Doe v. Intermountain Healthcare

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJanuary 16, 2021
Docket2:18-cv-00807
StatusUnknown

This text of Doe v. Intermountain Healthcare (Doe v. Intermountain Healthcare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Intermountain Healthcare, (D. Utah 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

JANE DOE, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:18-CV- 807-RJS-JCB

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. and SELECTHEALTH, INC., Chief District Judge Robert J. Shelby Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett Defendants.

Before the court are Plaintiff Jane Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) Short Form Discovery Motion Re: Defendants’ Assertions of Privilege and Defendants Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (“IHC”) and SelectHealth, Inc.’s (“SelectHealth”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion Memorandum Re: Privileged Documents (referred to jointly as “Motion”).1 The court held oral argument on the matter on September 30, 2020.2 Following the hearing, the court requested additional briefing on the privilege issues discussed on the record and ordered Defendants to submit the documents for an in camera review.3 On October 21, 2020, pursuant to the court’s order, Defendants submitted their challenged documents in camera with an updated privileged log and brief in support of

1 ECF Nos. 104, 126. 2 ECF No. 122. 3 ECF No. 121. their assertions of privilege.4 Plaintiff filed a response memorandum,5 and Defendants filed a reply.6 After reviewing the parties’ submissions and the documents submitted in camera, the court issued an Oral Argument Order (“Oral Argument Order”) prior to the hearing, wherein the

court provided tentative rulings and ordered that counsel be prepared to address particular issues.7 On December 21, 2020, the court held oral argument over video teleconference. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement. After carefully reviewing the documents in camera, and considering the parties’ briefs, relevant law, and arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion.8 The court addresses the discoverability of each document below. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action against IHC and SelectHealth alleging improper denial of insurance benefits. Plaintiff, an employee of IHC, had an insurance policy through a self-funded employee welfare benefits plan (the “Plan”). SelectHealth was the third-party claims administrator for the Plan. In 2017 and 2018, Plaintiff received mental health treatment at a residential treatment facility. Plaintiff filed insurance claims with SelectHealth for coverage of her treatment, and SelectHealth denied full payment. Plaintiff pursued internal and external appeals, which SelectHealth denied. Plaintiff then commenced this action in October 2018 under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction

4 ECF No. 126. 5 ECF No. 127. 6 ECF No. 129. 7 ECF No. 134. 8 ECF Nos. 104, 126. Equity Act. Broadly stated, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly denied her claims, misrepresented the bases for denying coverage, and withheld Plan-related documents. On August 28, 2020, Plaintiff moved to compel Defendants to produce documents withheld as privileged. Plaintiff seeks the production of communications that were generated in response to Plaintiff’s December 5, 2018 request. In compliance with the court’s September 30, 2020 Order, Defendants submitted an amended privileged log and the challenged documents for an in camera

review to resolve the dispute. The documents submitted for in camera review include approximately 1,317 pages comprised primarily of email discussion threads and documents attached to those emails. The parties have each advanced a number of arguments purportedly demonstrating either the protected nature of the disputed documents or the absence of any such protection. Although Plaintiff does not have the benefit of having examined the documents, Plaintiff, based on the amended privilege log, has identified three reasons why the disputed documents should be discoverable in the context of this litigation. Plaintiff contends that certain documents are not protected by attorney-client privilege because they do not constitute communications in which legal advice was sought or conveyed and contain purely factual information. Plaintiff also argues that the documents were not prepared in anticipation of litigation but reflect work prepared in the ordinary course of Defendants’ business and, therefore, are neither confidential nor protected by

the work product doctrine. Lastly, Plaintiff argues the documents are not privileged because they fall within the fiduciary exception to privilege. Conversely, Defendants assert the fiduciary exception does not apply and primarily advance two arguments for why the disputed documents are protected by attorney-client privilege and, in some instances, by the work product doctrine. Defendants first argue that the emails reflect Defendants’ requests and receipt of legal advice from Defendants’ in-house counsel and outside counsel. Second, Defendants contend that certain emails and documents attached to emails—although independently containing nonprivileged information—are nevertheless privileged because they relate to the facilitation of legal advice and revealing the contents of those documents would reveal the substance of privileged communications. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court begins by setting forth the standards that it has used in evaluating Defendants’ privilege claims. The court discusses attorney-client privilege followed by the work product doctrine. I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between client and counsel made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance.9 A party invoking the attorney-client privilege must show “(1) a communication (2) between privileged persons, (3) made in confidence,[] (4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance.”10 The burden of establishing each element rests with the party asserting privilege.11 The court construes the privilege narrowly because it renders relevant information undiscoverable, and, therefore, the court applies it “only where necessary to achieve its purpose.”12 The legal standards for each element of attorney client privilege are briefly discussed below.

9 United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996). 10 Hedquist v. Patterson, 215 F.Supp.3d 1237, 1244 n.2 (D. Wyo. April 18, 2016) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (2000); Edna Selan Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 35 (6th ed. 2017). 11 In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999). 12 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). A. Communications

The communications at issue here are emails and attachments to emails. The emails are contained in a string that gets longer after more responses to the original email are transmitted. Where, as here, Defendants assert privilege to a string of emails, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the aforementioned elements for each email in the string.13 Additionally, because there are attachments to the email strings, the elements of attorney- client privilege must also be established for each attachment.

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