D.M., individually and as parent and natural guardian of minor child on behalf of C. C. v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided May 13, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-00551·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

D.M., individually and as parent and natural : guardian of minor child on behalf of C. C., :

: Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:26-cv-00551

: Judge Michael H. Watson v. : Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall

:

: CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al., :

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (ECF No. 3), and Plaintiff’s Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal (ECF No. 4). For the following reasons, the Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, the Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym is GRANTED, and the Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff, D.M., individually and on behalf of her child, C.C., brings this action against the City of Columbus, Columbus Division of Police (“CDP”) Detectives Matthew Dunbar and Scott Plate in their individual capacities, Harambee Christian School (“HCS”), HCS Principal Alex Steinman, and HCS employees Olivia Steinman and Devon Jackson. Plaintiff alleges various violations of federal and state law arising from Defendants’ alleged failure to properly investigate and respond to Plaintiff’s reports that her child was sexually assaulted while enrolled as a student at HCS. (ECF No. 1.) II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2)

Plaintiff, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court will conduct an initial screening of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as soon as practicable to determine whether or not any claims are subject to dismissal as frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim, or because the Complaint seeks monetary relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. B. Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym (ECF No. 3)

Plaintiff moves to proceed under her and her child’s initials (D.M. and C.C., respectively), arguing that this action concerns allegations involving a minor child, and that public disclosure of Plaintiff’s name would necessarily identify the minor. (ECF No. 3, PAGEID # 73.) Generally, a complaint must state the names of all the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Yet the Court “may excuse [parties] from identifying themselves in certain circumstances.” Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004). “In exercising its discretion, a court must balance the public’s common law right of access to court proceedings against the interests of litigants in nondisclosure.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:15-CV-2519, 2015 WL 12698036, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2015) (citing In re Polemar Constr. Ltd. P’ship, 23 F. App’x. 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2001)). To determine whether a party’s privacy interests outweigh the presumption in favor of openness, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has identified factors to consider, including: (1) whether the [party] seeking anonymity [is] suing to challenge governmental activity; (2) whether prosecution of the suit will compel the [party] to disclose information ‘of the utmost intimacy’; (3) whether the litigation compels [a party] to disclose an intention to violate the law, thereby risking criminal prosecution; and (4) whether the [party is a child].

Porter, 370 F.3d at 560 (citing Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1981)). Here, the factors weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiff and her child to proceed by pseudonym. First, Plaintiff is challenging governmental activity, namely the City of Columbus’s failure to train, and Plaintiff names the City of Columbus as a Defendant. The application of the second factor—whether this litigation will disclose information of the utmost intimacy—also favors Plaintiff’s request. Here, Plaintiff says this “action concerns allegations involving a minor child.” (ECF No. 3, PAGEID #: 73.) Indeed, the Complaint arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants failed to properly investigate the alleged sexual assault of her minor child. (ECF No. 1.) “[F]ederal courts have recognized the privacy interests of alleged sexual assault victims and have held that those privacy interests ‘outweigh the presumption in favor of openness.”’ Doe v. Mitchell, No. 2:20-CV-00459, 2020 WL 6882601, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2020) (citation omitted) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-459, 2021 WL 2313436 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2021). Concerning the fourth factor, C.C. is a minor. Courts routinely allow minors and their parents to proceed anonymously or under a pseudonym to protect the minor’s identity. See, e.g., Doe v. Mechanicsburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (“Courts frequently grant protective orders to minors who challenge governmental conduct.”); Doe v. Southfield Pub. Sch., No. 24-10760, 2024 WL 1526084, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2024) (“Courts frequently permit parents bringing suit on behalf of minors to remain anonymous, to protect the minor’s identity.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3). Finally, because the Defendants were involved in the investigation of C.C.’s alleged sexual assault, and the parties can mitigate concerns regarding Plaintiff’s and her daughter’s identities by entering into protective orders, there is little to no prejudice toward Defendants. Given the weight of the factors, the balance of the litigants’ interests in nondisclosure

outweighs the public’s right to access court proceedings. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED. C. Motion to Seal (ECF No. 4)

Much like motions to proceed under a pseudonym, motions for leave to file documents under seal must be considered in the light of the strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. Stanley v. Turner Oil & Gas Properties, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-386, 2017 WL 5068444, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2017). The Sixth Circuit has directed that documents filed with the Court may be placed under seal “[o]nly for the most compelling reasons.” Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Knoxville News–Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)). “A movant’s obligation to provide compelling reasons justifying the seal exists even if the parties themselves agree the filings should be sealed.” White v. Wilberforce Univ., No. 1:16-CV-1165, 2017 WL 3537233, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2016)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

D.M., individually and as parent and natural guardian of minor child on behalf of C. C. v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al., (S.D. Ohio 2026).

D.M., individually and as parent and natural guardian of minor child on behalf of C. C. v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al. (D.M., individually and as parent and natural guardian of minor child on behalf of C. C. v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related