Doe v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
This text of Doe v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Doe v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 JOHN DOE, Case No. 21-cv-02602-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO 9 v. PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM; GRANTING MOTIONS TO SEAL 10 PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, [Re: ECF No. 35, 48] 11 Defendant. 12 13 This order concerns two related matters in this case: (1) whether to permit Plaintiff to 14 proceed pseudonymously and (2) whether to seal portions of materials that would reveal Plaintiff’s 15 identity. The Court addresses these issues in turn. 16 I. PROCEEDING PSEUDONYMOUSLY 17 Plaintiff filed this action in state court under a pseudonym but has not moved to proceed 18 pseudonymously in this court. Plaintiff has stated in court filings that he desires to proceed 19 pseudonymously due to harassment and discrimination he has received as a transgender man. 20 “In this circuit, we allow parties to use pseudonyms in the unusual case when 21 nondisclosure of the party's identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment, injury, 22 ridicule or personal embarrassment.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 23 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000). To test whether use of a fictious name is appropriate, courts ask whether 24 “the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s 25 interest in knowing the party's identity.” Id. at 1068. 26 Here, Defendant has not objected to Plaintiff proceeding pseudonymously. And “[s]everal 27 courts . . . have held that an individual’s transgender identity can carry enough of a social stigma 1 Univ., No. 1:18-CV-753, 2019 WL 2392958, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2019) (internal quotations 2 omitted) (collecting cases). In the absence of any indication of unfairness to Defendant, Plaintiff 3 may continue to proceed pseudonymously to avoid potential harassment and discrimination. Cf. 4 Doe v. Roblox Corp., 602 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1251 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (permitting plaintiff to 5 proceed pseudonymously “to avoid potential embarrassment” where there was no indication of 6 unfairness to defendant, despite failure to file motion). 7 II. MOTIONS TO SEAL 8 Before the Court are two motions to seal materials submitted with the parties’ briefing on 9 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The first seeks to seal a video submitted with 10 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Mot. I, ECF No. 35. The second seeks to redact 11 instances of Plaintiff’s name in three documents submitted with Defendant’s reply. See Mot. II, 12 ECF No. 48. Plaintiff has submitted statements in support of each motion. Statement I, ECF No. 13 40; Statement II, ECF No. 49. 14 For the reasons discussed below, both motions are GRANTED. 15 A. LEGAL STANDARD 16 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 17 and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cty. Of 18 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 19 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Accordingly, when considering a sealing request, “a ‘strong 20 presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 21 Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to 22 motions that are “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action” bear the burden 23 of overcoming the presumption with “compelling reasons” that outweigh the general history of 24 access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 25 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. 26 Records attached to motions that are “not related, or only tangentially related, to the merits 27 of a case,” however, are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 1 court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are often 2 unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.”). Parties moving to seal 3 the documents attached to such motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 4 26(c). Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This standard 5 requires a “particularized showing,” id., that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the 6 information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 7 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated 8 by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. 9 Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). 10 B. DISCUSSION 11 The motions to seal concern documents submitted with the briefing on Defendant’s motion 12 for summary judgment. The Court reviews the motions to seal under the “compelling reasons” 13 standard because a motion for summary judgment is more than tangentially related to the merits of 14 the case. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099. 15 Both motions seek to seal information that would reveal Plaintiff’s identity. The first seeks 16 to seal a short video of Plaintiff in which he says his name, and the second seeks to redact 17 Plaintiff’s name in three documents. Plaintiff requests that the Court seal this material to 18 “maintain the confidentiality of Plaintiff’s transgender identity and his medical history of 19 transitioning.” Statement I, at 3; Statement II, at 3. Plaintiff asserts that sealing is appropriate 20 here because there remains a social stigma associated with transgender identity and sealing will 21 protect him from harassment. Statement I, at 2; Statement II, at 2. 22 The Court finds compelling reasons to seal the materials at issue because Plaintiff’s need 23 for anonymity outweighs the public's interest in knowing the Plaintiff’s identity. Cf. Kamakana, 24 447 F.3d at 1179 (the court must “conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests” of the public 25 and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret”); cf. also Jane Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC 26 Mgmt., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 990, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[A] party may preserve his or her 27 anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party's need for anonymity 1 identity.”). As noted above, “[s]everal courts . . . have held that an individual’s transgender 2 identity can carry enough of a social stigma to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure.” 3 Meriwether, 2019 WL 2392958, at *2 (internal quotations omitted) (collecting cases). Here, 4 Plaintiff avers that he has an interest preventing disclosure of his identity due to this stigma so that 5 he may avoid harassment. See Statement I, at 2-3; and Statement II, at 2-3. In the absence of any 6 opposition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided compelling reasons to seal the materials he 7 seeks to seal and has narrowly tailored his request to sealable materials. Accordingly, the motions 8 to seal are GRANTED. 9 ECF or Ex. No. Document Portion(s) to Seal Ruling 10 Ex. F to Rivera Video Entirety Granted as reflecting 11 Decl.1 Plaintiff’s identity, the disclosure of 12 which would result 13 in harassment. Ex.
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