Doe a v. Spahn

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2859
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN DOE A, et. al.,

Plaintiffs

v. Civil Action No. 1: 23-cv-02859 (CJN)

CAROL SPAHN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

John and Jane Doe plaintiffs are eight individuals whose applications for overseas volunteer

positions with the United States Peace Corps were rejected on the grounds that each of them suffers

from a mental disability. They raise a series of challenges here, both as to the internal guidelines the

Peace Corps employs for determining medical fitness, as well as to their individual determinations.

The government moves to dismiss some of their claims; for the reasons discussed below, the Court

grants that motion in part.

I. Background

A. Legal Background

Congress established the Peace Corps in 1961 with the passage of the Peace Corps Act. Pub.

L. No. 87-293, 75 Stat. 612, 612–25 (Sept. 22, 1961) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2501–

2523). The Peace Corps’ purpose is to “promote world peace and friendship” by exporting American

workers and volunteers “qualified for service abroad and willing to serve, under conditions of

hardship, if necessary, to help the peoples of such countries . . . in meeting their needs for trained

manpower, particularly in meeting the basic needs of those living in the poorest areas of such countries.” 22 U.S.C. § 2501. As of December 1981, the Peace Corps is an independent federal

agency. See 22 U.S.C. § 2501-1; International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981,

Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 601, 95 Stat. 1519, 1540–42 (Dec. 29, 1981).

The Peace Corps Act authorizes the President to “enroll in the Peace Corps for service abroad

qualified citizens and nationals of the United States,” whom the Peace Corps Act calls “volunteers.”

22 U.S.C. § 2504(a). The Act specifies that all “terms and conditions” of volunteer service “shall be

exclusively those set forth in [the Act] and those consistent therewith which the President may

prescribe.” Id. § 2504(a). The President has delegated his authority and functions conferred by the

Peace Corps Act to the Director of the Peace Corps. Exec. Order No. 12137 of May 16, 1979, § 1-

103, 44 Fed. Reg. 29023 (May 18, 1979).

Peace Corps regulations expressly provide that “[t]he Peace Corps does not discriminate

against any person on account of… disability.” 22 C.F.R. § 305.1(d); see also id. §§ 306.1, 306.2(a),

306.3. But they also state the Peace Corps’ interests in ensuring that a volunteer can “[p]erform the

job to which [he] is assigned,” and that the Peace Corps is “capable of providing [him] with such

health care as the Peace Corps deems necessary….” 22 C.F.R. § 305.4(a)(2).

To that end, the regulations lay out the standards for volunteer eligibility and selection,

including medical eligibility. Id. §§ 305.2–305.6. In particular, applicants “must have the physical

and mental capacity required to meet the essential eligibility requirements for a Volunteer.” Id. §

305.4(a)(1). Medical eligibility is an “individualized assessment.” Id. § 305.4(b); see also id. §

305.4(c)(2). Accordingly, all Peace Corps volunteer applicants must pass a medical clearance

screening. And Peace Corps medical screeners consult a series of “Guidelines” to help them

determine, in light of the medical disclosures made by the applicant during the screening, whether the

applicant is healthy enough to merit clearance. ECF 22-4 at 2.

Those guidelines state “THESE ARE GUIDELINES. EACH APPLICANT RECEIVES AN INDIVIDUAL REVIEW AND CLEARANCE STATUS IS ULTIMATELY UP TO THE CLINICAL

JUDGMENT OF THE REVIEWER.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). With respect to mental health

issues, the Guidelines set out what they call “disqualifying criteria.” Those criteria include, for

example:

• Taking “as-needed anti-anxiety medication” or “sleep medication” any time in the past

year. ECF 22-5 at 2.

• A diagnosis of ADHD in addition to any history of, inter alia, an eating disorder, a

seizure disorder, a substance use disorder, or a psychiatric hospitalization. ECF 18-1

at 11.

• A diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder. Id. at 20.

• Any prescription of more than two psychiatric medications of any kind. Id. at 12.

In the event an applicant believes the denial of a volunteer position was discriminatory, the

regulations prescribe a process, facilitated by the Peace Corps’ Office of Civil Rights and Diversity

(“OCRD”), for appealing that decision. An aggrieved party must begin by “bring[ing] [his] allegations

to the attention of [the OCRD] within 60 days of the alleged discriminatory action.” 22 C.F.R. §

306.8. A counselor will then attempt to resolve the allegations through a “pre-complaint procedure”

that will finish in 30 days unless the OCRD Director chooses to extend the period upon the aggrieved

party’s showing of good cause. Id. at § 306.8(a), (b), (g). If, after inquiry and counseling, an informal

resolution is not reached, the counselor will notify the aggrieved party in writing of the right to file a

formal complaint of discrimination with the OCRD Director. Id. at § 306.8(h). That formal complaint

is due within 30 days of the notice; following its submission, an OCRD investigator “will… review…

the circumstances under which the alleged discrimination occurred, and any other circumstances

which may constitute, or appear to constitute, discrimination against the complainant.” Id. at §

306.9(e). “To the extent feasible,” this review must culminate in a draft final decision from the OCRD Director within 120 days. Id. at § 306.9(k), § 306.9(l). The aggrieved party has 10 days to appeal that

decision to the Director of the Peace Corps. If not timely appealed, the aggrieved person can file suit

challenging the OCRD Director’s decision. If it is timely appealed, the Peace Corps Director will

issue her own opinion—which can then be challenged. Id. at § 306.9(l), (m).

Also relevant here is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits disability discrimination

in federally funded programs. Section 501 (somewhat confusingly recodified as § 791 of Title 29 of

the U.S. Code) prohibits disability discrimination by federal employers. 29 U.S.C. § 791. Section

504 (recodified as § 794 of Title 29) extends that prohibition to discrimination in “any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance” and “any program or activity conducted by any

Executive agency.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Section 505 1 of the Rehabilitation Act provides various remedies for violations of the statute.

Section 505(a)(1) grants injured parties “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717

of the Civil Rights Act … with respect to any complaint under section 791 of this title,” that is, for

discrimination by federal employers. And Section 505(a)(2) provides plaintiffs “[t]he remedies,

procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act” for discrimination at the hands of

“any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this

title.”

B. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are eight individuals, proceeding under pseudonym, who suffer from different mental

1 The relevant portion of § 504 is § 794(a) of Title 29; § 505 is § 794a of Title 29. § 794(a) and § 794a are different provisions; the Court flags this nuance because it can prove confusing on first impression. 2 As noted above, seven plaintiffs had claimed that the Peace Corps unlawfully delayed a decision on their administrative appeals; the government, for its part, argued in its motion to dismiss that those plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Because the Peace Corps has since finally decided each of those appeals, plaintiffs’ undue delay claims are moot and the government’s exhaustion argument is no longer applicable. health disabilities. All were preliminarily invited to serve as Peace Corps volunteers but, after

disclosing their mental health disabilities during their medical clearance screeners, all were deemed

medically ineligible for service. ECF 1 at 4, 6; ECF 23 at 5.

Some of these denials stemmed from the Peace Corps’ determination that it lacked the capacity

to provide the plaintiff with necessary medical treatment overseas. For example, the Peace Corps

determined that the Philippines did not have “adequate or appropriate mental health care and

psychiatric resources to effectively support [John Doe A’s] current condition.” ECF 22-2 at 3. Other

denials stemmed from the Peace Corps’ determination that the condition would interfere with the

plaintiff’s ability to serve as an ineffective volunteer. The Peace Corp rejected John Doe C, for

example, because he required an “active medication regime of Duloxetine 60mg twice a day,

Buspirone 20mg three times a day, Doxepin 100mg three times a day, Buprenorphine three times a

day, and Ritalin 40mg twice a day”—and being under the “sedat[ing] influence” of that amount of

medication was incompatible with volunteer service in the “austere environment” of Fiji. Id. at 7.

Others were rejected because, for example, the Peace Corps concluded that the medical dosage

“exceeded the recommended maximum,” or because the recommended dosage might actually

“exacerbate” the plaintiff’s symptoms. Id. at 12, 14.

Each of the eight plaintiffs appealed these denials administratively. Each utilized the informal

process; in each case, the Pre-Service Review Board upheld the denial. ECF 22 at 25. Each plaintiff

then filed an administrative complaint with the OCRD. On August 29, 2018, plaintiff Jane Doe E

received a decision from the OCRD upholding her denial. ECF 18-1 at 43. By the time this suit was

filed on September 26, 2023, however, none of the other seven plaintiffs had received a decision.

Accordingly, in addition to their substantive challenges (addressed below), those seven plaintiffs

initially claimed that the Peace Corps had unlawfully delayed a final decision on their claims. Since

then, however, each plaintiff has received a final agency decision on those questions. See ECF 16. Accordingly, what primarily remains in this case are plaintiffs’ substantive challenges to the

Peace Corps’ Guidelines. Plaintiffs claim that the mental health screening Guidelines are themselves

unlawful, either as inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act or as arbitrary and capricious under § 706

of the Administrative Procedure Act. ECF 18-1 at 53, 55. They also claim that their individualized

rejections are unlawful, again as inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act or the APA.

The government moved to dismiss on various grounds. As still relevant here, 2 it contends that

Jane Doe E’s claims are moot because the volunteer program to which she applied has since ceased

to exist (ECF 22 at 14); that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a private right of action (id. at

18); and that the guidelines do not constitute final agency action under the APA (id. at 30).

II. Analysis

A. Jane Doe E’s Claims are Not Moot

The government argues that Jane Doe E’s claims are moot because, while she was denied the

opportunity to volunteer for a particular program, that program has since been discontinued. In

particular, Jane Doe E originally applied to a program known as “GHSP,” which offered “high-impact,

short-term” volunteer opportunities for U.S. citizens with medical backgrounds to “assist in

strengthening teaching and training capacity” in medical or nursing schools overseas and to “build

capacity in the health systems of developing countries.” ECF 22-1 at 2. The Peace Corps discontinued

GHSP in 2018. ECF 23 at 13. But it also launched a similar program the next year called “AHP,”

which it describes as “offer[ing] volunteers high-impact, short-term opportunities abroad to improve

health care education and strengthen health systems in resource-limited areas abroad.” ECF 23 at 13.

2 As noted above, seven plaintiffs had claimed that the Peace Corps unlawfully delayed a decision on their administrative appeals; the government, for its part, argued in its motion to dismiss that those plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Because the Peace Corps has since finally decided each of those appeals, plaintiffs’ undue delay claims are moot and the government’s exhaustion argument is no longer applicable. The Court recognizes that these programs are not completely identical, and it also recognizes

that Jane Doe E has not taken the (potentially futile) step of applying for a position with AHP. But

given these programs’ substantial similarity and the fact that the case is still at just the pleading stage,

the Court concludes that the government’s motion to dismiss on this question should be denied.

B. The Rehabilitation Act Does Not Provide a Private Right of Action Here

The government also moves to dismiss to dismiss Count One, plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act

claim, on the ground that the Act does not create a private right of action to sue a federal agency (such

as the Peace Corps) under Section 504 for non-employment, non-funding actions like those challenged

here. ECF 25 at 12-16. Plaintiffs, for their part, respond that Section 504(a) contains just the type of

“rights creating language” that the Supreme Court has recognized as authorizing a private right of

action. ECF 23 at 30.

The parties’ disagreement on this question mirrors a split among certain Judges on this Court

on the same question. On the one hand, Judges Moss and McFadden have held that the Rehabilitation

Act does not create a private right of action for non-employment, non-funding actions. See SAI v.

Department of Homeland Security, 149 F. Supp. 3d 99 (D.D.C. 2015),and Mathis v. United States

Parole Commission, 749 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2024). Chief Judge Boasberg, on the other hand, has

held that the Act does create a private right of action. See Nat'l Ass'n of the Deaf v. Trump, 486 F.

Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2020)

The Court concludes that the better view is that the Rehabilitation Act does not create a private

right of action here. To be sure, the language in § 504, read in a vacuum, may well create a

presumption of a private right of action for Rehabilitation Act claims. Mathis, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 18.

But the rest of the statute is inconsistent with that position. In particular, as described more fully in

Judge McFadden’s thoughtful opinion, the Act contains “three discrete prohibitions” of discrimination

by three discrete groups: (1) federal agencies in their capacities as employers (§ 501); (2) recipients of “federal financial assistance” funding (§ 504); and (3) executive agencies acting as conductors of

federal programs (also § 504). See Id. at 17. But Section 505 provides explicit private relief—that

is, the full scope of “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964”—only with respect to the first two categories: “any complaint under § [501] of this title” (that

is, discrimination by federal employers); and “to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by

any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section [504] of this

title” (that is, discrimination by recipients of federal funding). 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(a)(2). Where, as

here, Congress did not expressly extend private relief to the third category, the Court concludes that

the existence of explicit private rights of action for the federal-employer and funding-recipient

provisions implies the exclusion of a right of action for the program-conductor provision. See id.; see

also Mathis, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3

C. The Guidelines Are Not Final Agency Action.

That leaves plaintiffs’ APA claims, which as relevant here are asserted in Counts Two and

Three of the Amended Complaint. See supra p. 6 n.2; ECF 18-1 at 55, 59. The government does not

move to dismiss those claims in their entirety; in particular, the government concedes that plaintiffs’

APA challenges to their individual denials may proceed. Instead, the government argues that plaintiffs

cannot challenge the screening and clearance Guidelines under the APA because they do not constitute

agency action or final agency action. Instead, the government contends, they are a nonbinding and

3 Because the Court holds that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a private cause of action in these circumstances, the Court declines, at this time, to decide whether the Peace Corps Act preempts any such right of action—even though it recognizes that the question of the preemptive effect of the Peace Corps Act may remain live as this case progresses.

In addition, relying on Mathis, plaintiffs argued at oral argument that they can pursue their Rehabilitation Act claims even absent a private right of action under the Act because federal courts have inherent equitable authority to enjoin the government from committing statutory violations. See Mathis, 749 F.Supp.3d at 22. This issue has not been fully briefed, however, and the Court therefore declines to take it up in this opinion. internal government resource that is used to inform individualized assessments. ECF 22 at 43.

The Court agrees. As an initial matter, “[l]egislative rules generally require notice and

comment, but interpretive rules and general statements of policy do not.” Nat’l Min. Ass’n v.

McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014). To be legislative, a rule must have the “force and

effect of law,” which is the case only when a plaintiff can “establish a nexus between the [rule] and

some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by congress.” Id. at 250. And a legislative rule

must impose “legally binding obligations on regulated parties.” Id. at 251. While the Guidelines were

surely relevant (perhaps highly so) in how Peace Corps reviewers acted upon plaintiffs’ applications,

plaintiffs have failed plausibly to allege that the Guidelines bound the reviewers to reach particular

outcomes. In fact, the Guidelines themselves state that clearance is “UP TO THE CLINICAL

JUDGMENT OF THE REVIEWER,” ECF 22-5 at 2 and while plaintiffs point to other language in

the Guidelines, they also concede that Peace Corps staff have ultimate discretion to grant or deny

clearances based on an individualized review. ECF 23 at 52. Moreover, the Guidelines fit into two

statutory exceptions to notice and comment rulemaking: as matters “relating to agency management

or personnel,” and as “statements of policy.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(2), (d)(2); see also See Stewart v.

Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 496–500 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (no notice and comment for age limit in hiring policy);

Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (no notice and comment for personnel

management handbook). The Guidelines therefore do not constitute a legislative rule subject to the

notice and comment process.

Nor do the Guidelines constitute final agency action—or even agency action in the first place.

For the Guidelines to constitute final agency action, “rights or obligations,” or “legal consequences”

must “flow” from them. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). To that end, the Court of

Appeals has held that “[t]he distinction between ‘general statements of policy’ and ‘rules’ is critical,”

and has looked to both the “effects of an agency’s action” and the “agency’s expressed intentions” in determining whether something counts as final agency action. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway

Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 806–07 (D.C. Cir. 2006.

Here, no consequences flow from the Guidelines themselves. Instead, the determination is

made by a reviewer, applying the Guidelines; as the Guidelines themselves provide, the decision is

“UP TO… THE REVIEWER.” ECF 22-5 at 2 And the Guidelines are just one of many things that

reviewers may consult; under the regulations, reviewers are to consider “information from the

applicant and their physicians, current medical research, screening guidelines developed by OMS,

knowledge and experience of the nature of Peace Corps service, and information about the scope of

medical care available overseas.” Id. at 2, ECF 22-6 at 5. It is those individualized decisions, and not

the Guidelines, that constitute final agency action.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint, ECF 22, is granted in part and denied in part. A separate order accompanies this opinion.

DATE: May 6, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge