Doe v. County of Plumas

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 N.P. DOE, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-00264-DJC-CSK 11 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COUNTY OF PLUMAS; BRANDON COMPTON, in his individual and 15 official capacities; and DOES 1 16 through 20, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff, a former inmate, alleges she was sexually assaulted numerous times by 20 a correctional officer during her incarceration from 2015 to 2017 as well as 21 immediately after her release. Plaintiff alleges the correctional officer made threats to 22 keep her from reporting the assaults and also alleges that, when she reported the 23 assaults, the county inadequately investigated her claims. Plaintiff now brings state 24 and federal claims stemming from the sexual assaults. Defendants have moved to 25 dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing her federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are 26 untimely, and her remaining state law and federal claims are largely inadequately 27 pled. Having considered the Parties’ briefings and arguments, the Court will grant 28 Defendants’ motions and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in full. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff N.P. Doe alleges she was an inmate in the Plumas County Jail (“Jail”) 3 from about 2015 through December 2017. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (ECF No. 4) 4 ¶ 26.) During that time, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brandon Compton, who was 5 employed as a correctional officer by Defendant the County of Plumas (“County”), 6 repeatedly sexually assaulted her. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7, 27.) For example, in or about 2015, 7 Defendant Compton told Plaintiff to expose her breast to him, which she did. (Id. 8 ¶ 28.) During a second incident, Defendant Compton took Plaintiff to a holding cell 9 without cameras and forced her orally copulate him. (Id. ¶ 29.) During a third 10 incident, Defendant Compton ordered Plaintiff to lay down in the bed and play with 11 herself, after which Plaintiff orally copulated Defendant Compton through the food 12 slot of the cell. (Id. ¶ 30.) During a fourth incident, in or about late 2017, Defendant 13 Compton digitally penetrated Plaintiff through the food slot. (Id. ¶ 31.) Finally, on 14 four occasions during Plaintiff’s incarceration, Defendant Compton woke her during 15 the night in order to have sexual intercourse with him and forced her to swallow his 16 ejaculation. (Id. ¶ 32.) 17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Compton warned her not to say anything about 18 the assaults because “they won’t believe you.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff also alleges that, at 19 some point during her incarceration, Defendant Compton called Plaintiff “out of her 20 cell and told her she had a call, from Plumas County or Butte County probation.” (Id. 21 ¶ 34.) However, Plaintiff “discovered there was no one on the phone for her.” (Id.) 22 Instead, Defendant Compton took Plaintiff into an intake room and gave her a little 23 bag of chewing tobacco which he then used to threaten her into silence by telling her 24 that if she got caught with the chew it would be a federal offense. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.) 25 Plaintiff alleges that, the day she was released from the Jail, Defendant 26 Compton was waiting for her and ordered her to meet him at a nearby park in 27 exchange for $100. (Id. ¶ 35.) At the park, Defendant Compton ordered Plaintiff into 28 the back seat of his car, after which he drove her to his father’s trailer. (Id.) At the 1 trailer, Defendant Compton took Plaintiff into a back room and had forcible sexual 2 intercourse with her. (Id.) Defendant Compton gave Plaintiff $20 and threatened her 3 not to report the incident. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff alleges that she “learned and believed” the Plumas County Sheriff’s 5 Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) would retaliate against inmates who complained. (Id. ¶ 36.) 6 Accordingly, Plaintiff feared retaliation both during her incarceration and afterwards. 7 (Id.) Despite this, Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to report the assaults, and did 8 report the assaults to law enforcement in a neighboring county. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff 9 believes that agency reported the assaults to the County. (Id.) However, no one from 10 the Sheriff’s Office contacted her to investigate her claims. (Id.) 11 In 2019, Officer Goodson, a female correctional officer at the Jail, sued 12 Defendant Compton and the County alleging that Defendant Compton had sexually 13 harassed and assaulted her. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff, along with several other former 14 female inmates, provided sworn statements in the case detailing the sexual 15 harassment they endured from Defendant Compton. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 53.) Plaintiff alleges 16 her statement was provided to the Sheriff’s Office, but that no one ever contacted her 17 to investigate her claims. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff also alleges that the County retaliated 18 against Officer Goodson for bringing suit by firing her. (Id. ¶ 52.) 19 Plaintiff alleges that in or about 2019, briefly after she provided her sworn 20 statement, the Sheriff’s Office arrested her and transported her to the Jail. (Id. ¶ 54.) 21 While at the Jail, a Correctional Sergeant suggested Plaintiff and the other former 22 inmates should have reported the sexual assault by Defendant Compton back when it 23 occurred. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she was in extreme fear during and after being 24 released from custody and has suffered extreme emotional distress and physical 25 symptoms as a result of Defendant Compton’s assaults. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 70.) 26 Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2025, bringing ten causes of action in 27 her operative First Amended Complaint under federal question and supplemental 28 jurisdiction for (1) violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”), Cal. Civ. 1 Code § 52.1, et seq. (against Defendant Compton and the County) ; (2) Sexual 2 Assault/Sexual Battery under Cal. Civ. Code §1708.5 (against Defendant Compton 3 and the County); (3) Sexual Harassment under Cal. Civ. Code § 51.9 (against 4 Defendant Compton and the County); (4) Gender Violence under Cal. Civ. Code 5 § 52.4 (against Defendant Compton and the County); (5) Cruel and Unusual 6 Punishment/Excessive Force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Defendant Compton 7 and the County); (6) Failure to Protect under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Defendant 8 Compton and the County); (7) Due Process/Bodily Integrity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 9 (against Defendant Compton and the County); (8) Equal Protection under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 (against Defendant Compton and the County); (9) Sex Trafficking under 18 11 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1594(a) (against Defendant Compton and the County); and 12 (10) Forced Labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (against Defendant Compton and the 13 County). (Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 72–176.) The County and Defendant Compton moved to dismiss 14 Plaintiff’s claims on May 27, 2025. (County Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 16); Compton Mot. 15 Dismiss (ECF No. 17).) The matter was submitted without oral argument on August 16 14, 2025, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (ECF No. 25.) 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 19 be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint 20 lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 21 theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light 23 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 24 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 25 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly 26 give rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 27 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of 28 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not 1 “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 2 However, this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual 3 matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same 4 vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements alone do not suffice. Id. “A claim 5 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 6 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 7 alleged.” Id. 8 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide whether to grant leave 9 to amend. Leave to amend should be freely given where there is no “undue delay, 10 bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the 11 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment 12 . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 13 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only 14 if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex 15 Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F. 3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Daou 16 Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)). 17 ANALYSIS 18 I. Plaintiff’s Fifth Through Eighth Causes of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 19 are Untimely 20 Plaintiff brings four causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of her 21 sexual assault by Defendant Compton while in detention. (See FAC ¶¶ 107–50.) As a 22 threshold matter, the County and Defendant Compton contend that none of these 23 claims are timely as they are all brought well outside the two-year statute of limitations 24 for section 1983 claims and are not saved by either tolling or estoppel. (County Mot. 25 Dismiss at 5–11; Compton Mot. Dismiss at 9–14). 26 The Court finds that these claims are time-barred. “It is well-established that 27 claims brought under [section] 1983 borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for 28 personal injury claims, and in California, that limitations period is two years.” Action 1 Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Op. Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2 2007) (citations omitted); see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (establishing a two- 3 year statute of limitations for personal injury actions). When a section 1983 claim 4 accrues is “a matter of federal law, ‘governed by federal rules conforming in general 5 to common-law tort principles.’” Gregg v. Haw., Dep't of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 6 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). Accrual of 7 section 1983 claims is thus typically dictated by the “discovery rule” which determines 8 a claim has accrued “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that 9 is the basis of the action and the cause of that injury.” Id. Generally, the applicable 10 statute of limitations starts to run upon accrual of the plaintiff’s claim. See Douglas v. 11 Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 12 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims accrued at the latest in 2017, when 13 the last incident of sexual assault occurred, as Plaintiff was clearly aware of the assaults 14 Defendant Compton allegedly committed. Plaintiff argues that, despite this accrual 15 date, at least her Equal Protection claim is timely under the continuing violations 16 doctrine because “the FAC plainly alleges a persistent pattern of the County failing to 17 prevent or investigate sexual assaults committed by Compton against female inmates, 18 including Plaintiff” and the “harm to Plaintiff arises not only from the sexual assaults 19 themselves, but also from the County’s continuing failure to investigate and provide 20 institutional remedies.” (Opp’n County Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 20) at 4–5.) “The 21 continuing violations doctrine functions as an exception to the discovery rule of 22 accrual ‘allowing a plaintiff to seek relief for events outside of the limitations period.’” 23 Bird v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Knox v. Davis, 24 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)). Historically, the Ninth Circuit recognized two 25 applications of the continuing violations doctrine: (1) to “a series of related acts, one 26 or more of which falls within the limitations period” (known as the serial acts branch), 27 and (2) to “the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during [the 28 1 limitations] period” (known as the systematic branch). Bird, 935 F.3d at 746 (quoting 2 Gutowsky v. Cnty. of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1997)) (bracketing in original). 3 However, the Supreme Court severely limited the continuing violations doctrine 4 in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Therein, 5 the court held that “‘discrete . . . acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they 6 are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges’ because ‘[e]ach discrete . . . act 7 starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.’” Bird, 935 F.3d at 747 (quoting 8 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); see also Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa 9 Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although Morgan was a Title VII case . . . 10 we have applied Morgan to bar [section] 1983 claims predicated on discrete time- 11 barred acts, not-withstanding that those acts are related to timely-filed claims.”). In 12 2019, the Ninth Circuit further observed that, “[a]lthough the Supreme Court in 13 [Morgan] addressed only the serial acts branch of the continuing violations doctrine 14 . . . we have applied [Morgan] to abrogate the systematic branch of the continuing 15 violations doctrine as well.” Bird, 935 F.3d at 747 (citation omitted). Thus, under 16 Morgan, “little remains of the continuing violations doctrine” because: 17 Except for a limited exception for hostile work environment claims—not at issue here—the serial acts branch is virtually 18 nonexistent. Moreover, while we have left room for the 19 systematic branch to apply to class-wide pattern-or-practice claims, . . . we have consistently refused to apply the 20 systematic branch to rescue individualized claims that are 21 otherwise time-barred. 22 Id. at 748. Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated either narrow exception applies, as 23 she does not assert her pattern and practice claim on a class-wide basis. As such, the 24 continuing violations doctrine is inapplicable, and the discovery rule applies. 25 Applying the two-year statute of limitations, Plaintiff claims, which were brought 26 in 2025, are untimely absent tolling or estoppel.1 When a federal court applies the

27 1 The Court notes that California’s longer statute of limitations for claims of sexual assault applicable to 28 state law claims, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.9; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.16, do not alter the two-year 1 forum state’s statute of limitations, the court also applies the forum state’s tolling rules. 2 Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, the Court borrows 3 California’s statutory and equitable tolling and estoppel rules to the extent they are 4 not inconsistent with federal law. See Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 5 2002); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 Here, Plaintiff argues her section 1983 claims are timely under equitable 7 estoppel, or estoppel by duress. (Opp’n County Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 20) at 5–11; 8 Opp’n Compton Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 22) at 4–9.) “[T]he doctrine of equitable 9 estoppel takes its life . . . from the equitable principle that no man will be permitted to 10 profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice.” Doheny Park Terrace 11 Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 132 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1089 (2005) 12 (quotations omitted). Estoppel may be appropriate in the statute of limitations context 13 “where the defendant’s act or omission actually and reasonably induced the plaintiff to 14 refrain from filing a timely suit.” Doe v. Marten, 49 Cal. App. 5th 1022, 1028 (2020). 15 Notably, California courts have found that “estoppel by duress” may apply in the 16 context of sexual abuse. See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 17 438, 445–46 (1989). Under that doctrine, a defendant will be estopped from raising a 18 statute of limitations defense if: (1) the defendant engages in “unconscionable acts” 19 such as threats, intimidation, coercion, or misrepresentations that deter the plaintiff 20 from filing a claim, and (2) the plaintiff establishes she filed the claim within a 21 reasonable time after the effects of the acts ended. Bianco v. Warner, 562 F. Supp. 3d 22 526, 533 (C.D. Cal. 2021). 23

24 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) (Section 1983 plaintiff not entitled to Oregon’s longer statute of limitations for childhood sexual response because “a state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, not a range 25 of specialized statutes of limitations, should be applied to [section] 1983 claims to prevent unnecessary litigation and preserve the efficacy of the [section] 1983 remedy”) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 26 272–73 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (holding that 27 “where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering [section] 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions”). Thus, 28 Plaintiff's section 1983 claims are subject to California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal- 1 Courts have recognized that a defendant’s threats can “still hav[e] a deterrent 2 effect” long after a sexually abusive relationship ends. Doe v. Bakersfield City Sch. 3 Dist., 136 Cal. App. 4th 556, 572 (2006). For example, in Bianco, an actress brought 4 an action against a recording artist for sexual assault and sexual battery alleging the 5 artist perpetrated physical, sexual, psychological, and emotional abuse against her 6 over a period of several years. 562 F. Supp. 3d at 534. When she escaped, the artist 7 also threatened to have her visa revoked and to punish her. Id. The artist sought to 8 dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, arguing that while the last incident had allegedly 9 occurred in 2013, plaintiff did not file her claims until 2021, making them untimely. Id. 10 at 528, 531. However, the court found that the artist was estopped from raising a 11 statute of limitations defense as the plaintiff had plausibly alleged the artist “engaged 12 in unconscionable acts that could have caused Plaintiff to refrain from instituting legal 13 proceedings against him.” Id. at 534. In particular, the court reasoned that: 14 A reasonable jury could find that the effects of [the artist]’s alleged unconscionable acts, including the perceived threat 15 to Plaintiff’s safety, immigration status, and career, persisted 16 years after her last contact with [the artist]. As a result of [the artist]’s abuse, Plaintiff also allegedly suffers from complex 17 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety, depression, and 18 panic attacks. Given Plaintiff’s post-abuse struggles, a jury could also find that Plaintiff filed suit within a reasonable time 19 after the coercive effects of [the artist]’s unconscionable acts ended. 20 21 Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the court declined to dismiss plaintiff’s claims. Id. 22 Plaintiff argues that she should similarly benefit from estoppel by duress 23 because she was sexually assaulted numerous times by Defendant Compton; 24 Defendant Compton threatened her against reporting the assault while she was 25 detained; once she was released from detention and reported Defendant Compton’s 26 sexual assault, both to the neighboring county and in Officer Goodson’s case, the 27 County never investigated or acted on her claims; the County retaliated against 28 Officer Goodson when she brought her case alleging assault; and Plaintiff was 1 arrested after providing a declaration in Officer Goodson’s case and told she should 2 have reported the assault when it happened. (Opp’n County Mot. Dismiss at 5–11; 3 Opp’n Compton Mot. Dismiss at 4–9.) 4 The Court disagrees. While Defendant Compton’s sexual assaults were 5 undoubtedly “unconscionable acts,” Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead that she filed 6 suit within a reasonable time after the deterrent effect of those acts ended. 7 First, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Compton threatened her not to 8 report the assaults, at most she alleges he warned her not to report the assaults 9 because “they won’t believe you,” and threatened that if Plaintiff was caught with 10 chewing tobacco in jail it would be a federal offense. (FAC ¶¶ 33, 36). Defendant 11 Compton’s threats could not reasonably have had the same deterrent effect as those 12 alleged in Bianco, as they did not implicate Plaintiff’s safety, immigration status, or any 13 other serious consequence. While Defendant Compton implied Plaintiff could be 14 prosecuted for possessing the chewing tobacco in jail, Plaintiff was released in 2017, 15 at which time the effect of that threat would have been nullified. Finally, Plaintiff 16 pleads that the last time she was actively harassed or threatened by Defendant 17 Compton was in 2017, eight years before she brought her claims. (Id. ¶ 35.) 18 Second, Plaintiff alleges she reported the assaults to law enforcement in a 19 neighboring county and subsequently provided an affidavit in Officer Goodson’s case 20 in 2019, but does not allege she experienced any retaliation or harassment from the 21 County or Defendant Compton as a result. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 51–53.) Despite having publicly 22 come forward with her claims twice, Plaintiff vaguely pleads that she could not file this 23 action until 2025 because she “believed the [Sheriff’s Office] would retaliate against 24 inmates who complained,” and believed she was in “grave danger” of being arrested 25 and prosecuted for the affidavit. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 52–53.) However, Plaintiff does not allege 26 why she formed these beliefs, or how she believed the Sheriff’s Office would retaliate 27 if she reported the assaults. Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff’s Office retaliated against 28 Officer Goodson by firing her when she filed her claims, but this form of retaliation 1 could not reasonably apply to Plaintiff as she was not employed by the County. 2 Further, while Plaintiff alleges she was arrested in 2019 shortly after providing her 3 affidavit in Officer Goodson’s case, she does not allege any facts indicating her 2019 4 arrest was unlawful, had anything to do with her alleged sexual assaults, or was in 5 retaliation for her affidavit. (See id. ¶ 54.) 6 Plaintiff’s allegations here stand in marked contrast to those alleged in M.S. Doe 7 v. County of Plumas, No. 2:24-cv-02640, 2025 WL 2381815 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025), 8 in which another former inmate brought similar allegations of sexual assault against 9 Defendant Compton. Therein, the Court found that the plaintiff’s section 1983 claims 10 were timely even though they had been brought more than 10 years after the alleged 11 assault because the plaintiff alleged Defendant Compton continued harassing her 12 well after her release from detention, including by threatening to call Child Protective 13 Services to have her children taken away, showing up to her family court hearings, and 14 harassing her at her workplace, the county animal shelter, to deter her from reporting 15 the sexual assault. Id. at *6. The plaintiff further alleged that she reported the assault 16 to her supervisor at the shelter, who in turn reported the assault to the county sheriff’s 17 department, but that county inadequately investigated her claims and later retaliated 18 against her supervisor by firing and pursuing criminal charges against her. Id. *2, 6. 19 Given these allegations, the Court found that plaintiff had plausibly alleged “both 20 Defendant Compton and the County engaged in ‘unconscionable acts’ which 21 deterred Plaintiff from pursuing her claims.” Id. at *6. The Court further found that the 22 plaintiff’s allegations were timely, even though she similarly filed an affidavit in Officer 23 Goodson’s case in 2019, because she plausibly alleged she “she feared taking any 24 further action given Defendant Compton’s previous threats, the County’s prior 25 inadequate investigation of her claims, and the County’s retaliation . . . until at least 26 2024 when she heard the news that Officer Goodson had won her case.” Id. By 27 comparison, Plaintiff here has failed to allege any deterrent acts by Defendants as 28 severe or continuous as those alleged in M.S. Doe. 1 In short, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient details that would explain her 2 duress extending until 2025, including any further contact or actions by Defendant 3 Compton or the County after 2019. Without more, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff 4 filed suit within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Fifth through 5 Eighth Causes of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are untimely and will be dismissed 6 with leave to amend. 7 II. Plaintiff’s Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action under the Trafficking Victims 8 Protection Act (“TVPA”) are Inadequately Pled 9 Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s causes of action under the Trafficking 10 Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) for Sex Trafficking and Forced Labor are inadequately 11 pled because Defendant Compton’s alleged sexual assaults do not fall within the 12 scope of that act. (County Mot. Dismiss at 20–24; Compton Mot. Dismiss at 16–20.) In 13 particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege any connection to 14 interstate commerce in support of her sex trafficking claim and has failed to allege she 15 was subjected to forced labor. (Id.) 16 The Court agrees. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) occurs when a person, “in 17 or affecting interstate or foreign commerce[,] . . . entices . . . or solicits by . . . force, 18 threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination [thereof] . . . [a] person to 19 engage in a commercial sex act.” Although courts have held “that any individual 20 instance of conduct regulated by the TVPA need only have a de minimis effect on 21 interstate commerce,” United States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2015), 22 Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendant Compton’s sexual assaults 23 implicated interstate commerce in any way. The pleadings do not suggest, for 24 example, that Defendant Compton traveled or facilitated the transport of Plaintiff 25 across state lines or national boarders, or that he solicited her from out of state. See, 26 e.g., United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[S]ex traffic in this case 27 was conducted by advertising across state lines and so affected interstate 28 commerce.”); United States v. Backman, 817 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding 1 “[s]ufficient evidence . . . supported the jury’s finding of an effect on interstate or 2 foreign commerce” when the “[d]efendant knew that the victim had flown, in foreign 3 commerce, from China to Saipan” and “one of the victim’s customers paid for the sex 4 acts by checks drawn on an out-of-state bank”). Nor is it alleged that Defendant 5 Compton initiated or arranged his encounters with Plaintiff using means within the 6 flow of interstate commerce, such as via the internet, telephone, or text messaging. 7 See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 573–75 (7th Cir. 2014); United 8 States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 9 1314, 1325–26 (10th Cir. 2014). 10 Plaintiff argues in opposition that Defendant “Compton’s conduct, though 11 occurring in Plumas County, involved the use of multiple instrumentalities of interstate 12 commerce.” (Opp’n Compton Mot. Dismiss at 9.) Notably, Plaintiff argues that 13 Defendant Compton “utilized the phone system as a pretext to bring N.P. Doe out of 14 her cell to provide her with tobacco, and generally used the telephone system, the 15 Internet, and Facebook to communicate with victims and coerce them into silence.” 16 (Id.) However, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Compton actually used the phone 17 system to solicit sex from Plaintiff; rather, he merely informed her she had a call as a 18 pretext to get her out of her cell. (FAC ¶ 34.) Further, Defendant Compton’s use of 19 the phone or internet to solicit other victims has no bearing on his use of such 20 instrumentalities to solicit Plaintiff. 21 Plaintiff also argues that “[b]eyond electronic means, Compton’s actions also 22 implicated California State Route 70, a regional transportation corridor connecting to 23 U.S. Route 395 and supporting the movement of goods and individuals across state 24 lines.” (Opp’n Compton Mot. Dismiss at 9.) However, Plaintiff does not actually allege 25 the use of California State Route 70 in her First Amended Complaint, nor does she 26 explain how use of this road, a state route, affects interstate commerce. Thus, Plaintiff 27 has failed to allege any nexus to interstate commerce sufficient to sustain her sex 28 trafficking claim. 1 Plaintiff has similarly failed to allege she was subjected to forced labor. Under 2 18 U.S.C. § 1589, forced labor is perpetrated by someone who “knowingly provides or 3 obtains the labor or services of a person” by means which include force, threats, 4 physical restraint, or abuse (or threatened abuse) of law or legal process. Plaintiff’s 5 claim for forced labor here is premised on her allegations that Defendant Compton 6 had ” been ordering her to expose herself (akin to stripper work), penetrating her with 7 his fingers through a food slot, coercing her to perform oral sex, repeatedly waking 8 her at night to have intercourse, making her swallow his ejaculation, and taking her to 9 a camera-free cell to assault her, which constitute forced labor . . . .” (FAC ¶ 167.) In 10 short, Plaintiff alleges the sexual assaults were forced labor. 11 The sexual assaults allegedly committed by Defendant Compton, egregious as 12 they were, do not constitute forced labor under the TVPA. While compulsory labor 13 may include forced sexual chores, the courts that have so held contemplated 14 situations wherein the victim was also forced to work for the perpetrators. See, e.g., 15 United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (defendants took in mentally 16 ill victims and forced them to perform uncompensated manual labor around the farm 17 as well sexually explicit acts over at least a decade); United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 18 260 (4th Cir. 2008) (victim was forced to live with defendants for four years during 19 which time she was forced to care for their children, clean the house, cook, and work 20 without compensation in the defendant’s medical business, and was subject to 21 repeated physical, emotional, and sexual abuse). Here, by contrast, Plaintiff has 22 alleged numerous incidents of sexual assault but has not alleged she was forced to 23 work for Defendant Compton in any other capacity. The isolated nature of the 24 assaults distinguishes this case from Kaufman and Udeozor. 25 Thus, Plaintiff’s Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action will be dismissed with leave to 26 amend. 27 //// 28 //// 1 | Ill. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's 2 First through Fourth Causes of Action Under State Law 3 Plaintiff's remaining claims for violations of the Bane Act, Sexual Assault/Sexual 4 | Battery, Sexual Harassment, and Gender Violence are premised on California law. 5 | Because the Court has dismissed all federal claims, albeit with leave to amend, the 6 | Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims unless and 7 | until a viable federal claim is adequately pled. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Ove v. 8 | Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may decline to exercise 9 | supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims 10 | over which it has original jurisdiction.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))). 11 Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff First 12 | through Fourth Causes of Action and dismisses them without prejudice. 13 CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the County and Defendant 15 | Compton’s Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 16, 17) will be GRANTED in full. The Court 16 | hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff's Fifth through Tenth Causes of Action with leave to 17 | amend, and declines supplemental jurisdiction over the First through Fourth Causes 18 | of Action without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint 19 | within thirty (30) days. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 | Dated: _ August 26, 2025 Donel J □□ bratte— Hon. Daniel alabretta 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 | ica - Plumas.25ev00264.MTD 26 27 28

4K

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28