Dixon v. Partida

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 13, 2022
• Docket: 3:22-cv-04461
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BRUCE M DIXON, Case No. 22-cv-04461-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL SERVICE; 9 v. ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO SHOW CAUSE 10 PARTIDA, et al.,

Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate housed at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), has filed a pro se 14 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before the Court for 15 review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in 16 a separate order. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 25 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 4 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 5 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 7 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 8 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 9 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 10 B. Complaint 11 The complaint names the following SVSP correctional officers as defendants: CSR 12 auditors Jane/John Doe Nos. 1 and 2; correctional counselor I. Mondragon; correctional counselor 13 Gamboa; correctional counselor Partida; Chief Deputy Warden E. Borla; Associate Warden V. 14 Solis; correctional counselor Curiel; and correctional counselor Gaither. The complaint also 15 names as defendants the following California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) 16 officials: Deputy Director of Institution Operations J. Clark; and Director T. Foss. 17 The complaint makes the following allegations. 18 Plaintiff is classified as high risk medical, is mobility impaired, and has been prescribed 19 Clozaril. Plaintiff has a February 8, 2021 medical chrono stating that he must be endorsed to a 20 Clozaril maintenance prison, i.e. an institution capable of prescribing Clozaril and monitoring 21 inmates on Clozaril. Inmates taking Clozaril must be monitored because Clorazil can cause 22 serious health issues, such as abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, fatigue, dyspnea, 23 syncope and seizure. On or about August 5, 2021, Plaintiff was endorsed to SVSP. Plaintiff has 24 been housed at SVSP since at least December 2021. 25 SVSP is not a Clozaril maintenance prison. As a result, Plaintiff has been suffering side 26 effects from Clozaril (blurred vision, headache, and a spinning sensation) that have not been 27 addressed. In March 2022, prison psychiatrist R. Mariano and SVSP mental health chief Yanez 1 housed at an institution capable of monitoring him while on Clozaril. Dr. Mariano stated that he 2 could not effectively treat Plaintiff while Plaintiff was housed at SVSP because he required 3 qualified nursing staff to examine Plaintiff. In chronos dated March 30, 2022, May 14, 2022, and 4 June 2, 2022, the classification committee agreed that Plaintiff should not be housed at SVSP and 5 should be endorsed to an institution capable of prescribing Clozaril. On June 2, 2022, a 6 conference was held and a level two override was granted, allowing for Plaintiff’s transfer to 7 Valley State Prison and Mule Creek State Prison, both of which are Level II prisons and Clozaril 8 maintenance prisons. Plaintiff was put up for transfer in June 2022 but his transfer was blocked 9 by defendants Mondragon, Curiel, Gaither, Borla, Solis and Jane/John Doe CSR auditor. 10 For five days in July 2022, Plaintiff was unable to obtain his medication because SVSP 11 does not keep Clozaril in stock and must special order it, unlike Clozaril maintenance prisons. 12 During those five days, Plaintiff suffered severe side effects from withdrawal from Clozaril, 13 including severe abdominal pain, severe headaches, insomnia, tremors, and flu-like aches. Upon 14 learning of Plaintiff’s lack of access to Clozaril and related withdrawal symptoms, Dr. Mariano 15 informed his supervisor, Dr. Crayton, that he could not treat Plaintiff while Plaintiff was housed at 16 SVSP because SVSP could not ensure regular access to Clozaril. Dr. Crayton relayed his 17 information to defendants Clark and Foss but defendants Clark and Foss did not have Plaintiff 18 transferred. 19 Plaintiff remains housed at SVSP. 20 The complaint makes the following additional allegations regarding defendants Partida and 21 Gamboa. Defendant Partida endorsed Plaintiff to SVSP without the required committee review 22 despite knowing that SVSP is not a Clozaril maintenance prison. In December 2021, defendant 23 Partida transferred Plaintiff out of SVSP’s PIP housing to SVSP’s EOP housing. On December 24 31, 2021, defendant Gamboa gave Plaintiff a notice of transfer dated for January 4, 2022 or later, 25 and informed Plaintiff that he would be transferred to Mule Creek State Prison, stating that her 26 superiors knew that SVSP was not the appropriate housing for someone on Clozaril. 27 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and an injunction compelling that Plaintiff be transferred 1 facilities. 2 C. Legal Causes of Action 3 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Mondragon, Curiel, Gaither, Borla, Solis, Jane/John Doe 4 CSR auditor, Partida, Gamboa, Clark, and Foss acted with deliberate indifference to his serious 5 medical needs when defendants Mondragon, Curiel, Gaither, Borla, Solis, and Jane/John Doe CSR 6 auditor blocked his transfer to a Clozaril maintenance prison; when defendants Gamboa, Clark, 7 and Foss failed to have Plaintiff transferred to a Clozaril maintenance prison; and when defendant 8 Partida endorsed Plaintiff’s housing at SVSP, a non-Clozaril maintenance facility. Plaintiff also 9 alleges that Defendants’ actions and inactions violated the Equal Protection Clause because other 10 inmates on Clozaril are housed at Clozaril maintenance prisons. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that 11 defendant Partida violated the Due Process Clause when she endorsed Plaintiff’s housing at SVSP 12 without committee approval, as required by prison regulations. 13 Liberally construed, the allegations state cognizable claims against defendants Mondragon, 14 Curiel, Gaither, Borla, Solis, Partida, Gamboa, Clark, and Foss for violation of the Equal 15 Protection Clause and of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on deliberate indifference to an 16 inmate’s serious medical needs. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs 17 violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer 18 v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and 19 disregards excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it); 20 Gerhart v. Lake County Montana, 637 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (where state action does 21 not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification, plaintiff can establish equal 22 protection “class of one” claim by demonstrating that state actor (1) intentionally (2) treated him 23 differently than other similarly situated persons, (3) without rational basis) (citing Village of 24 Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)). 25 However, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable due process claim against Defendant 26 Partida. The violation of a prison regulation requiring that a committee approve a housing 27 endorsement does not implicate the Due Process Clause because the violation does not result in a 1 ordinary incidents of prison life,” or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] 2 sentence.” See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (changes in conditions so severe 3 as to affect sentence imposed in unexpected manner implicate Due Process Clause, whether or not 4 they are authorized by state law). In addition, there is no liability under Section 1983 for violating 5 state law or prison policy. See Owe v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To the extent 6 that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches 7 beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.”) (internal 8 quotation marks and citation omitted); Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) 9 (no liability under § 1983 for violating prison policy). The due process claim is DISMISSED with 10 prejudice because the deficiency could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. See 11 Schmitt v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Washington, 965 F.3d 945, 960 (9th Cir. 2020) (“‘a 12 district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, 13 unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 14 facts’”) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). 15 The Court DISMISSES the Doe defendants from this action without prejudice. The use of 16 “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit, see Gillespie 17 v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980), in part because it is effectively impossible for the 18 United States Marshal to serve an anonymous defendant. The Court’s general practice is to 19 dismiss Doe defendants without prejudice and, if the plaintiff is able to identify the unknown 20 defendant through discovery, allow the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to name the 21 intended defendant. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. Plaintiff may seek to determine the identity of 22 the John/Jane Doe defendants through discovery and then, after he has determined the John/Jane 23 Doe defendants’ identities, request leave to amend the complaint to add these John/Jane Doe 24 defendants. 25 D. Order to Show Cause Why Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue 26 Plaintiff has requested immediate transfer to a Clozaril maintenance prison, which the 27 Court construes as a request for a preliminary and permanent injunction. For the reasons set forth 1 issue requiring that Defendants immediately transfer Plaintiff to a Clozaril maintenance prison. 2 1. Preliminary Injunction Standard 3 The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) restricts the power of the court to 4 grant prospective relief in any action involving prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). 5 Section 3626(a)(2) permits the court to enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary 6 injunction “to the extent otherwise authorized by law” but requires that such an order “be narrowly 7 drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary 8 relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” See 18 U.S.C. 9 § 3626(a)(2). The court must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or 10 the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief.” Id. 11 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 12 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 13 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. 14 Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (noting that such remedies are extraordinary, and not 15 granted as of right). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these 16 elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009). “The Ninth Circuit 17 weighs these factors on a sliding scale, such that where there are only ’serious questions going to 18 the merits’—that is, less than a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’—a preliminary injunction 19 may still issue so long as ’the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor’ and the 20 other two factors are satisfied.” Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Shell 21 Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)). 22 Even where the balance tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, however, the plaintiff must still make 23 the threshold showing of likely success on the merits or a serious legal question. See Leyva-Perez 24 v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven certainty of irreparable harm has 25 never entitled one to a stay.”) (emphasis in original). In addition, the issuance of a preliminary 26 injunction is at the discretion of the district court. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 27 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 2. Analysis 2 The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated there is a likelihood of success on the 3 merits, that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 4 harm, and that an injunction is in the public interest. 5 The Court first finds that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. According to the 6 prison records attached as exhibits to the complaint, prison officials are in agreement that Plaintiff 7 should be housed at an institution capable of prescribing Clozaril. Plaintiff has a February 7, 2021 8 mental health chrono requiring endorsement to an institution capable of prescribing Clozaril, ECF 9 No. 1-1 at 20, 23; in March 2022, two prison mental health professionals – staff psychiatrist R. 10 Mariano and SVSP Chief of Mental Health Yanez – recommended transferring Plaintiff to an 11 institution that provides Clozaril, id.; from March to June 2022, the Classification Committee 12 twice referred Plaintiff for a non-adverse transfer to an institution capable of prescribing Clozaril, 13 ECF No. 1-1 at 20-22 (March 30, 2022 chrono referring Plaintiff for transfer to Valley State 14 Prison); 23-25 (June 2, 2022 chrono referring Plaintiff for transfer to Mule Creek State Prison); 15 and on May 14, 2022, SVSP granted Grievance Log No. 221619 requesting transfer to an 16 institution designated for Clozaril treatment, ECF No. 1-1 at 10. Despite recommendations by 17 medical professionals and agreement by correctional officials, Plaintiff remains housed at SVSP. 18 The record supports the claim that Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of 19 serious harm to Plaintiff resulting from being housed at an institution incapable of safely 20 prescribing Clozaril, but failed to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 21 847. 22 Plaintiff has also demonstrated that he may suffer irreparable harm if not transferred to an 23 institution designated for Clozaril treatment. Plaintiff is suffering from side effects from Clozaril 24 that go unaddressed, and SVSP has been unable to ensure a regular supply of Clozaril. 25 Given that prison doctors have opined that Plaintiff cannot be safely maintained on 26 Clozaril unless he is housed at an institution designated for Clozaril treatment, the balance of 27 equities tips in his favor. 1 protecting inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to their 2 serious medical needs. “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 3 constitutional rights.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 3. Order to Show Cause 5 By September 23, 2022, Defendants are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why they, and 6 each of them, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other person 7 or entity subject to their control or acting directly or indirectly in concert or participation with 8 Defendants, should not be ordered to immediately transfer Plaintiff to a Clozaril maintenance 9 prison. By October 7, 2022, Plaintiff shall file his response to Defendants’ answer to the order to 10 show cause. 11 Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court may grant 12 a preliminary injunction “only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers 13 proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 14 enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The district court retains discretion “as to the 15 amount of security required, if any.” Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) 16 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In light of Plaintiff’s 17 indigent status, the Court finds it appropriate to waive a bond. See Taylor-Failor v. County of 18 Hawaii, 90 F.Supp.3d 1095, 1103 (D. Haw. 2015) *869 (“Plaintiffs are individuals of limited 19 financial means and there is a significant public interest underlying this action.”). 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 22 1. The following defendant(s) shall be served: Salinas Valley State Prison 23 correctional counselor I. Mondragon; Salinas Valley State Prison correctional counselor Gamboa; 24 Salinas Valley State Prison correctional counselor Partida; Salinas Valley State Prison Chief 25 Deputy Warden E. Borla; Salinas Valley State Prison Associate Warden V. Solis; Salinas Valley 26 State Prison correctional counselor Curiel; Salinas Valley State Prison correctional counselor 27 Gaither; California Correctional Health Care Services deputy director of institution operations J. 1 Service on the listed defendant(s) shall proceed under the California Department of 2 Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners 3 in the CDCR’s custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on the 4 CDCR via email the following documents: the operative complaint, this order of service, a CDCR 5 Report of E-Service Waiver form, a summons, and a consent or declination to magistrate judge 6 jurisdiction form. The Clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the Plaintiff. 7 No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on the CDCR, the CDCR shall 8 provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which 9 defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by 10 the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) and which defendant(s) decline to waive service or 11 could not be reached. The CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service 12 Waiver to the California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 days, shall file with the Court 13 a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are waiving service. 14 Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk shall prepare for each 15 defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a 16 USM-205 Form. The Clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-205 forms and copies 17 of this order, the summons, and the operative complaint for service upon each defendant who has 18 not waived service. The Clerk also shall provide to the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E- 19 Service Waiver. 20 2. Liberally construed, the complaint states cognizable claims for violation of the 21 Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on deliberate indifference to an 22 inmate’s serious medical needs against defendants Mondragon, Curiel, Gaither, Borla, Solis, 23 Partida, Gamboa, Clark, and Foss. 24 3. The due process claim against defendant Partida is DISMISSED with prejudice. 25 The Doe defendants are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. 26 4. By September 23, 2022, Defendants are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why they, 27 and each of them, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other 1 with Defendants, should not be ordered to immediately transfer Plaintiff to a Clozaril maintenance 2 prison. By October 7, 2022, Plaintiff shall file his response to Defendants’ answer to the order to 3 show cause. The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of this order to the California Attorney 4 General’s Office. 5 5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 6 a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, Defendants must file 7 and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants are of the 8 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the 9 Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 10 accompanied by a Rand notice so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what 11 is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 12 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 13 served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 14 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 15 must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 16 motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 17 provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 18 c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 19 opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 20 hearing will be held on the motion. 21 6. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 23 do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 24 granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 25 1 If Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 26 required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Defendant must raise such argument in a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) 27 (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 1 any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 2 entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 3 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 4 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 5 specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 6 as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 7 documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 8 your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 9 If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 10 Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A). (The Rand notice above does 11 not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again concurrently with a motion for 12 summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939). 13 7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants’ 14 counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 15 any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until Defendants’ 16 counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 17 Defendants, but once Defendants are represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 18 counsel rather than directly to Defendanst. 19 8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 21 before the parties may conduct discovery. 22 9. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 23 Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 24 fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 25 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 26 pending case every time he is moved to a new facility. 27 10. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 1 he must include the case name and case number for this case on any document he submits to the 2 || Court for consideration in this case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 || Dated: September 13, 2022 5 JON S. TIGA 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12

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