Doe v. Richland County School District 2

District Court, D. South Carolina·Decided March 12, 2020·No. 3:18-cv-02731·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION

Mother Doe, individually and as the Mother and C/A No. 3:18-cv-02731-CMC Natural Guardian for Jane Doe, a Minor,

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

ON MOTIONS TO SEAL EXHIBITS Richland County School District Two, Sheriff of (ECF Nos. 129, 134, 147, 149, 156) Richland County in his official capacity d/b/a

Richland County Sherriff’s Department, John E. Ewing, and Jamel Bradley,

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on motions to seal documents filed in support of the summary judgment motion filed by Defendants Richland School District Two (ECF No. 135) and Jamel Bradley (ECF No. 150); documents filed in support of Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the School District’s motion (ECF No. 148); and documents filed in support of Defendant School District’s reply (ECF No. 155). ECF Nos. 129, 134, 147, 149, 156. School District’s motions request six total exhibits to its motion for summary judgment and reply be sealed. ECF Nos. 129, 134, 156. Plaintiff Mother Doe (“Plaintiff”) seeks to seal ten exhibits to her response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 147. Bradley asks to seal two exhibits to his motion. ECF No. 149. For reasons set forth below, the motions to seal related to the briefing of the School District’s and Bradley’s motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part. STANDARD As explained in Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., “before a district court may seal any court documents, . . . it must (1) provide public notice of the request to seal and allow interested parties a reasonable opportunity to object, (2) consider less drastic alternatives to sealing the documents,

and (3) provide specific reasons and factual findings supporting its decision to seal the documents and for rejecting the alternatives.” 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Stone v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir.1988) (“The public’s right of access to judicial records and documents may be abrogated only in unusual circumstances.”). The last step in this process requires the court to first determine the source of the public right of access. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014) (relying on Stone in holding district courts must first determine source of right-of-access as to each document for which sealing is sought); Stone, 855 F.2d at 180. As explained in Stone: The common law presumes a right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents. . . . The common law presumption of access may be overcome if competing interests outweigh the interest in access, and a court’s denial of access is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.

Where the First Amendment guarantees [apply], . . . [public] access may be denied only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

Stone, 855 F.2d at 180. Because summary judgment substitutes for trial, judicial records filed in connection with a summary judgment motion may be sealed only if the First Amendment standard is satisfied. Id. (citing Rushford v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)); see also Doe, 749 F.3d at 267 (“We have squarely held that the First Amendment right of access attaches to materials filed in connection with a summary judgment motion.”). When the government is a party to litigation, the “interest of the public and press in access to civil 2 proceedings is at its apex . . . the public has a strong interest in monitoring not only the functions of the courts but also the positions that its elected officials and government agencies take in litigation. Doe, 749 F.3d at 271. To support sealing, the party seeking such protection must not only identify a protectable

interest, but must also proffer evidence that substantiates the risk of harm. Id. at 270. As the majority explained, it had “never permitted wholesale sealing of documents based upon unsubstantiated or speculative claims of harm[.]” Id.; see also Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2019) (reversing district court’s sealing of documents submitted to the court for consideration of a summary judgment motion because such documents must be reviewed individually and the district court must produce “specific, on-the-record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values,” as opposed to simply making “generalized statements about the record as a whole.”). In sum, because the motions under consideration address documents filed in connection with a motion for summary judgment, the First Amendment standard applies. To support sealing

under that standard, the parties must present concrete proof that the public right of access is outweighed by a compelling governmental interest and sealing is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. “Federal courts have traditionally recognized that in some cases the presumption of open trials – including identification of parties and witnesses by their real names – should yield in deference to sufficiently pressing needs for party or witness anonymity.” James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993). Factors to be considered when determining whether a privacy right outweighs the presumption of open trials include:

3 whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature; whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly, the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.

Id. at 238. The Fourth Circuit more recently reexamined these requirements and determined “a district court has an independent obligation to ensure that extraordinary circumstances support such a request by balancing the party’s stated interest in anonymity against the public’s interest in openness and any prejudice that anonymity would pose to the opposing party.” Doe, 749 F.3d at 274; see also Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (allowing use of a pseudonym when “a plaintiff’s privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings”); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice; 253 F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.”).1

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Doe v. Richland County School District 2, (D.S.C. 2020).

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