Dobronski v. Alarm Management II, L.L.C.

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided November 18, 2020·No. 3:18-cv-11055·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______________________________________________________________________

MARK W. DOBRONSKI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 18-11055

ALARM MANAGEMENT II, L.L.C., d/b/a SONITROL GREAT LAKES,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDERING DEFENDANT TO FILE A BILL OF COSTS

Plaintiff Mark Dobronski brings this action against Defendant Alarm Management II, L.L.C., for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., and the Michigan Home Solicitation Sales Act (“MHSA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.111, et seq. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6-7.) Plaintiff claims Defendant made two calls to his residential telephone, both of which were allegedly on the National Do Not Call Registry. Defendant moves for summary judgement arguing it did not call Plaintiff’s residential numbers. (ECF No. 53, PageID.718.) Plaintiff has filed a response and Defendant has replied. (ECF No. 58, 59.) The court finds a hearing unnecessary, E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), and for the reasons provided below, the court will grant Defendant’s motion. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed suit on March 21, 2018 in state court, and Defendant removed the action to this court on April 2, 2018. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2; ECF No. 53, PageID.718.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made two telephone calls to Plaintiff’s

residential telephone numbers – (734) 424-1212 and (734) 424-2424 – on October 25, 2017 and November 1, 2017 to “encourage the purchase or rental of a home security system or service.” (ECF No.1, PageID.5-.8.) Plaintiff contends that these numbers are on the National Do Not Call Registry and are emergency telephone numbers for a law enforcement agency. (Id., PageID.5-.6.) As a result, Plaintiff asserts the telephone calls violate both the TCPA and the MHSA. (Id., PageID.6-7.) Defendant provides electronic security equipment and monitoring services. (ECF No. 53, PageID.718.) At times, Defendant will “utilize[] EAM Staffing Solutions, LLC (“EAM”), an independent third-party telemarketing company, to contact prospective commercial clients about using Defendant’s equipment and services.” (Id., PageID.718-

719.) In June 2018, Defendant produced call logs and audio recordings showing the telephone numbers and companies EAM contacted on behalf of Defendant. (Id., PageID.719.) The call logs indicate that EAM never contacted either of the telephone numbers identified in the complaint on the dates in question or at any other time. (Id., PageID.719; ECF No. 53-4, PageID.767.) On or about October 25, 2017, an EAM representative placed a phone call to Teletech Inc. (“Teletech”) at (734) 641-2300 and asked to speak with the Teletech President. (ECF No. 53, PageID.721-722; ECF No. 53-5, PageID.768.) Teletech is a for-profit company owned and operated by Plaintiff and his wife, Susan Dobronski. (ECF No. 53, PageID.719; ECF No. 53-7, PageID.887.) The audio recordings showed that Plaintiff did not answer the call. A woman answered the phone and stated, “Good afternoon, A&B Railroad.” Further, she clarified that the telephone number called was for both the A&B Railroad and Teletech. (ECF No. 53, PageID.722; ECF No. 53-5,

PageID.768.) A&B Railroad is another for-profit corporation run by Plaintiff and his wife. (ECF No. 53-8, PageID.889.) Call logs further show that on November 1, 2017, an EAM representative placed a second call to Teletech at (734) 641-2300. (ECF No. 53, PageID.723; ECF No. 53-5, PageID.768-69.) The audio recording shows the representative asked for Susan Dobronski but was transferred to an individual identified as “Stan,” Susan’s “executive administrative assistant.” (ECF No. 53, PageID.724; ECF No. 53-5, PageID.768-69.) The conversation did not last long; Stan ended the call saying he would “pass the message along.” (ECF No. 53-5, PageID.769.) Stan was later determined to be Plaintiff. (ECF No. 53-6, PageID.823.)

At his deposition on May 10, 2019, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant never called the numbers listed in the complaint. (ECF No. 53-6, PageID.821, 823.) He stated the inclusion of the wrong numbers “was an oversight on [his] part.” (Id., PageID.821.) On May 14, 2019, Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 25.) “Plaintiff sought to amend his allegations to reflect (i) that the phone calls giving rise to his claims were placed to a different number, (734) 641- 2300, than the one identified in his existing complaint, (ii) that this phone number is assigned to Adrian & Blissfield Rail Road Company (“ADBF”), (iii) that ADBF is a law enforcement agency, and (iv) that the number allegedly called by Defendant qualifies as an emergency line of a law enforcement agency.” (ECF No. 49, PageID.697.) The court denied the motion on July 20, 2020. (ECF No. 49.) It found that “Plaintiff’s request was unduly delayed and . . . Defendant would be prejudiced if

Plaintiff were permitted to amend his complaint.” (Id., PageID.696.) In its opinion, the court noted that while the proposed amendments did not advance a new theory of recovery, the suggested allegations were “nowhere to be found in Plaintiff’s existing complaint . . . [and] appear for the first time in his proposed amended complaint.” (Id., PageID.700.) On August 28, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgement and sanctions. (ECF No. 53.) In his response, Plaintiff explains that calls made to his home telephone forward back to his office, allowing Plaintiff to answer his home telephone line at either his home or his office. (ECF No.58, PageID.1067.) Plaintiff agreed that Defendant initiated the telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s place of business and not the

residential numbers listed. (Id., PageID.1072-73.) II. STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show—point out— that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). First, the moving party bears the initial burden of presentation that “demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is no requirement, however, that the moving party “support its motion with [evidence] negating the opponent’s claim.” Id.; see also Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Petrol. Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1995). Second, “the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis removed) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). This requires more than a “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” or “‘[t]he mere possibility of a factual dispute.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gregg v.

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Dobronski v. Alarm Management II, L.L.C., (E.D. Mich. 2020).

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