Doe v. United States

110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 2015 WL 2452613
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 21, 2015
DocketNo. 14-MC-1412 (JG)
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (Doe v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 2015 WL 2452613 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN GLEESON, District Judge:

Jane Doe filed an application on October 30, 2014, asking me to expunge her thir[449]*449teen-year old fraud conviction because of the undue hardship it has created for her in getting — and especially keeping — -jobs. Doe gets hired to fill home health aide and similar positions only to be fired' when her employers learn through subsequent background checks about her conviction. Since the conviction was for health care fraud, it’s hard to blame those employers for using the conviction as a proxy for Doe’s unsuitability.

However, even if one believes, as I do, that employers are generally entitled to know about the past convictions of job •applicants, and that their decisions based on those convictions are entitled to deference, there will nevertheless be cases in which all reasonable employers would conclude that the conviction is no longer a meaningful consideration in determining suitability for employment if only they had the time and the resources to conduct a thorough investigation of the applicant or employee.

I have conducted such an investigation, and this is one of those cases. In addition to presiding over the trial in Doe’s case and her subsequent sentencing, I have reviewed every page of the extensive file that was .created during her five years under probation supervision. I conclude that the public’s interest in Doe being an employed, contributing member of society so far outweighs its interest in her conviction being a matter of public record that the motion is granted and her conviction is expunged.

FACTS

A. Doe’s Background and Crime

Doe was born and raised in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. In 1983, at age 24, she came to New York in search of a better life. She became a naturalized citizen in 1989. By 1990 she had three children from a relationship with a taxi driver who in that year left the family to return to Haiti. Doe’s mother had come from Haiti in 1988 to help with the children, but she died in 1995. Another relationship ended prior to the birth of Doe’s fourth child in 1996.

Doe enrolled in a nursing assistant program and became a home health aide. By 1997, when she first became involved in the criminal conduct that gave rise to her conviction, Doe’s children were ages 12, 10, 7, and 1. She was raising them by herself on her net monthly income of $783. They lived in a two-bedroom apartment on the first floor of a six-story building in the Jamaica section of Queens. The monthly rent exceeded Doe’s take-home pay. After visiting the home as part of the pre-sentence investigation, a probation officer reported that crack dealers and crack addicts frequented the entrance to the building and its lobby.

In those circumstances, Doe participated in 1997 in one of the automobile insurance fraud schemes that were ubiquitous in this district at the time. The schemes involved, among other criminal participants: corrupt physicians and other health care professionals at clinics; organizers of staged car “accidents” (who were usually principals of car service businesses); drivers of livery cars, who would deliberately cause minor collisions; and people like Doe, who would climb into the back seat of a car before the staged collisions. A car full of passengers would be deliberately driven into an innocent motorist’s car at low speed, often when the latter car was stopped at a light. A police officer was summoned, producing a police report, and the passengers would feign injuries. They were taken to a clinic, where they signed over their rights to no-fault insurance benefits to the clinic. The clinic would then bill the insurance companies for unnecessary (and usually unperformed) services, up to the $50,000 limit. The corrupt clin[450]*450ics would pay the car service operators for each “patient” they provided, the driver would get a fee (usually $500) for causing the “accident,” and the passengers in the back of the car would sometimes get a small cash payment. In addition, the phony treatment files generated by the clinics for each of the (uninjured) passengers would sometimes become the basis of particularly audacious personal injury lawsuits. Specifically, the passengers would be referred to lawyers who would bring suits on their behalf against the innocent drivers of the other cars. Of course those suits were entirely meritless (a fact the lawyers sometimes were aware of, and sometimes not), but they could be settled for their nuisance value.

On August 1, 1997, Doe agreed to be involved in one of these staged accidents. She was one of the passengers in the back seat, and she falsely claimed that she was injured, assigned her no-fault insurance claim to a clinic, and represented that she had received medical services related to her fabricated injury. A civil claim was filed on her behalf, which was settled, and Doe received I^OO.1 In 2001, Doe was found guilty after a jury trial of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1347 based on her role in the scheme. She was sentenced on March 25, 2002 to five years’ probation, ten months of home detention, and a restitution order of $46,701. She had no prior criminal history, and she has not had any contact with the criminal justice system since her conviction.

B. Doe’s Employment Problems While on Probation and Afterward

I have carefully reviewed the Probation Department’s files on Jane Doe. They memorialize the five years she spent under supervision. The two files total almost 1,000 pages. They paint a portrait of a woman who (1) needs to work to support the four young children she was raising by herself at the time; (2) wants very much to work; (3) detests being on public assistance; and (4) poses no risk of financial harm to others. Along with the facts advanced in support of the instant motion, the probation files also show that during the 13 years since Doe was sentenced, her conviction has become an increasingly insurmountable barrier to her ability to work.

Early in her five-year probationary period, Doe got a job as a “house manager” at Agency One,2 a homeless shelter for women with children. It was not fulltime work, but the combination of her wages from that job, her public assistance, and food stamps equaled approximately $1,300 per month. Doe was laid off from that job in July 2003, apparently for reasons unrelated to her conviction.

Doe actively began looking for other work, and in March 2004 she began working as a counselor at Agency Two, a home for families with children with mental disabilities. The probation officer noted on May 21, 2004 that Doe’s supervisor was unaware of her conviction. Even with the [451]*451job at Agency Two, Doe’s total monthly income was less than $1,000. At that time her children were ages 17, 16, 13, and 7.

Despite her dire financial circumstances, Doe was intent on keeping up with her restitution obligation. I had ordered her to pay $25 per month. The October 2004 notes in the file state that she was actually two months ahead. in her payments, explaining that “[t]hough she occasionally misses a payment, she doubles the payment the following month,” and she apparently doubled her payment on two more occasions than she needed to.

By September 2004, for reasons not set forth in the file, Doe was back on public assistance.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Doe v. United States
Second Circuit, 2016
United States v. Pichardo
202 F. Supp. 3d 342 (S.D. New York, 2016)
United States v. Nesbeth
188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D. New York, 2016)
Doe v. United States
168 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D. New York, 2016)
United States v. Saena Tech Corporation
140 F. Supp. 3d 11 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Stephenson v. United States
139 F. Supp. 3d 566 (E.D. New York, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 2015 WL 2452613, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-united-states-nyed-2015.