District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc.

415 A.2d 1349, 1980 D.C. App. LEXIS 305

Opinions

FERREN, Associate Judge:

This case presents one question: under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § l-146(a), does the District Council have authority to respond to “emergency circumstances” by adopting successive, substantially identical 90-day acts addressed to the same, ongoing emergency, without a second reading or congressional review, as is required for passage of permanent legislation? Alleging that the Council does not have such authority, The Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc. (WHOC)¹ brought a three-count action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the District of Columbia, challenging the validity of three series of emergency acts imposing moratoriums on conversion of rental property to condominium and cooperative units, and regulating the sale of converted units. The Metropolitan Washington Planning and Housing Association, Inc. and a group of tenants’ organizations intervened as defendants.² After a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled for the plaintiff, WHOC.³ The court accordingly enjoined enforcement of the one challenged act then in effect, the Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Stabilization Act of 1979, E.A. 3-95 (approved August 27, 1979). The District and the intervenors have appealed.⁴ We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.

On occasion we have interpreted the Home Rule Act to determine whether the Council had exceeded its authority. For example, in McIntosh v. Washington, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 744 (1978), we upheld the Council’s authority to enact the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, whereas in Bishop v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 997 (1980) (en banc), we invalidated § 605 of the Revenue Act of 1975, and in Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, D.C.App., 410 A.2d 184 (1979), we nullified the Council’s effort to confer jurisdiction upon this court for direct review of determinations under the Historic Sites Subdivision Amendment of 1976.

In exercising our review function, we have acknowledged that “the core and primary purpose of the Home Rule Act . was to relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local matters ‘to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the constitutional mandate.’ D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-121(a).” McIntosh, supra at 753 (footnote omitted). We also have stressed, however, that the Act only “delegates to the Council legislative power over ‘all rightful subjects of legislation within the District.’ ” Id. at 750 n.11 (quoting D.C.Code 1978, § 1-124) (emphasis added). Thus, we have perceived that our role — indeed our duty — is to interpret the Act without undue deference to either legislative body, but always with a central focus: the intent of Congress.⁵

II.

Under the Home Rule Act, the District of Columbia Council is empowered to pass legislation by a majority vote after two readings, at least 13 days apart. D.C. Code 1979 Supp. § 1-146(a).⁶ If the Mayor does not veto the act within 10 days, (or if the Council overrides a veto by a two-thirds vote), it becomes effective after a 30 legislative-day layover in Congress, unless disapproved by concurrent resolution. D.C.Code 1979 Supp., §§ 1-144(e), -147(c)(1).⁷ The second-reading requirement was adopted to give notice of a pending proposal so that “the public and interested parties can discuss this legislation” before passage. Staff of the House Comm, on the District of Columbia, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Home Rule for The District of Columbia 1973-1974 at 1042 (Comm. Print 1974) (hereafter cited as Home Rule History) (statement of Rep. Thomas M. Rees).⁸ The 30 legislative-day layover was imposed as an orderly way for Congress to carry out its constitutional responsibility to legislate for the District.⁹

In contrast, the Council may pass “emergency” legislation by a vote of two-thirds of the members if “emergency circumstances make it necessary that an act be passed after a single reading, or that it take effect immediately upon enactment.” § 1-146(a). However, “such act shall be effective for a period of not to exceed ninety days.” Id.

The Council considers a situation to be an emergency when immediate legislative action is required for “[t]he preservation of the public peace, health, safety and general welfare.” Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Control Resolution of 1979, Res. 3-126, 25 D.C.Reg. 10370, 10372 (June 1, 1979); accord, Lifschitz v. City of Miami Beach, 339 So.2d 232, 234 (Fla.App.1976), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 949 (Fla.1977); Padberg v. Roos, 404 S.W.2d 161, 168 (Mo.1966) (en banc).

Faced with a serious shortage of rental housing in the District because of widespread conversion of rental housing to condominium and cooperative property, the Council perceived a need “to impose temporary controls on the conversion of rental properties to condominium or cooperative status and thus to stabilize rental housing in the District of Columbia.” Res. 3-126, supra. Accordingly, to preserve to status quo until permanent legislation could be devised, the Council passed three series of emergency acts imposing moratoriums on such conversion and regulating the sale of converted units.¹⁰

WHOC does not dispute that the Council acted in response to a genuine emergency.¹¹ Nor does the District contend that different emergencies prompted adoption of the acts within each count of WHOC’s complaint; each count admittedly reflects substantially identical, successive measures directed at the same, ongoing emergency.¹² Thus, all parties agree on the statement of the issue.

The dispute stems from the District’s position that the only procedural limitation in § 1-146(a) on passage of “an act” in emergency circumstances is a two-thirds vote of the Council, and that the 90-day temporal limitation refers only to the particular emergency act itself, not more broadly to the substantive provisions of the act. According to the District, there is no prohibition against adoption — without a second reading or referral to Congress — of successive, substantially identical acts directed at the same emergency.

The trial court rejected this construction. It held “that the Council may not, through its emergency power, continue in effect substantially the same substantive provisions of law for more than ninety days without a second reading of the act.” Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 107 Wash.D.L.Rptr. 1985, 1993 (Nov. 9, 1979). This interpretation accords more closely with the concept announced in the House of Representatives Committee Report on the proposed Home Rule Act, which stated that “[w]hen the Council acts in an emergency fashion, . its action shall be effective for not more than ninety days.” Home Rule History at 1462 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, because the statutory language is not conclusive, we examine the scheme of the Home Rule Act, as illuminated by additional legislative history.

III.

A. According to WHOC, the Council’s “emergency” power in § 1-146(a) to dispense with the second-reading and congressional layover requirements is an exception to the basic scheme, not an alternate route to long-term legislation. More specifically, WHOC challenges the District’s view that the 90-day limitation on “such act” is applicable, separately, to each emergency act as such, without regard to the substance of the legislation. WHOC argues that this view is inconsistent with the exceptional nature of the emergency power because it would permit adoption of consecutive emergency acts to the point where they effectively amount to permanent legislation. WHOC stresses that Congress did not intend this alternative to the second-reading and congressional layover requirements.

In reply, the District concedes that under its reading of the statute, the Council could pass an unbroken succession of emergency acts extending over years — as in this case— limited only by the requirement that the Council find an “emergency.” The District, therefore, argues in effect that Congress intended two alternative legislative tracks; the Council can choose between regular or emergency legislative procedures solely by reference to its own perception of the circumstances.

The District premises its argument not only on its literal reading of the “such act” clause in § 1-146(a), but also on the protections against abuse inherent in the two-thirds voting requirement for emergency measures. According to the District, Congress intended this additional obstacle to Council action as a sufficient offset to the second-reading and congressional layover requirements. The District argues that the two-thirds vote is an adequate safeguard because no substantial protections are lost when the emergency procedure is used. It stresses that the 90-day limitation on emergency acts effectively serves the purpose of the second-reading requirement, since the public will be on notice after the first such act that citizen efforts may be necessary to forestall, modify, or sustain the legislation after 90 days. As to the congressional layover, the District notes that Congress has authority to override the Council’s acts — including emergency acts — at any time, without reference to a formal statutory mechanism for doing so. See note 9 supra. Thus, according to the District, the second-reading and 30 legislative-day layover requirements, while perhaps convenient to alert the public and focus congressional attention, do not inherently add to protection of public rights or congressional prerogatives.

Contrary to the District’s argument, we conclude that WHOC’s view of the statutory scheme comports more closely with the structure of the Home Rule Act, reflecting the common-sense notion that an “emergency” prerogative and procedure is extraordinary and should not be substituted freely for the regular procedure. Because the District’s position is not wholly implausible, however, we turn to the legislative history.

B. Section 146(a) of the Home Rule Act, as finally adopted, incorporated an amendment offered by Representative Thomas M. Rees, who had initiated the “emergency” concept. See Home Rule History at 1042. Rep. Rees originally proposed that emergency legislation could be enacted “[i]f the Council determines that emergency circumstances make it necessary that an act be adopted at a single reading or that it take effect immediately upon enactment.” Id Representative Gilbert Gude then suggested requiring a two-thirds vote of the Council for enactment of such measures. Rep. Rees replied:

Mr. Rees. What I think you’re suggesting is a good suggestion. ... I think that you might amend this to say “if the Council determines by a two-thirds vote that emergency circumstances make it necessary that an act be adopted at a single reading or that it take effect immediately upon enactment, such act shall be effective for a period of not to exceed ninety days.” Usually by a ninety day period, you ascertain whether the act is necessary on a continuing basis and then follow the second and third reading rule and adopt the act which will be a permanent part of the municipal regulations.

Mr. Washington. Can the majority of the Council determine if an emergency exists?

Mr. Rees. I think in the emergency situation, it would be best to have a two-thirds majority vote. I think there could be some chain hanky-panky. We think there is an emergency, they could say that, and we declare it an emergency. So I would offer an amendment to the amendment. I suggest to the gentleman from Maryland, the last sentence, if the Council by two-thirds vote that emergency circumstances make it necessary that an act be adopted at a single reading or that it take effect immediately upon enactment, and I think this would put the proper safeguard in there. Then if they want to extend the act past the ninety days, they could obviously follow the second reading rule. [Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).]

Several aspects of this exchange are significant. First, Rep. Rees believed that “usually” 90 days would be a sufficient period for emergency legislation, i.e., for “ascertaining] whether the act is necessary on a continuing basis.” Id. Second, he implicitly acknowledged that emergencies could last beyond 90 days, but in that case, he asserted, the problem should be resolved by tacking permanent legislation onto a single emergency act. In the event the Council “want[s] to extend the act past the ninety days, they could obviously follow the second reading rule.” Id. Third, Rep. Rees also apparently assumed that any problem could be addressed legislatively without a gap between emergency and permanent legislation, although there is no evidence in the Home Rule History that he — or anyone else — knew at the time how realistic that belief actually might turn out to be.¹³ Finally, the reference to possible “chain hanky-panky” reinforces the view that a second, substantially identical emergency act in lieu of a second reading was not to be permitted.

The District argues, to the contrary, that Rep. Rees’ acceptance of “a two-thirds majority vote” in the sentence immediately preceding his remarks about “chain hanky-panky” supports its view that Congress contemplated successive emergency acts, subject only to the limitation inherent in the more difficult, two-thirds voting requirement. We do not agree. The two-thirds requirement, suggested initially by Rep. Gude, was directed fundamentally against the Council’s precipitous use of emergency power in any situation; a two-thirds vote is required even for passage of a single emergency act. Given Rep. Rees’ own conclusion that if the Council “want[s] to extend the [emergency] act past the ninety days, they could obviously follow the second reading rule,” we do not believe his acceptance of the two-thirds voting requirement was an endorsement of a potentially unlimited number of successive emergency acts. To the contrary, in context, Rep. Rees’ reference to “chain hanky-panky” is best interpreted as a general concern about overuse of the emergency power in ways that bypass the second-reading rule.

In summary, based on Rep. Rees’ remarks and the House Committee report that an emergency “action shall be effective for not more than ninety days,” Home Rule History, supra at 1462, we conclude that the legislative history supports WHOC, not the District.

C. The District argues that whatever the structure of the Home Rule Act or its legislative history otherwise might suggest, a congressional intent to permit successive 90-day acts must be inferred from the addition of the congressional layover requirement — one of the later legislative developments. See note 13 supra.

The District points out that, in the Council’s experience, emergency situations com monly continue well beyond 90 days. It stresses that the most appropriate, permanent legislative solution usually requires time-consuming care in its development and may evolve months after the original 90-day act has expired. Even in the best of circumstances, when the legislative solution is clear, the ordinary legislative machinery, with its elaborate hearing procedure — and a 30 legislative-day congressional layover— simply does not allow for permanent legislation within 90 days of the first emergency act.¹⁴ A gap between expiration of 90-day legislation and congressionally-approved permanent legislation is virtually inevitable, the District says; and, as in the case of rampant condominium conversion, the failure to bridge that gap legislatively can be disastrous to the public welfare. Given such realities, the District argues that Congress cannot have intended to limit the Council to one emergency act in an ongoing emergency situation; Rep. Rees’ comments about “chain hanky-panky” and the use of “the second reading rule” become, in effect, obsolete in light of the congressional layover provision proposed later. See note 13 supra.

This contention is substantially premised on the assumption that the only acceptable “permanent legislation” that can succeed an emergency act is a thoughtfully developed, “permanent” solution to the problem. Obviously, the Council’s hearing procedures, careful study in committee, the process of amendment, the Mayor’s role, and the congressional layover make it doubtful that, in a situation as complex as the wave of condominium conversions, a definitive solution can be designed and implemented within 90 days. But this argument overlooks a crucial point: as the Council itself has recognized, it can use its regular legislative authority to deal with the problem on an interim basis.¹⁵ There is no reason why the solution adopted in the first emergency act cannot be proposed simultaneously as “permanent” legislation, as Rep. Rees suggested. The “permanent” legislation could be effective for a specified period, e.g., six or nine months, see note 15 supra, with a reasonable expectation that it could be effective {after a second reading, consideration by the Mayor, and a congressional layover) within 90 days of the first reading.¹⁶

It is true that in order to adopt permanent legislation within 90 days, the Council first would have to adopt abbreviated hearing procedures for use on those occasions when it declares emergency circumstances, in order to assure that a second reading and passage could occur not long after 13 days from the first reading. Compare note 16 supra with note 14 supra. The need to abbreviate hearing procedures in emergency circumstances, however, does not detract from the reasonableness of this alternative to successive emergency enactments, since there is no statutory requirement that binds the Council to any particular hearings. See D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-144(c).¹⁷

We agree with the District that this approach puts a premium on pushing temporary solutions through the full legislative process, and that it may detract from the most orderly legislative consideration of a problem by forcing the Council and Mayor to spend time on legislation known to be an incomplete, even flawed response to the problem. But this does not make the approach so unworkable that we can infer Congress must have intended (by virtue of the layover provision or otherwise) to permit consecutive emergency acts. The fact is, the succession of emergency acts at issue in this case imposed solutions over a long period of time that were no more complete than those available through the suggested combination of emergency and regular procedures. The District, therefore, is not in a position to argue that its sustained “emergency” approach to the problem, without a second reading or congressional layover, necessarily brings such a superior legislative response that Congress manifestly intended it as a valid alternative to permanent legislation. Cf. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 115, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 1710, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (SEC is not empowered to impose successive suspensions of trading although alternative remedies were “more cumbersome”).

We conclude that Congress, fundamentally, required a second reading and congres sional layover as necessary safeguards whenever long-term legislation is adopted. The proponents of the amendment authorizing emergency legislation (most notably Rep. Rees) cannot be understood to have compromised the second-reading requirement when they proposed the two-thirds voting requirement for emergency acts; and the later addition of the 30 legislative-day congressional layover cannot be said to have imposed such a burdensome requirement that its very adoption manifests an eventual congressional decision to tolerate an unlimited number of consecutive, substantially identical emergency acts by the Council, as a way of overcoming that burden.

D. The District argues, finally, that despite any adverse implication from the initial legislative history, Congress made clear its intent, favoring the District’s interpretation, in adopting the 1978 amendments to the Home Rule Act. These allegedly show that Congress was aware of, and thus implicitly approved, the Council’s regular use of consecutive, nearly identical emergency acts.¹⁸

We cannot agree. It is true the House committee report acknowledged that “[t]he unpredictability [of the congressional review process] has forced the District to enact an inordinate amount of temporary (90-day) ‘emergency legislation’,” note 18 supra; but the report did not focus on the legality of successive emergency acts and did not express approval of the District’s actions. See Sloan, supra at 120-21, 98 S.Ct. at 1713-14. More importantly, Congress responded to the acknowledged problem of delay in final passage of Council acts by affirmatively rejecting a recommendation that, in the interest of Congress, the layover should be increased to 60 days; instead, Congress retained a 30 legislative-day layover and even adjusted the calculation of legislative days in the District’s favor. See D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-147(c)(1); note 18 supra.

Footnotes

•

19 Congress thereby reaffirmed that the 30 legislative-day period for review is compatible with the Council’s needs, including the ability to deal with emergencies. We cannot construe Congress’ 1978 acknowledgment of the Council’s emergency legislation to be, in addition, a reinterpretation of legislative intent or an amendatory endorsement of the Council’s practice. See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4, 88 S.Ct. 722, 725, 19 L.Ed.2d 923 (1968) (“The views of a subsequent Congress of course provide no controlling basis from which to infer the purposes of an earlier Congress”); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313, 80 S.Ct. 326, 331, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960) (earlier congressional intent will not be inferred from a later amendment). The better interpretation of Congress’ attitude is a willingness to forbear from joining issue on the problem.

IV.

We have reviewed the language of § 1-146(a), the overall legislative process under the Home Rule Act, the legislative history, and the workability of the “emergency” and “permanent” legislative provisions in conjunction. We agree with WHOC and the trial court.

We conclude, in summary, that Congress intended the Council’s emergency power to be an exception to the fundamental legislative process requiring a second reading and congressional layover; it is not an alternative legislative track to be used repeatedly whenever the Council perceives an ongoing emergency. We read the legislative history, especially as elaborated by Rep. Rees, to underscore that the Council must follow the “permanent” legislative route whenever it concludes that emergency circumstances demand legislative protection beyond a 90-day emergency act. The fact that Congress, even when adopting the 1978 amendments to the Home Rule Act, may not fully have appreciated the difficulties it had imposed on the District, does not alter our reading of what Congress has required.

Finally, the District has not shown that a 90-day limit on substantive legislation enacted by way of the Council’s emergency power under § 1-146(a) is incompatible with the need for a responsive legislative process in the District of Columbia. Nothing in the structure of the home rule legislative scheme, as applied to the realities faced by the Council, compels a conclusion that Congress must have contemplated the possibility of consecutive, virtually identical 90-day acts by the District Council in response to the same emergency.²⁰ We believe the District’s arguments are strained in comparison with the interpretation advanced by WHOC and adopted by the trial court.²¹

We therefore hold that when the Council, by a two-thirds vote after a single reading, enacts legislation in response to emergency circumstances, as authorized by D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-146(a), that act “shall be effective for a period of not to exceed ninety days,” id., and the Council has no authority to pass another substantially identical emergency act in response to the same emergency.

Consistent with the declaratory relief inherent in our construction of § 1-146(a), we also affirm the trial court’s injunction against implementation of the Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Stabilization Act of 1979, E.A. S-95.22 The trial court’s declaratory relief, coupled with an immediate injunction, could not have taken the District by surprise because the former Corporation Counsel warned the District Council about the possible illegality of such successive emergency legislation.²³ On the other hand, Congress was aware of the issue while considering the 1978 amendments to the Home Rule Act and was not inclined to take it on directly. Furthermore, the parties have stipulated to the existence of numerous emergency acts which this opinion may affect, and yet we are not in a position, on this appellate record, to evaluate the impact of our decision in these other contexts. Nor, finally, are we in a position to evaluate the implications of this opinion for the validity of unchallenged, successive emergency acts which have expired. Cf. American Bankers Association v. Connell (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 240, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (judgment invalidating bank fund transfer systems recognized as potentially disruptive of private investment and the public interest; judgment stayed for over eight months to permit congressional response).²⁴

Recognizing, therefore, that the District requires an appropriate interval in which to deal with its emergency legislation, we shall stay for 90 days the mandate to be issued upon this opinion and order. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142-43, 96 S.Ct. 612, 693-94, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Junghans v. Department of Human Resources, D.C.App., 289 A.2d 17, 26 (1972); American Bankers Association, supra.

So ordered.

APPENDIX

The emergency enactments challenged in WHOC’s complaint are: *

A. Count One

On December 4, 1979, after two readings, the Council passed the Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Stabilization Act No. 3-143, which was signed by the Mayor on December 21, 1979. The act imposes a 180-day moratorium on cooperative and condominium conversions, with specified exemptions to be determined by the Mayor. The act became D.C.Law 3-53 upon expiration of the congressional review period on February 23, 1980.

This permanent legislation was preceded by the following emergency acts:

1. Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization Act of 1979, E.A. 3-44, approved May 29, 1979. [25 D.C.Reg. 10363]

Accompanied by Resolution 3-126, May 22, 1979, this act imposed a 90-day moratorium on condominium and cooperative conversions, and established the Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Commission to study the subject and recommend permanent legislation to address problems of low-moderate income tenants who would experience difficulty buying units upon conversion. In setting forth the circumstances deemed to constitute an emergency, the resolution stated:

The preservation of the public peace, health, safety and general welfare necessitates an emergency act to impose temporary controls on the conversion of rental properties to condominium or cooperative status and thus to stabilize rental housing in the District of Columbia.

2. Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Stabilization Act of 1979, E.A. 3-95, approved August 27, 1979. [26 D.C.Reg. 1014]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-201, July 31, 1979, which is identical to Resolution 3-126, supra.

3. Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Stabilization Emergency Act of 1979, E.A. 3-132, approved November 23, 1979.** [26 D.C.Reg. 2436]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-277, November 20, 1979, stating that permanent legislation has been favorably reported out of committee, but that it could not be made effective until 1980. The provisions are otherwise substantially identical to those contained in Act No. 3-95 and Resolution 3-201, supra.

4. Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization Emergency Act of 1980, E.A. 3-151, approved February 20, 1980.** [27 D.C.Reg. 849]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-335, February 20, 1980, stating that permanent legislation would not become effective until after the expiration of E.A. 3-132. The provisions are otherwise substantially identical to those contained in Act No. 3-95 and Resolution 3-201, supra.

B. Count Two

Following enactment of two emergency moratorium acts,*** the Council, after two readings, enacted and submitted to Congress the Cooperative Conversion Moratorium Act, D.C.Law 1-71, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 29-801. It became law on June 19, 1976, at the expiration of the 30-day congressional review period. This law provided for a 180-day moratorium on cooperative conversions, expiring on November 3, 1976. The report of the Council’s Committee on Housing and Urban Development which accompanied the bill stated that the 180-day moratorium was needed to allow the Council time to “construct and offer permanent legislation which will serve to govern the establishment and conduct of cooperative housing accommodations in the District.”

Following expiration of the 180-day moratorium, the Council passed and the Mayor approved 10 successive emergency acts which continued the moratorium in force:

1. Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1976, E.A. 1-189, approved January 3, 1977. [23 D.C.Reg. 4941]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 1-434, December 7, 1976, finding emergency circumstances in the fact that the congressionally-approved 180-day moratorium would expire before the Council (given its “legislative schedule”) could enact “comprehensive legislation,” and that “chaos ... in the housing market” would result from termination of the moratorium prior to enactment of comprehensive legislation. 23 D.C.Reg. 4275.

2. Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1977, E.A. 2-13, approved March 18, 1977. [23 D.C.Reg. 7683]

Accompanied by Resolution 2-38, March 8,1977, 23 D.C.Reg. 7699, this act follows the language of the first emergency moratorium (E.A. 1-189, supra), and is based on the same emergency circumstances.

3. Second Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1977, E.A. 2-47, approved June 17, 1977. [24 D.C.Reg. 207]

This Act and accompanying Resolution 2-100, June 14, 1977, 24 D.C.Reg. Ill, are the same as their predecessors, except that the act adds provisions for housing and relocation assistance to persons displaced by conversions occurring within the limited exceptions to the moratorium.

4. Third Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1977, E.A. 2-88, approved October 12, 1977. [24 D.C. Reg. 3177]

This act and accompanying Resolution 2-165, September 13, 1977, 24 D.C.Reg. 5583, are virtually identical to those immediately preceding (Act No. 2-47 and Resolution 2-100, supra).

On December 6,1977, the Council enacted the First Emergency Cooperative Conversion Regulation Act of 1978, E.A. 2-70, following adoption of Resolution 2-224. The provisions of that act and resolution were virtually the same as E.A. 2-88 and Resolution 2-165 supra. On January 20, 1978, the Mayor disapproved E.A. 2-70 because of technical deficiencies in the language (and in the language of the similarly-worded permanent legislation then pending on the same subject). In his statement of reasons, the Mayor stated that his action would not adversely affect tenants in the District.

5. Second Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1978 E.A. 2-171, approved April 3, 1978. [24 D.C.Reg. 9265]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 2-258, February 21, 1978, which notes that the Mayor’s disapproval of E.A. 2-70 left a gap in regulation of cooperative conversions, resulting in an emergency because a continued moratorium is needed to prevent chaos. 24 D.C.Reg. 8231. The Act is a revised version of E.A. 2-88, supra.

6. Third Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1978, E.A. 2-239, approved July 17, 1978. [25 D.C.Reg. 1480]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 2-389, which recites that comprehensive legislation is under consideration in committee and scheduled for public hearings, and that the moratorium must continue to avoid chaos. 25 D.C.Reg. 1786. The Act is identical to Act No. 2-171, supra.

7. Fourth Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1978, E.A. 2-290, approved October 25, 1978. [25 D.C. Reg. 4332]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 2 — 447, October 3,1978. 25 D.C.Reg. 3565. The act and resolution are virtually identical to E.A. 2-239 and Resolution 2-389, supra.

8. First Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979, E.A. 3-2, approved January 25, 1979. [25 D.C.Reg. 7680]

Accompanied by Resolution 3-12, January 16,1979, 25 D.C.Reg. 7837, this act is identical to its predecessor, E.A. 2-290, except that additional amendments were made to the code provisions governing the Relocation Assistance Office. The resolution is identical to Resolution 2-447, supra.

9. Second Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979, E.A. 3-37, approved May 4, 1979. [25 D.C.Reg. 9918]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-73, April 10, 1979. 25 D.C.Reg. 9937. The act and the resolution are virtually identical to their immediate predecessors.

10. Third Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979, E.A. 3-79, approved August 3,1979. [26 D.C.Reg. 642]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-170, July 17, 1979, which recites that permanent legislation is before the Mayor and that the moratorium meanwhile must remain in effect to avoid chaos. 26 D.C. Reg. 662. Provisions of this act are virtually identical to E.A. 3-37, supra.

On June 5, 1979, the Council adopted permanent legislation in the Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979, which became D.C.Law 3-19 on September 28, 1979, upon expiration of the 30-day congressional review period. 26 D.C.Reg. 1649. This law, containing essentially the same provisions as those included in the preceding emergency act, was adopted by the Council almost three years after enactment of D.C.Law 1-71, the 180-day moratorium which had been intended to gain time for the Council to develop and enact permanent legislation.

C. Count Three

On November 29, 1977, the Council passed the Rental Housing Act of 1977, Act No. 2-118, which generally provides a rent-control plan for the District and regulates sales of rental housing. Upon completion of the congressional review period, it became D.C.Law 2-54 on March 16, 1978, D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § 45-1681 et seq. The Council has adopted permanent legislation to amend that law, namely (1) the Offer to Purchase Act of 1979, Act No. 3-75, approved August 1, 1979, which became law on October 18, 1979, 26 D.C.Reg. 1823, and (2) the Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1979, Act No. 3-62, which completed congressional review and became D.C.Law 3-18 on September 28, 1979. 26 D.C.Reg. 1648. The Offer to Purchase Act extends the period which owners must give tenants to consider the purchase of rental property and limits the down payment that may be required to 5% of the purchase price. The Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act gives tenants an extended time for organizing to consider an offer of sale by the owner.

During the interim between the enactment of the Rental Housing Act of 1977 and the two permanent amendments in 1979, the substance of these amendments was enacted in the form of 10 emergency measures:

1. Emergency Offer to Purchase Act of 1978, E.A. 2-273, approved September 1, 1978. [25 D.C.Reg. 2545]

Accompanied by Resolution 2-425, August 10, 1978, 25 D.C.Reg. 2078, this act amended sections 601 and 602 of the Rental Housing Act of 1977. The resolution describes inadequacies in the 1977 act and states that an emergency exists in that immediate amendment is needed to prevent tenant evictions and to protect purchase rights of tenants.

2. Emergency Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1978, E.A. 2-277, approved October 3, 1978. [25 D.C.Reg. 3419]

Accompanied by Resolution 2-434, September 19, 1978, 25 D.C.Reg. 3450, this act addresses an emergency in the fact that tenants are at a disadvantage in attempting to buy their buildings in the absence of an amendment to section 602(b) of the 1977 act.

3. Second Emergency Offer to Purchase Act of 1978, E.A. 2-315, approved December 15, 1978. [25 D.C.Reg. 6120]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 2-471, November 14, 1978, which notes that permanent legislation had been introduced in the Council. 25 D.C.Reg. 5557. This act and resolution are otherwise identical, respectively, to Act No. 2-273 and Resolution 2-425, supra.

4. Emergency Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 2-314, approved December 14, 1978. [25 D.C.Reg. 6118]

Accompanied by Resolution 2 — 469, November 15, 1978, 25 D.C.Reg. 5552, this act deletes section 602(b) of the Rental Housing Act of 1977 and substitutes a new section 602(b). The resolution notes that permanent legislation is under consideration in committee, but that a scheduled recess would prevent enactment of permanent legislation before expiration of the previous emergency act (E.A. 2-277). This situation was said to constitute an emergency.

5. Second Emergency Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 3-15, approved March 13, 1979. [25 D.C.Reg. 8787]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-39, 25 D.C.Reg. 8790, which states that committee consideration of permanent legislation continues, and that permanent legislation cannot be enacted before expiration of E.A. 2-314, supra. This Act is identical to E.A. 2-314, supra.

6. First Emergency Offer to Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 3-16, approved March 16, 1979. [25 D.C.Reg. 8793]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-42, 25 D.C.Reg. 8796, noting that permanent legislation had been introduced in the Council but would not be enacted prior to expiration of E.A. 2-315, thus creating the need to reenact the provisions of the earlier act.

7. Third Emergency Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 3-53, June 11, 1979. [25 D.C. Reg. 10880]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-119, May 22, 1979, 25 D.C.Reg. 10883, recognizing the same emergency as its predecessor (E.A. 3-15, supra) and noting that a permanent bill had been reported out of committee.

8. Second Emergency Offer to Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 3-54, approved June 12, 1979. [25 D.C.Reg. 10886]

This act was accompanied by Resolution 3-120, May 22, 1979. 25 D.C.Reg. 10889. This act and resolution are substantially identical to E.A. 3-16 and Resolution 3-42, supra.

9. Fourth Emergency Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 3-90, approved August 27, 1979. [26 D.C.Reg. 986]

Accompanied by Resolution 3-179, July 31, 1979, 26 D.C.Reg. 989, this act was adopted after submission of the MultiFamily Housing Purchase Act of 1979, Act No. 3-62, to Congress on July 12, 1979. The Council stated in Resolution 3-179 that the permanent legislation would not become effective before the expiration of E.A. 3-53, supra, in September. This was the case because Congress adjourned for a district work period for most of the month of August. This emergency act was intended, therefore, to “fill the gap” between enactment of the permanent bill and expiration of the congressional review period.

10. Latest Conforming Emergency Offer to Purchase Act of 1979, E.A. 3-96, approved August 27, 1979. [26 D.C.Reg. 1022]

Accompanied by Resolution 3-205, 26 D.C.Reg. 1026, this act includes the provisions of the previously-enacted emergency bills on this subject, as well as a provision requiring an owner to allow no fewer than 60 days for settlement with a tenant purchaser after the effective date of the purchase contract. Resolution 3-205 noted that the Mayor was expected to sign the permanent Offer to Purchase Act on July 31, 1979, but that, like the MultiFamily Rental Housing Purchase Act, it would not clear congressional review before the expiration of E.A. 3-54, supra, in September.

1

. WHOC is a nonprofit corporation having members engaged in ownership, brokerage, development, and management of real estate in the District of Columbia, including rental, condominium, and cooperative housing.

2

. Metropolitan Washington Planning and Housing Association, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation that represents and assists low and moderate income persons in need of housing in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The other intervenor-defendants are Towne Towers, Aristocrat Tenants Association, Dorchester Tenants Association, Mintwood Tenants Association, Park Regent Tenants Association, Covington Tenants Association, and Arundel Tenants Association.

3

. In reaching this result, the trial court held that counts two and three, challenging emergency acts superseded by permanent legislation, were not moot. On appeal, the District questions that ruling. We note, first, that unquestionably there was a justiciable controversy at the time the trial court ruled, for an emergency act in the series of acts challenged in count one was still in effect, presenting legal issues identical to those raised in counts two and three. A substantially identical successor to that emergency act was in force when this case was argued before the en banc court. See Appendix. That successor act, however, has since been superseded by permanent legislation, the Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization Act of 1979, which became D.C.Law 3-53 on February 23, 1980. Nonetheless, even this development does not moot the issue of the Council’s power to enact substantially identical successive emergency acts; otherwise, as the trial court noted, the Council’s practice would be “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). A decision on the merits should be rendered if (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) we can reasonably expect that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), citing Sosna v. Jowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). This case demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining review of the validity of a series of successive emergency acts before they are superseded by permanent legislation, even with the utmost effort by the parties and courts to expedite the proceedings. We also have every expectation that the members of WHOC, which have continuing involvement with real estate development in the District, would be subject again to the Council’s successive enactment of substantially identical emergency acts if we were to allow that practice to continue. Accordingly, we reach the merits.

4

. On October 22, 1979, a division of this court granted a temporary stay of the trial court’s order. On November 9, 1979, the full court, because of the “exceptional importance” of the issue presented, ordered that the case be heard initially by the court sitting en banc. D.C. App.R. 40(c).

5

. Our dissenting colleagues argue from two premises: first, the presumptive validity of the Council’s actions and, second, the principle of judicial restraint in reviewing the authority of the Council to act in a particular manner. More specifically, they say:

[1] There is a fundamental canon of statutory construction which mandates that if a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one which will give it effect, the other which would defeat it, the former is preferred. Coupled with this canon is the strong presumption in favor of the validity of actions by the legislature (in this case the District Council).

* * * * * *

[2] Courts should adhere to the principles of judicial restraint when called upon to review the validity of the authority under which a coordinate branch of government acts. Any restriction on broad authority should be read narrowly and no limitations not expressly imposed by Congress should be inferred. The interpretation of its powers by any branch is to be given great respect. [Post at 49, 58 (Citations omitted).]

We cannot agree that these premises help the analysis. As to the first, given the fact that we are dealing with two legislatures, Congress and the District Council, it begs the question to say that the Council’s own interpretation of the Home Rule Act should be presumed valid. The Council itself is the result, not the initiator, of the Home Rule Act. The Council’s interpretation of its own authority obviously commands great respect, but neither the Council’s interpretation nor any opposed to it, is entitled to weight beyond the inherent persuasiveness of the position taken in a particular instance.

As to the second premise, our dissenting colleagues do not question this court’s authority— and responsibility — to review the Council’s actions here. The cases cited in support of judicial restraint, however, rely substantially on the same proposition advanced to support the dissenters’ first argument: the presumed validity of a legislative act. Yet, as already indicated, we are confronted by the potentially conflicting positions of two legislative bodies— Congress and the Council — and it is this court’s duty to determine whether they can be reconciled. We perceive no principled basis for deferring to the Council’s interpretation of the Home Rule Act, apart from the merits of the Council’s argument. Although “the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others [,]... ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).

6

. The Home Rule Act, D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-146(a), provides:

The Council, to discharge the powers and duties imposed herein, shall pass acts and adopt resolutions, upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Council present and voting, unless otherwise provided in this Act or by the Council. The Council shall use acts for all legislative purposes. Each proposed act (other than an act to which section 47-224 applies) shall be read twice in substantially the same form, with at least thirteen days intervening between each reading. Upon final adoption by the Council each act shall be made immediately available to the public in a manner which the Council shall determine. If the Council determines, by a vote of two-thirds of the members, that emergency circumstances make it necessary that an act be passed after a single reading, or that it take effect immediately upon enactment, such act shall be effective for a period of not to exceed ninety days. Resolutions shall be used to express simple determinations, decisions, or directions of the Council of a special or temporary character.

7

. D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-147(c)(1) provides:

Except acts of the Council which are submitted to the President in accordance with the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) [,] any act which the Council determines according to section l-146(a), should take effect immediately because of emergency circumstances, and acts proposing amendments to title IV of this chapter, the Chairman of the Council shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the Senate a copy of each act passed by the Council and signed by the Mayor, or vetoed by the Mayor and re-passed by two-thirds of the Council present and voting, each act passed by the Council and allowed to become effective by the May- or without his signature, and each initiated act and act subject to referendum which has been ratified by a majority of the registered qualified electors voting on the initiative or referendum. Except as provided in paragraph (2), no such act shall take effect until the end of the 30-day period (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days) beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and then only if during such 30-day period both Houses of Congress do not adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving such act. The provisions of section 1-127, except subsections (d), (e), and (f) of such section, shall apply with respect to any concurrent resolution disapproving any act pursuant to this paragraph. [Emphasis added.]

D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-147(c)(2) authorizes a one-house veto of Council legislation with respect to Titles 22, 23, and 24, on criminal offenses, criminal procedure, and prisoners and their treatment, respectively.

8

. A second-reading rule is often found in municipal charters; it serves the purpose of permitting the public to participate in the legislative process. See Town of Burnsville v. City of Bloomington, 268 Minn. 84, 90, 128 N.W.2d 97, 102 (1964); Hatfield v. Meers, 402 S.W.2d 35, 44-45 (Mo.App.1966).

9

. Congress has expressly reserved a statutory right “to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, . including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District.” D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-126. This statute follows from the constitutional requirement that Congress retain “the power ... at any time to revise, alter, or revoke the [legislative] authority granted.” D.C. v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953); see U.S.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17 (“The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States.”).

10

. A chronology of this emergency legislation is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion.

11

. We therefore do not reach the question whether the District of Columbia courts may review the validity of the Council’s determination that an emergency exists under particular circumstances. State courts are divided on that question of judicial power. Compare State ex rel. Tyler v. Davis, 443 S.W.2d 625 (Mo.1969) (en banc) (court will review and decide whether emergency exists) with State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash.2d 320, 363 P.2d 121 (1961) (en banc) (legislative determination of emergency is conclusive unless facially false).

12

. WHOC also does not dispute that an “emergency” may persist for an extended period. See United States v. Southern Ry. Co., 364 F.2d 86, 94 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031, 87 S.Ct. 1479, 18 L.Ed.2d 592 (1967); Daugherty Lumber Co. v. United States, 141 F.Supp. 576, 581 (D.Or.1956) (3-judge court).

13

. Rep. Rees made these remarks almost three months before Congress, at the behest of Rep. Charles Diggs, added the 30 legislative-day layover provision to the Act. See Home Rule History, supra at 1043, 2084, 2228, 2318-19. The House Committee Report stating that an emergency “action shall be effective for not more than ninety days,” Home Rule History, supra at 1462, also was written prior to addition of the congressional layover requirement— but after Rep. Rees’ statements. There is no other legislative history indicating whether addition of the congressional layover affected the views of Rep. Rees or other members of Congress on the feasibility of “tacking” permanent legislation onto a single emergency act and, consequently, on the scope of the Council’s authority to adopt successive emergency legislation.

14

. D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-144(c) provides: “The Council shall adopt and publish rules of procedures which shall include provisions for adequate public notification of intended actions of the Council.” The Council, in response, has adopted Rules of Organization and Procedures, Res. 3-53, 25 D.C.Reg. 9343 (April 13, 1979). These are described as follows in the District’s motion for summary reversal:

Rule 709 requires a 15 day period for publication of the proposed enactment (25 DCR 9376). Moreover, if hearings are contemplated, Rule 902 requires an additional notice of ‘not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the hearing’ (25 DCR 9384). Following hearings and/or citizen input, and deliberation by the appropriate Committee of the Council, a report is prepared and filed with the Council’s Secretary. (See Rules 502(a), 506, 25 DCR 9362, 9367-9368.) The Secretary then schedules the proposed bill for review at a ‘work session’ by the Committee of the Whole (COW) which consists of the entire Council. Work sessions of this kind are held every other week, i.e., alternating with legislative sessions (Rule 404, 25 DCR 9354). Following COW review and approval, the proposed measure is scheduled for consideration at ensuing legislative sessions at which it must ‘be read twice in substantially the same form with at least thirteen days intervening between each reading’ (§ 412(a) supra). If passed following the second reading, the act is transmitted to the Mayor, who in turn has ‘ten calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after it is presented to him’ to consider it with a view to approval or disapproval (§ 404(e)). If vetoed by the Mayor, the Council is given 30 days to override his veto by a vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. Id. If the Mayor approves the measure, it is then transmitted to Congress where it must lie for a 30-day review period before taking effect. This layover period is far more lengthy than 30 calendar days because it excludes ‘Saturdays, Sundays, holidays and any day on which neither House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess for more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days.’ § 602(c), as amended, D.C.Code, § l-147(c) (Noncum. Supp. VI, 1979). At times, this 30-day period may span many months; for example, if an act transmitted to Congress does not complete the 30-day period before an adjournment sine die, the act must begin the 30-day period anew after the reconvening of the next Congress. See 3 Op. C.C.D.C. 524 (1978). These circumstances do not take into consideration such matters as the length of hearings, the time required for careful legislative drafting, and the fact that publication in the D.C. Register of intended actions occurs but once weekly.

15

. The Council used the regular legislative process to pass the Cooperative Conversion Moratorium Act, Act No. 1-71, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 29-801, which imposed a 180-day moratorium on cooperative conversions.

16

. If an emergency act were used as a first reading, to be followed by the ordinary legislative sequence as suggested by Rep. Rees (quoted in the text above), the virtually ideal timetable, requiring 71 days, would be as follows:

Action Day

Emergency act (first reading) 1

Second reading; submission to Mayor 15 *

Approval by Mayor; submission to Congress 29 **

End of congressional layover without disapproval 71 ***

‘Assumes the required 13-day interval and no substantial changes, which would require an additional reading. D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § l-146(a).

“Assumes 10 days plus two weekends: the full “ten calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after the act is presented to him.” D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § l-144(e). If the Mayor instead disapproved, the Council would have up to 30 days to override the veto. Id.

*“ Assumes 30 days plus six weekends and no recesses or adjournments of more than three days; i. e., the full 30 days “excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or adjournment of more than 3 days.” D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § l-147(c)(l).

17

. Contrary to the suggestion of our dissenting colleagues, see post at 1371 n.5, adoption of abbreviated hearing procedures for use in emergency circumstances would not alter the hearing procedure for adoption of permanent legislation in ordinary circumstances, unaccompanied by declaration of an emergency. Thus, when permanent legislation is not initiated by an emergency enactment, the Council could still proceed under its present regulations. Our point is that the required second reading before extension of an emergency act beyond 90 days puts the public on notice of the longer-term action the Council is about to take, without limiting the Council to particular hearing procedures.

18

. The Council’s practice was noted in H.R. Rep.No.95-1104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 23 (1978):

Perhaps the most difficult and burdensome aspect of section 602(c), the congressional review process, is the uncertainty of when an act passed by the Council will become law. . . At its worst, as in the case of the Condominium Act of 1976 (D.C.Act 1-151), seven months elapsed before the act became law. The unpredictability has forced the District to enact an inordinate amount of temporary (90-day) "emergency legislation” that requires no congressional review and takes effect immediately.

Although the Task Force recommended a review period of 60 calendar days, the committee feels that 30 calendar days, excluding weekends, holidays and recesses or adjournments over three days, will allow sufficient time for Congress to act on a disapproving resolution if one were introduced. This span of time would have accommodated any disapproving resolutions previously introduced.

19

. As indicated in D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-147(c)(1) and the Committee report cited in note 18 supra, the 30 legislative-day period now excludes only days in which “neither House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days.” § 1-147(c)(1). Thus, after the 1978 amendments, a three-day recess or adjournment would be counted in the 30-day layover.

20

. As indicated at note 16 supra, we premise our analysis of the District’s “structural” argument on an assumption that Congress is in session, such that the 30-day layover period can run interrupted only by weekends and holidays. We do not foreclose the argument that a congressional recess after enactment but before the 30-day period has run may create a different emergency permitting a second, consecutive emergency act.

21

. In interpreting the language used in § 1-146(a), in the context of the overall legislative scheme, we take the approach used by the Supreme Court in Sloan, supra. There, the Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not have power to order successive suspensions of trading under a statutory provision permitting it “summarily to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period, not exceeding ten days” for the protection of the public. Id. 436 U.S. at 105, 98 S.Ct. at 1706 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 781 (k) (1976)). The Court concluded that successive 10-day suspensions unlawfully bypassed notice and hearing procedures in other sections of the statute designed to protect the issuer’s rights. Although the contexts are different, Sloan is strong authority for the propositions that an overall legislative scheme must be carefully evaluated, and that express provisions against arbitrary action — here the second-reading and congressional layover requirements — should not be subordinated to summary procedures, absent clear congressional intent or compelling indications in the statute.

22

. This Act apparently has expired and has been superseded by permanent legislation. See Appendix. We leave it to the parties and the trial court to evaluate the legal effect of this injunction.

23

. See Comments on EA 1-86: Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1976, 1 Opinions of the Corporation Counsel 424 (Jan. 11, 1977); The Emergency Legislation Authority of the Council, 1 Opinions of the Corporation Counsel 467 (Feb. 16, 1977); Comments on EA 2-133, the “First Emergency Housing Discontinuance Regulation Act of 1978," 3 Opinions of the Corporation Counsel 258 (July 27, 1978).

24

. The circuit court’s reasons are set forth in an unpublished judgment. The disposition itself is acknowledged at 595 F.2d 887 (1979).

The following description of the legislation at issue closely follows the trial court’s clear and comprehensive discussion contained in its Opinion and Order of October 19, 1979.

•

This emergency act was passed since the filing of WHOC’s complaint and before oral argument, but it replaced E.A. 3-95 supra. Since the two acts are substantially identical, we understand that the controversy between the parties was unaffected by the new enactment.

•

The Emergency Cooperative Conversion Act, E.A. 1-90, approved February 6, 1976, and the Second Emergency Cooperative Conversion Moratorium Act of 1976, E.A. 1-112, approved May 6, 1976.