District of Columbia v. Pickford

179 F.2d 271, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2641
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedDecember 12, 1949
Docket10122_1
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 179 F.2d 271 (District of Columbia v. Pickford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
District of Columbia v. Pickford, 179 F.2d 271, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2641 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

Opinion

PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia. The tax involved is the franchise tax imposed by an act of Con *272 gress in 1947. 1 The facts are not in dispute. Respondent, a resident of California, is an individual who owns and operates, by an agent, an apartment house in the District of Columbia. The franchise tax upon the conduct of that business has been paid and is not in dispute. Respondent also owns a hotel, known as the Hotel Lafayette, which, prior to 1947, he had leased to a corporation. He owned no stock or other interest in the corporation, was not an officer or director thereof, did not confer with any of its officials or employees, and did not in any way undertake to advise or direct matters of policy relating to the conduct of the hotel. The lease called for a rental equal to 15 percent of the gross revenues of the hotel, with a minimum of $36,000 per year, and a reservation to the owner of the right to an apartment. The controversy concerns the taxability of that rental to the lessor.

The “District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1947” is a comprehensive revenue statute composed of seven Articles. Article I is an “Income and Franchise Tax Act”. It is composed of sixteen Titles. Title VI deals with a “Tax on Residents and Nonresidents”, which is an income tax. Title VII deals with a “Tax on Corporations”, which is for the privilege of carrying on or engaging in trade or business within the District and of receiving income from sources within the District, and is imposed upon taxable income. Title VIII deals with a “Tax on Unincorporated Businesses”. This is the tax with which we are here concerned, and we shall discuss it in a moment. Title IX deals with a “Tax on Estates and Trusts”, which is an income tax. Title X deals with the “Purpose of Act and Allocation and Apportionment”.

The tax on unincorporated businesses, imposed by Title VIII, is prescribed by the statute as follows: “For the privilege of carrying on or engaging in any trade or business within the District and of receiving income from sources within the District, there is hereby levied for each taxable year a tax at the rate of 5 per centum upon the taxable income of every unincorporated business, whether domestic or foreign (except those expressly exempt under title II of this article).” 2

The statute provides that “Before computing the tax upon the taxable income of an unincorporated business, there shall be deducted therefrom an exemption of $10,-000”. It further provides that the tax shall be payable by the person or persons conducting the unincorporated business. It also provides that the words “taxable income” mean the amount of net income derived from sources within the District, within the meaning of Title X, in excess of the exemption.

The answer to the question presented by the petition for review, that is, whether the rent from the hotel for the year 1947 is subject to the franchise tax, depends upon the answers to two other questions. The first of these is whether the ownership of the hotel and the collection of the rent upon its lease was an unincorporated business. Title VIII of the statute levies the tax for the privileges both of carrying on business and of receiving income from sources within the District. But the levy is upon the net income of an unincorporated business only. The privilege of receiving income from sources within the District, for which the statute imposes the tax, is, under this statute, a privilege being exercised by an-unincorporated business. So, if there be no “business” within the meaning of the statute, there is no tax. It is striking that this act does not levy a tax upon nonresident individuals generally upon income from sources within the District, as the federal income tax law and the laws of many states do in respect to nonresidents of their respective jurisdictions. While Title VI is headed “Tax on Residents and Nonresidents”, the tax levied by it is upon residents only, as that term is defined in the act. 3 *273 The scheme of the statute seems to be that nonresidents be taxed only upon income of a “business”, and that tax is to be effected by a franchise exaction. If this were not the scheme of the statute, we see no reason for the elaborate and precisely worded provisions to that effect and the omission of any general levy upon nonresidents. There is a broad definition of resident, but, outside the borders of that definition, nonresidents seem to be untaxed except by way of the- franchise upon “unincorporated business”. Thus, the first question to be answered in a contest over this tax is whether the operation or activity is or is not a “business”.

We think this first question is answered by Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate. 4 The tax there involved was an excise imposed, by an Act of August 5, 1909, 5 upon the carrying on or doing of business in corporate form. The Minneapolis Syndicate was a corporation which had leased its property to others. “It had wholly parted with control and management of the property; its sole authority was to hold the title subject to the lease for 130 years, to receive and distribute the rentals which might accrue under the terms of the lease, or the proceeds of any sale of the land, if it should be sold.” The Court held that the corporation was not engaged in doing' business within the meaning of the act. The rule thus established has consistently been followed by the federal courts. 6 It seems clear for present purposes that activity, or lack of it, which is not doing business” is not a “business”.

The District points to a regulation 7 of the Commissioners, relating to these taxes, which reads as follows: “The renting or operation of one or more apartment houses, hotels, dwellings, boarding houses or other buildings or parts thereof is classed as an unincorporated business where conducted by an individual, partnership or other unincorporated entity.”

Concerning that regulation, the Board of Tax Appeals said: “The quoted section of the regulation is not entirely clear as to whether the ‘renting’ of apartment-houses, etc., is intended to have reference to the act of the lessee or tenant, or of the lessor or landlord. Assuming that it was intended to apply to the act of the lessor or landlord, it is not valid insofar as it purports to enlarge the meaning of the words of the statute, as here interpreted.” With that view we agree.

The second question which is presented is more complicated. The operation of the apartment house (not the hotel) was admittedly an unincorporated business. Upon it, therefore, a franchise tax had to be paid, and since respondent was the owner and operator, he had to pay it. The amount of the tax is measured by net income. The District Government contends that if the owner of an unincorporated business in the District of Columbia is a nonresident, the net income to be used as a measure of his tax is his entire net income from sources *274 within the District.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bishop v. District of Columbia
411 A.2d 997 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1980)
Newark Bldg. Assoc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation
320 A.2d 867 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1974)
District of Columbia v. John Chester Brady
288 F.2d 108 (D.C. Circuit, 1960)
District of Columbia v. Ben Lar Associates
261 F.2d 376 (D.C. Circuit, 1958)
Stone v. District of Columbia
198 F.2d 601 (D.C. Circuit, 1952)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
179 F.2d 271, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2641, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/district-of-columbia-v-pickford-cadc-1949.