Ditullio v. Ross, No. Cv00-034 01 16 S (Oct. 25, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13566
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedOctober 25, 2002
DocketNo. CV00-034 01 16 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13566 (Ditullio v. Ross, No. Cv00-034 01 16 S (Oct. 25, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ditullio v. Ross, No. Cv00-034 01 16 S (Oct. 25, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13566 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This proceeding was instituted as a foreclosure of a mechanic's lien arising out of a contract entered into between the parties whereby the defendant was to box in the driveway with materials, stump the lot, dig the foundation, install footing drains and backfill said drains as well as to install and backfill a septic system.1 The total price for this work was twenty thousand five hundred six dollars and five cents ($20,506.05), to which extras were added in the amount of three thousand two hundred eleven dollars and fifty-six cents ($3211.56), for a claimed total due of twenty-three thousand seven hundred seventeen dollars and sixty-one cents ($23,717.61). The extras present an interesting question. There was a provision in the agreement requiring that any extra cost would be executed only upon written orders.2 This particular issue should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant Ross is also a contractor and has built several homes. The evidence clearly establishes that he knew that these charges were extras and that he agreed to them albeit not in writing. To deny payment therefor under these circumstances would elevate form over substance and would permit the law to be used as a sword rather than a shield.

Not long after the plaintiff began the services for which he was obligated under the terms of the agreement, the relationship between the parties began to deteriorate. That deterioration soon was converted from a professional relationship to personal antagonism. One of the biggest problems involved in this project was that the defendant directed the plaintiff to dig an electrical trench down the center of the driveway against the plaintiffs recommendations that it be located on either side of the proposed driveway. At Ross' insistence, DiTullio did, in fact, dig the trench down the approximate center of the driveway and installed stabilization fabric in an attempt to minimize the effect of the electrical trench undermining the driveway.

DiTullio began this project on or about November 24, 1999, and stopped working and moved his equipment from the premises on or about December CT Page 13567 11, 1999, as a result of the utter deterioration of his relationship with Ross. It is the plaintiffs claim that Ross precluded him from carrying out the balance of the contract because of his attitude, his directions, some of which defied appropriate construction practices, and his severe criticism of him. Ross, on the other hand, claims that the work that DiTullio was doing was inferior, that he refused to follow directions and that he refused to follow the contract. Once again, the court is satisfied that DiTullio was justified in leaving the premises and decides this issue in favor of the plaintiff as the result of very persuasive testimony by one subcontractor, a Mr. Perley, who described several incidents between the parties which convinced the court the plaintiffs version was correct. In addition to the aforesaid tension that increased dramatically between the parties as the project continued, a clear inference was raised which the court chose to accept. That inference is that Ross interfered with and directed actions which the plaintiff recognized as serious errors which would doom much of the work performed by him. This equates to impossibility of performance in that a direction to do something clearly wrong in the eyes of the contractor does indeed permit the court to find and strengthen the inference of impossibility.

When the plaintiff left the premises, he had not completed the installation of the footing drains, had not stumped the lot, and had not backfilled the foundation. These complaints must be recognized as secondary, with the primary problem existing with the driveway and the so-called corrective work necessary to accomplish the finished product.

During the course of the trial, there was no evidence whatsoever of any problem with the septic system installed under the direction of the prime contractor, with the exception of a claim that the location of one corner was at variance with the plans. This objection was quickly overcome, and no further problem with that particular aspect of the project was presented.

There is no doubt, however, that the defendant is entitled to a credit for incomplete work and the failure of the plaintiff to provide the necessary materials were he to complete that work. That credit consists of six items: one hundred fifty ($150) dollars for three hundred (300) feet of perforated pipe at fifty (50) cents per foot; twenty-five ($25) dollars for approximately ten to twelve (10-12) couplings to connect the pipe around the foundation corners; fifty-three ($53) dollars for three hundred (300) feet of three (3) foot filter fabric to place over the pipe; four hundred ($400) dollars for one (1) load of stone to place over the pipe; eighty ($80) dollars for two (2) hours of manual labor at forty ($40) dollars per hour to install the pipe; two hundred twenty ($220) dollars for two (2) hours at one hundred ten ($110) dollars per hour to CT Page 13568 backfill the foundation. These figures aggregate the sum of nine hundred twenty-eight ($928) dollars with a tax of six (6) percent which equals fifty-five dollars and sixty-eight cents ($55.68), for a total of nine hundred eighty-three dollars and sixty-eight cents ($983.68). The court chooses to round off that credit at one thousand ($1000) dollars.

After the plaintiff left the site, the plaintiff retained the services of one Robert Cioffoletti, a contractor whose business includes Earthmoving Construction.3 The plaintiff seeks credit for the work performed by Cioffoletti in what he considers corrective services and/or services necessary to complete the project. The court is unable, to find that he did not remove and reinstall three hundred (300) yards of bankrun gravel at sixteen ($16) dollars per yard which is chargeable to the plaintiff Cioffoletti's testimony on cross-examination indicated that he removed some of the gravel provided by the plaintiff. The plaintiff s rebuttal, however, was that any extra bankrun gravel that was installed, provided and spread by Cioffoletti was done to raise the level of the existing driveway and not to replace the materials delivered by the plaintiff Defendant's Exhibit 14 indicates a circled area listed as the tracking pad. That pad slants downward toward the driveway. The Defendant's Exhibit 22, however, displays the driveway level with the roadway, supporting the plaintiffs position that new materials were placed on the driveway to avoid the conditions complained about. The Defendant's Exhibit 21 clearly shows the finished driveway as being higher than the surrounding area.

It was Cioffoletti's testimony that the material that was removed was spread around the lot and used for fill. The project did not require a great amount of fill and topsoil to finish the project. If Ross did not use the material that was supplied to him by the plaintiff, he would have to go out in the open market and purchase an amount equal thereto. There is a substantial variance in the testimony with respect to the charge per yard for bankrun gravel. That variance precludes the court from being able to make a finding since each of the witnesses was quite persuasive and neither effectively rebutted the other's position.

Cioffoletti testified that some of the driveway materials had to be removed because of "fines" which apparently are a sandy material that worked its way to the surface and then turned to mud.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13566, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ditullio-v-ross-no-cv00-034-01-16-s-oct-25-2002-connsuperct-2002.