Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture

431 A.2d 1364, 49 Md. App. 379, 1981 Md. App. LEXIS 320
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJuly 14, 1981
Docket1621, September Term, 1980
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 431 A.2d 1364 (Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture, 431 A.2d 1364, 49 Md. App. 379, 1981 Md. App. LEXIS 320 (Md. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions

Thompson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. Melvin, J., dissents and files a dissenting opinion at page 389 infra.

In this case we are concerned with the duty of a general partner to give notice to limited partners concerning a business opportunity.

I The Law

Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, while the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of New York set out the standard in his usually eloquent manner when he said in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928):

"Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion’ of particular exceptions. Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 444, 154 N.E. 303. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.”

The Supreme Court of Alaska drew a parallel between the relationship of partners to their partnership and the fidu[381]*381ciary relationship of corporate officers and directors to their corporation in Mathis v. Meyeres, 574 P.2d 447, 448 (Alas. 1978):

"The parties are not in disagreement concerning the law governing business opportunities among partners. They correctly acknowledge that what we said in Alvest, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corporation, 398 P.2d 213, 215 (Alaska 1965) regarding the fiduciary relationship of corporate officers and directors to their corporation applies to the parallel relationship between partners and their partnership:
'A corporate officer or director stands in a fiduciary relationship to his corporation. Out of this relationship arises the duty of reasonably protecting the interests of the corporation. It is inconsistent with and a breach of such duty for an officer or director to take advantage of a business opportunity for his own personal profit when, applying ethical standards of what is fair and equitable in a particular situation, the opportunity should belong to the corporation. Where a business opportunity is one in which the corporation has a legitimate interest, the officer or director may not take the opportunity for himself. If he does, he will hold all resulting benefit and profit in his fiduciary capacity for the use and benefit of the corporation.’ ”

At this point it may be well to look at the Maryland Code with reference to the duty of a general partner in an ordinary partnership, set out in Md. Corp. & Ass’ns. Code Ann. § 9-404 (a) as follows:

"Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.”

[382]*382The particular duty with reference to limited partnerships is contained in § 10-108:

"A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners,____”

Maryland cases, although they do not address the precise question before the Court, approve the principles we have quoted. See, Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, 295 A.2d 876 (1972), and Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223 A.2d 240 (1966), in which it was said that managing partners of a limited partnership owe a special duty:

"A partner is a trustee to the extent that his duties bind him, a cestui que trust as far as the duties that rest on his copartners. 1 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, §§ 341-42; Restatement, Restitution §§ 166 comment d, 190 comment a; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76; 40 Am. Jur. Partnership § 128; Hagan v. Dundore, 187 Md. 430. These authorities which consider the matter also hold that generally the principle of utmost good faith covers not only dealings and transactions occurring during the partnership but also those taking place during the negotiations leading to the formation of the partnership. See also Knapp v. First National Bank and Trust Co. (10th Cir.), 154 F.2d 395, 398; Stephens v. Stephens (Ky.), 183 S.W.2d 822, 824. Managing partners particularly owe a ñduciary duty to inactive partners. Corr v. Hoffman (N.Y.), 176 N.E. 383; Einsweiler v. Einsweiler (Ill.), 61 N.E.2d 377.” (Emphasis added). Id. at 128.

The principles were reiterated in Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 324, 389 A.2d 887 (1978):

"A fiduciary relationship 'carries with it the requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty and the obligations of [the fiduciary] to make full disclosure of all known information that is significant [383]*383and material to the affairs ... of [the fiduciary relationship] ... "the principle of utmost good faith covers not only dealings and transactions occurring during the [fiduciary relationship] but also those taking place during the negotiations leading to the formation of the [fiduciary relationship].” Allen v. Steinberg, supra at 128’; Herring at 597.”

See also, Levin v. Levin, 43 Md. App. 380, 390, 405 A.2d 770 (1979). In Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 463-64, 194 A.2d 298 (1963) the Court said:

"This Court has long recognized as a corollary to the law of a corporate officer’s and director’s fiduciary duty, that, when presented with a business opportunity to fulfill a corporate purpose, he should take advantage of it, not for himself, but for the corporation. See Acker, Merrall & C. Co. v. McGaw, 106 Md. 536....”
"Of course, a corporation, as such, has no interest in its outstanding stock or in dealings therein by its officers, directors or shareholders. If there is a struggle for control the corporation would normally occupy a neutral position.

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Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture
431 A.2d 1364 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
431 A.2d 1364, 49 Md. App. 379, 1981 Md. App. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dixon-v-trinity-joint-venture-mdctspecapp-1981.