 5–7). But the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) “provides that complete diversity of citizenship is not required;

instead, only minimal diversity is required.” , 2006 WL 3191184, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2006) (“Thus, the diversity requirement is met when ‘any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)). Here, the Plaintiff is a citizen of Georgia, and VGW Luckyland is a Delaware

4 corporation, with its principal place of business in Delaware, making it a citizen of Delaware. Accordingly, regardless of VGW Malta’s citizenship, minimal diversity exists here to support jurisdiction under CAFA. Even if

complete diversity were required, VGW substantiates that Ltd. companies are treated as corporations in assessing jurisdictional questions under U.S. law (VGW Malta is incorporated in Malta), and in any event, none of VGW Malta’s members are citizens of Georgia.1 (Defs.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, at 10–11). Accordingly, both minimal and complete diversity exist in the case, only the former of which is required here.

Turning to the amount in controversy, the Plaintiff contends that the $5,000,000 threshold is not met because he seeks compensation only for sustained and not merely for all purchases made by class members on VGW games. (Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, at 8–9). But as VGW points out, such a contention runs contrary to the Plaintiff’s own allegations in his Complaint. (Defs.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, at 7–8). He alleges that “all of Defendants’ gambling operations, agreements, and funds

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Bluebook (online)
Doe v. VGW Malta Ltd, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-vgw-malta-ltd-gand-2023.