Doe v. Rubio

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 9, 2025
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-4210
StatusPublished

This text of Doe v. Rubio (Doe v. Rubio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Rubio, (D.D.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 25-4210 MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as US Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe are a married couple. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 3. Jane is

a U.S. citizen, id., ¶ 77, but John is a Russian national who needs a visa to join his wife in the

United States. See id., ¶ 78. He applied for the relevant visa, was interviewed at a U.S.

consulate, and a consular officer told him that the visa would be issued in a few days. Id., ¶¶ 79–

84. That was eight months ago. Id., ¶ 92. Since then, John’s visa has languished in

administrative processing, id., ¶ 93, and he and Jane have brought this action to compel

Defendants to promptly adjudicate his application. Id. at 35. They now move to proceed

pseudonymously. See ECF No. 2 (Mot.) at 1. The Court will grant their Motion.

I. Legal Standard

Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);

LCVR 5.1(c)(1), 11.1. That requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of

litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of

governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial

proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal

1 Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to

proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need

for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed

in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court

must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in

full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting Sealed

Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:

(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.

Id. at 326–27 (cleaned up).

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs have shown that their interest in pseudonymity outweighs the public’s interest

in learning their identities.

First, Plaintiff John Doe is not seeking “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that

may attend any litigation.” Id. at 326. This factor favors pseudonymity if naming a plaintiff

would expose facts whose disclosure would threaten his safety. Sponsor v. Mayorkas, 2023 WL

2598685, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2023); Doe v. Federal Republic of Germany, 680 F. Supp. 3d 1,

5 (D.D.C. 2023). That is the case here. John is an independent journalist, and his Complaint

alleges that journalists who displease the Russian government are sometimes imprisoned, exiled,

2 or even killed. See Compl., ¶ 98. That is a risk for John because he has deep ties to the United

States: he got his PhD here, previously lived here, is married to a U.S. citizen, and hopes to

emigrate here. Id., ¶¶ 3–4, 97, 99. The State Department warns that “Russian officials have

questioned and threatened U.S. citizens without reason,” “Russian security services have arrested

U.S. citizens on false charges,” and the Russian legal system has “denied [U.S. citizens] fair

treatment and convicted them without credible evidence.” Id., ¶ 96 (quoting Russian Federation

Travel Advisory, Travel.State.Gov (Aug. 5, 2025), https://perma.cc/8AN9-9RTB). So it urges

Americans, “Do not travel to Russia for any reason” and “U.S. citizens in Russia should leave

immediately.” Id. (quoting Russian Federation Travel Advisory). In sum, John Doe is an

independent journalist, and disclosing his name would publicize his ties to the United States.

That disclosure could put him in danger.

True, John is currently in a third country and is trying to avoid going back to Russia. Id.,

¶ 102; Mot at 1. But he has only a temporary visa, and at some point he might have to return to

his native country. See Compl., ¶ 103; Mot at 4. If that happens, and if his identity were

publicly connected with the facts here, he would be at risk of harassment, imprisonment, or even

violence. As for Jane Doe, identifying her would risk identifying her husband. See S.T. ex rel.

Shanisha L. v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2817734, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2025) (identifying mother

risked identifying her daughter). This factor therefore favors pseudonymity for both Plaintiffs.

The second factor asks “whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or

mental harm.” Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326. Courts in this district have sometimes held that if

identifying a plaintiff would expose him to danger, then he wins this test’s first and second

factors. Sponsor, 2023 WL 2598685, at *2; Doe v. Germany, 680 F. Supp. 3d at 5. If that is

right, then this factor favors pseudonymity for the reasons above. All the same, that conflation

3 risks making the first and second factors duplicative. Whether the danger to John belongs in

factor (1) or factor (2) is an interesting scholastic exercise, but it does not matter here. His

interest in his safety is so strong that the Court would grant his Motion no matter which factor

that interest belongs in.

As for the ages of the people with relevant privacy interests, Plaintiffs are both adults, so

this factor weighs against letting them proceed pseudonymously. See Mot. at 5.

Moving on to the fourth factor, the defendant’s identity, this factor usually favors

pseudonymity when a plaintiff sues the government, J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D.

196, 201 (D.D.C. 2016), as Plaintiffs do here. True, this factor tips the other way if a plaintiff is

seeking programmatic relief that would change public policy — in which case the public has a

stronger interest in learning who is trying to change law affecting many others. Sealed Case, 971

F.3d at 329. But in this suit, Plaintiffs seek individualized relief: they argue that John Doe’s visa

application has been improperly delayed, so Defendants must promptly adjudicate his visa. See

Compl., ¶¶ 16–17. That favors pseudonymity. Doe v. Blinken, No. 24-1629, ECF No. 3 (Mem.

Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024).

Finally, letting Plaintiffs proceed pseudonymously would not prejudice Defendants. This

factor favors pseudonymity if the defendant knows who the plaintiff is. Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at

326 n.1.

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Related

N.W. v. District of Columbia
318 F.R.D. 196 (District of Columbia, 2016)
In re: Sealed Case
931 F.3d 92 (D.C. Circuit, 2019)
In re: Sealed Case
971 F.3d 324 (D.C. Circuit, 2020)

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