NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
D.L.M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
C.R.C.
Appellee No. 650 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered January 3, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): A06-05-62795-C-31
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 Appellant, D.L.M. (Mother), appeals from the January 3, 2014 order granting C.R.C. (Father) primary physical custody during the school year and
2004. After careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case as follows. Mother filed the initial custody petition in this case on April 18,
entered a stipulated custody order, granting Mother primary physical custody, and Father partial custody on alternating weekends and every Monday and Wednesday evening. Trial Court Order, 2/14/07. In January 2012, Mother, together with N.D.C., and her older son, R. half-sibling, moved in with Father at his Southhamton, Bucks County
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apartment due to her inability to maintain stable housing. N.T., 1/13/14, at 5-7. On November 28, 2012, Mother vacated the apartment with the children.
On December 5, 2012, Father filed a petition for contempt against Mother, wherein he alleged that Mother had not informed him of her whereabouts and had denied him partial custody of N.D.C. Petition for Contempt, 12/5/12, at ¶¶ 4-6. Further, Father alleged that Mother has a history of unstable living arrangements, and he requested legal and physical custody of N.D.C. and Mother to have supervised visitation. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. Also on December 5, 2012, Mother filed a Protection from Abuse (PFA) petition against Father in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, where she resided at the time. N.T., 1/3/14, at 6.
On January 5, 2013, upon agreement of the parties, without admission, prejudice, or findings of fact, a PFA order was issued against Father with respect to Mother and R.M., but not to N.D.C. Id. The PFA order was amended on July 22, 2013, to include that Father may have contact with Mother related to issues involving N.D.C. Id.
empt,
by order dated January 23, 2013, the trial court granted the parties joint
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legal custody,1 Father primary physical custody, and Mother partial custody on alternating weekends and on Tuesday and Thursday evenings. Id. at 6- 7; Trial Court Order, 1/23/13. On January 25, 2013, Mother filed a petition
trial court issued an interim order on April 24, 2013, granting the parties joint legal custody and shared physical custody on an alternating weekly basis.2 In addition, the interim order directed the parties to obtain a custody evaluation through the Court Conciliation and Evaluation Service (CCES), a private organization that performs custody evaluations in Bucks County. See Trial Court Order, 4/24/13; N.T., 1/3/14, at 7; Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/14, at 10, n. 4. By interim order dated May 7, 2013, the trial court again directed the parties to participate in the CCES process, granted Mother and Father shared legal and physical custody on an alternating weekly basis,
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1 The Child Custody Act (Act), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340, was applicable
subsequent custody proceedings. See C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 445 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that, if the custody evidentiary proceeding commences on or after the effective date of the Act, i.e., January 24, 2011, the provisions of the Act apply). We note that the Act does not provide for
See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a)(6), (7) (types of
to Section 5323(a)(6).
2 The Honorable Susan Devlin Scott presided over the custody hearing on April 24, 2013, and all subsequent custody proceedings, including that which is the subject of the instant appeal.
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and directed that N.D.C. shall continue to attend Davis Elementary School in the Centennial School District, wherein Father resides, for the remainder of the school year. Trial Court Order, 5/7/13.
On May 24, 2013, Mother filed a petition requesting that the trial court waive the costs for the CCES process because she is proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) in the custody action.3 In the same petition, Mother requested that the CCES process not include joint sessions between her and Father. See -2. The trial court held a
the court vacated the April 24, 2013 order requiring that the parties obtain a CCES evaluation. See Trial Court Order, 7/30/13. This order also scheduled Id.
In addition, at the July 20, 2013 hearing, the trial court directed that the
Elementary School in the Centennial School District] pending a full and
3/3/14, at 11.
The custody hearing was held on October 16, 2013, and December 16, 2013, wherein Mother was represented by counsel, and Father appeared pro se. The trial court heard testimony from Father, Mother, R.M., and N.D.C.
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3 By order dated April 9, 2013, Mother was granted IFP status.
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On January 3, 2014, the trial court delineated its findings and conclusions on the record in open court. N.T., 1/3/14, at 1-53. By written order the same date, the court granted the parties joint legal custody, Father primary physical custody during the school year, and Mother partial custody the first three weekends out of a four-week cycle. During the summer, the court granted Mother primary physical custody and Father partial custody the first three weekends out of a four-week cycle. In addition, the court set forth a vacation and holiday custody schedule. On January 31, 2014, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.4 On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review.
1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in denying Mother access to mediation and evaluation services through [CCES] when Mother validly objected to flaws in the CCES system that the trial court has established as the exclusive avenue for a person of limited means to obtain such services?
2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it based the January 3, 2014 custody order on a series of inferences that are legally erroneous and unsupported by the evidence in the record?
a. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in determining that [N.D.C.] should be separated for most of the year from his cal fourteenyear
-old son, with whom [N.D.C.] lived from birth until January 2013? Relatedly, did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in
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4 Mother and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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concluding that [R.M.] poses a threat of physical harm to [N.D.C.]?
b. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in ordering Mother and Father to enroll [N.D.C.] at Centennial School District, the school district in which Father resides, in
finding that attending Centennial School District was the schooling arrangement in the best interest of [N.D.C.]? Did the court further err in using its improper school enrollment decision as the basis for making inferences
c. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in failing to weigh significant evidence bearing on stability in [N.D.C.] family life, specifically that Mother had primary physical custody of [N.D.C.] from his birth [in]
July [], 2004, until an illegal order from the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County divested her of primary physical custody on January 23, 2013?
d. Did the trial court err and abuse its
mother and brothers rendered her less capable than Father of ma
consistent and nurturing relationship with the
e. Did the trial court err in finding that Father did not abuse Mother notwithstanding that another court had previously entered a [PFA]
order against Father and in favor of Mother?
-7.
Our scope and standard of review of an appeal from a custody order are as follows.
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In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we
inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the sions are
unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.
We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
[T]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed record.
A.H. v. C.M., 58 A.3d 823, 825 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006).
The primary concern in any custody case is the best interests of the -interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis,
physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well- Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006), quoting Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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Relevant to this case are the best interest factors set forth in Section 5328(a) of the Act, which provide as follows.
§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.
(a) Factors. In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and another party.
(2) The present and past abuse
household, whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.
(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services).
(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the child.
(4) The need for stability and and community life.
(5) The availability of extended family.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of judgment.
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(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.
(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for the child's emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
for the child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A ort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol household.
(15) The mental and physical con
household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). The trial court must consider each of these factors when entering an order either establishing or modifying custody. A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2014).
In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by denying her the benefit of the CCES process. Specifically, Mother argues that, in vacating the order requiring the CCES evaluation, the
co
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petition for court-
Brief at 23-
-sponsored mediation pr
litigant, the cost is waived pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 240(f) and 1904.5. Id. at 29.
We begin by noting that mediation is a specifically defined term in the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding custody cases.
Rule 1940.2. Definitions
As used in this Chapter, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
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violated her procedural due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, that argument is waived See In re B.C., 36
statement cannot be used to raise a claim for the first time on appe (citation omitted).
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neutral mediator assists the parties in attempting to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on issues arising in a custody action. The role of the mediator is to assist the parties in identifying the issues, reducing misunderstanding, clarifying priorities, exploring areas of compromise and finding points of agreement. An agreement reached by the parties must be based on the voluntary decisions of the parties and not the decision of the mediator. The agreement may resolve all or only some of the disputed issues. Parties are required to mediate in good faith, but are not compelled to reach an agreement. While mediation is an alternative means of conflict resolution, it is not a substitute for the benefit of legal advice.
Pa.R.C.P. 1940.2. The Rules also note that parties who are proceeding IFP court-conn Id. at 1940.5(a)(1), Note.
A prior trial court decision in Bucks County described CCES as follows.
Under CCES, the parties agree to be evaluated by a Ph.D. level psychologist for the purpose of generating recommendations as to a custody arrangement that is in the best interests of the children. The CCES process often results in custody agreements. If no agreement is reached, the CCES evaluator prepares a report that is submitted to the court and counsel. As part of the agreement to go to CCES, the parties agree that the court may consider the report prepared by the psychologist without requiring the testimony of the psychologist.
Smith v. McCollum, 77 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 3 n.1 (Bucks 2005).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its decision, as follows.
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praecipe submitted by her trial counsel, which certified that she was providing free legal service to Mother and believed Mother was unable to pay the costs of litigation. Pa.R.C.P. 240(d). Mother never provided a statement of her income. As IFP, Mother
authorized by Act of Assembly or general rule which is payable to any court or Prothonotary or any public of
-connected mediation services as well, so that [IFP] parties without sufficient resources may file a petition seeking a waiver or
1940.5, note [].
Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/14, at 9. However, the trial court stated that the
that is awarded to applicants based on their financial ability to pay for the evaluation. Id. at 10. In addition, the trial court explained that the CCES is not a mediation service. The trial court stated, as follows:
[CCES] is not a mediation service, but a means to have an expert render an opinion on a proper custody arrangement.4 The Court has a small budget for subsidizing CCES fees. Applicants may qualify for a subsidy based on their current income level and other applicable factors. The amount of the subsidy is awarded on a sliding scale relative to
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CCES is a conciliation and evaluation process that does not force the parties to come to an agreement.
If conciliation is not possible, the evaluator notes it and the parties proceed to a hearing. CCES is not a mediation process that arrives at a final agreement.
CCES is a private organization that has a yearly contract with the court to do custody evaluations.
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Id. at 9-
bility for a CCES subsidy because [Mother] would not state her income. Given this, we vacated the Order that the parties go Id. at 10.
We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining that CCES is not a mediation service. CCES, as described by assist[ing] the
parties in identifying the issues, reducing misunderstanding, clarifying priorities, exploring areas of compromise and fi evaluated by a
the expert evaluator. Smith, supra. argument that the trial court erred in vacating its order requiring that the
to use the CCES process. Both parties presented their case directly to [the
Id. at 11. Therefore,
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argument as to whether, if the parties had used CCES, the trial court erred in ordering joint sessions, as this argument is now moot. See at 38-40.
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In her second issue, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in its application of the statutory best interest factors. Specifically, Mother raises five sub-arguments with regard to the custody factors. First, Mother argues the trial court erred when it separated N.D.C. from his half-sibling, ther avers the trial court erred in ordering the parties to enroll N.D.C. at Davis Elementary School. Id. at 47. Third, Mother claims the trial court failed to consider that Mother had primary physical custody of N.D.C. from the time of his birth until January 23, 2013. Id. -issue is that the trial court
siblings. Id. at 54. Fifth, Mother avers the trial court erred in finding that Father did not abuse her. Id. be construed that the trial court erred in its credibility and weight of the evidence determinations, we decline to re-weigh the evidence in this case, as we are bound by the determinations made by the trial court. See V.B., supra at 820 (stating that this Court defers to the trial court with respect to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence) (citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court thoroughly considered the Section 5328(a)
factors on the record in open court on January 3, 2014. N.T., 1/3/14, at 9- 30; see also delineate the reasons for its decision on the record in open court or in a ore, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial
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court incorporated its analysis of the Section 5328(a) factors, placed on the
asserted errors. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/14, at 1-9, 11-12.
The trial court concluded that the separation of N.D.C. and R.M. was outweighed by the level of conflict and animosity between the half-siblings. Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/14, at 4. The trial court also concluded that any issue stemming from i Elementary School was moot. Id.
e that parent to any extra Id. at 2, citing M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 338 (Pa. Super.
2013) (stating, our Legislature has rejected the notion that in analyzing both parents, additional consideration should be given to one because he or appeal denied, 68 A.3d 909 (Pa.
2013). The trial court also concluded that it onl
Id. her, the trial court noted that none of the incidents alleged by Mother amounted to physical abuse or threats thereof. Id. at 6-7. The trial court further noted
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Id. at 6. The trial court also concluded that it was not
without admission, so [there was no] judicial determination as to whether Id.
Upon careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion, as the record
2014 opinion of the Honorable Susan Devlin Scott as our own for the
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purpos See Trial Court
Opinion, 3/3/14, at 1-9, 11. The parties are directed to attach redacted
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude al
2014 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
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statement, which Mother did not include in her brief on appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/14, at 9-11, 11-12. 8 The copies shall include the redacted names of Mother, Father, N.D.C., and R.M.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2014
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