Dixon v. Barrett

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 14, 2022
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01412
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 S. SEANAH DIXON, Case No.: 2:22-cv-01412-APG-DJA

4 Plaintiff Order (1) Denying Motions for Injunctive Relief, (2) Granting Motion to Seal, 5 v. (3) Denying as Moot Motion for Expedited Review, and (4) Denying Motion for 6 STACY BARRETT, et al., Medical Records

7 Defendants (ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3, 9, 18, 22)

9 Plaintiff S. Seanah Dixon filed a complaint and motions for injunctive relief seeking a 10 variety of medical tests and consultations with physicians.1 I screened Dixon’s complaint and 11 directed the Attorney General’s Office to respond to the motions, given the nature of her 12 allegations. ECF Nos. 4, 6. The Attorney General did so. ECF No. 8. 13 To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of 14 success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships favors the 15 plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 16 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Alternatively, under the sliding scale approach, the plaintiff must 17 demonstrate (1) serious questions on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm, (3) the 18 balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public 19 interest. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Under 20 either test, a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not 21 be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 22

23 1 I previously denied a similar motion for injunctive relief that Dixon filed in another case. See ECF No. 18 in Case No. 2:21-cv-2133. 1 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (simplified). Mandatory injunctions, like the one Dixon 2 seeks—which go beyond maintaining the status quo and instead order a party to take specific 3 action—are “particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly 4 favor the moving party.” Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979)

5 (simplified). 6 In the context of a lawsuit challenging prison conditions, injunctive relief “must be 7 narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 8 preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. 9 § 3626(a)(2). I must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the 10 operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and . . . respect the 11 principles of comity set out” in § 3626(a)(1)(B). Id. 12 Dixon has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. She complains of a wide 13 variety of ailments. She alleges the defendants have been indifferent to her suffering and 14 retaliating against her by denying medical care. The defendants presented evidence that Dixon

15 was evaluated upon arrival at High Desert State Prison and subsequently had several medical 16 tests and consultations, including treatment with physicians outside the prison system. ECF No. 8 17 at 3-5. And Dixon has refused treatment at times. Id. 18 Rather than showing deliberate indifference, the available evidence shows that the 19 defendants addressed Dixon’s medical needs with monitoring, multiple tests, and referral to a 20 cardiologist. See Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (“A prison official is 21 deliberately indifferent to that need if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 22 health.” (quotation omitted)). Dixon’s disagreement with the defendants’ course of evaluation 23 and treatment are insufficient reasons for injunctive relief. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “a plaintiff’s showing of nothing more than a difference of 2 medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as 3 a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference” (quotation omitted)); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 4 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate

5 indifference to [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.”). Nor do her allegations raise serious 6 questions on the merits of her case. 7 Dixon also alleges that the defendants have falsified her medical records to cover up her 8 claims of mistreatment, but she provides insufficient evidence to support that allegation. 9 Although I screened Dixon’s complaint and allowed her to proceed with her claims, that 10 does not satisfy the more stringent standard for injunctive relief. Because Dixon has not satisfied 11 the heightened standard to justify a mandatory injunction, I deny her motions for injunctive 12 relief.2 13 I THEREFORE ORDER that plaintiff S. Seanah Dixon’s motions for injunctive relief 14 (ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3) are DENIED.

15 I FURTHER ORDER that the defendants’ motion for leave to file medical records under 16 seal (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED. ECF No. 10 shall remain sealed. 17 I FURTHER ORDER that the plaintiff’s motion for medical records (ECF No. 18) is 18 DENIED. Dixon may not possess her medical records in her cell, but she may review those 19 records in the prison’s designated facility. 20 / / / / 21

2 The defendants also argue that I have no jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief against them 22 because they have not been served with process. ECF No. 8 at 7. They also contend that Dixon has not exhausted her administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. Id. at 8. I do not need to 23 address these procedural arguments at this time because I am denying Dixon’s motions on other grounds. 1 I FURTHER ORDER that plaintiff S. Seanah Dixon’s motion for expedited review (ECF No. 22) is DENIED as moot. 3 DATED this 14th day of November, 2022. 4 Ga > ANDREW P.GORDON sits 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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