Doe v. Garland

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 10, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-03759
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN DOE, Case No. 3:22-cv-03759-JD

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE PETITION FOR HABEAS 9 v. CORPUS

10 MERRICK GARLAND, et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 Habeas petitioner John Doe has been detained at the Golden State Annex detention facility 14 in McFarland, California, since July 12, 2021, pending removal proceedings.1 Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 10; 15 Dkt. No. 15-1 ¶ 10 (Garibay declaration). Doe seeks an individualized bond hearing before an 16 immigration judge, which he has not been afforded during his detention. He alleges that his 17 detention without a hearing violates his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the 18 United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 1. The federal respondents filed a return to Doe’s petition on 19 behalf of the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Acting Field Director of the 20 San Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Field Office. Dkt. No. 15. Doe filed 21 a traverse. Dkt. No. 18. Neither side has requested a hearing on the merits of Doe’s petition, and 22 the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument pursuant 23 to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed, and Doe’s petition 24 is granted. 25

26 1 Doe’s request to proceed under pseudonym, Dkt. No. 12, is granted. Doe has demonstrated that maintaining his anonymity is necessary to protect him from physical harm. See Does I thru XXIII 27 v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court and others have 1 The parties do not dispute that Doe is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1226(c). Dkt. No. 15 at 29, 36; Dkt. No. 18 at 16, 18. “Section 1226(c) mandates detention 3 during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens -- including those convicted of 4 an aggravated felony.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18 (2003); see also Jennings v. 5 Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837-38 (2018). It is true, as the government notes, see Dkt. No. 15 at 6 30, that Section 1226(c)’s mandatory-detention provision has been upheld as facially 7 constitutional, see Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. But in holding that “[d]etention during removal 8 proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process,” id., the Supreme Court operated 9 on the understanding that “not only does [Section 1226(c)] detention have a definite termination 10 point, in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid 11 in Zadvydas [v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)],” id. at 529. It was not presented with an as-applied 12 challenge to a detention of the exceptional duration here. See id. at 530 (noting that the habeas 13 petitioner had spent six months in custody). 14 “[D]istrict courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond 15 hearings for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under [Section] 1226(c).” Martinez v. Clark, 16 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022). Although the exercise of this discretion is, strictly speaking, 17 something of an open question, see id., it is abundantly clear that an unreasonably prolonged civil 18 detention, without an opportunity to be heard, “would raise a serious constitutional problem,” 19 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., 20 concurring) (“Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing 21 deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to 22 facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for 23 other reasons.”); Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We have grave doubts 24 that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional 25 or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary 26 deprivation of liberty would have thought so.”). 27 Even if some of Doe’s detention may be attributable to his requests for continuances before 1 and the fact remains that he has been detained for eighteen months without a bond hearing. The 2 || government has not said why a delay of this magnitude is reasonable under the circumstances, and 3 || did not proffer evidence that “there is [a] reasonably certain end to his custody in sight.” Masood 4 vy. Barr, No. 19-cv-07623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020). There is no 5 question that Doe’s detention qualifies as “prolonged,” and that his private interest in “freedom 6 || from prolonged detention is unquestionably substantial.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 7 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Masood, 2020 WL 8 || 95633 at *5 (alien detainee’s interest in conditional release from detention became “profound” 9 || once it exceeded six months and removal was not imminent). While the government has an 10 || interest in “ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly executed,” Dkt. No. 15 at 11 36, that interest is now outweighed by the deprivation of liberty that Doe has suffered. 12 The government is ordered to release Doe from custody or, within 31 days of the date of 5 13 this order, provide him with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, where 14 || the government will bear the burden to show that Doe’s continued detention is justified by clear 3 15 and convincing evidence. See Masood, 2020 WL 95633, at *5 (clear and convincing evidence 16 standard); see also Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1231. If the immigration judge’s decision is not issued 3 17 within 14 days of the bond hearing, Doe must be released from detention. IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: January 10, 2023 20 21 JAMEYPONATO UnitedfJtates District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28