Disciplinary Counsel v. Troller

2014 Ohio 60, 6 N.E.3d 1138, 138 Ohio St. 3d 307
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 14, 2014
Docket2013-0572
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2014 Ohio 60 (Disciplinary Counsel v. Troller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Disciplinary Counsel v. Troller, 2014 Ohio 60, 6 N.E.3d 1138, 138 Ohio St. 3d 307 (Ohio 2014).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, David Edward Troller of Mason, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0013296, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1984. On December 2, 2005, we suspended him for his failure to register for the 2005-2007 biennium. In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Troller, 107 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2005-Ohio-6408, 838 N.E.2d 671 (“Troller /”). And on May 16, 2006, we suspended him for his failure to meet the continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) requirements of Gov.Bar R. X. In re Continuing Legal Edn. Suspension of Troller, 109 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2006-Ohio-2403, 847 N.E.2d 443 (“Troller //”). These suspensions remain in effect.

{¶ 2} In July 2012, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Troller with violations of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Rules of Professional Conduct, 1 and the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio for *308 failing to comply with the duties of a suspended attorney, continuing to practice law while his license was under suspension, and engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. A probable-cause panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found that probable cause existed and certified the complaint to the full board on August 6, 2012.

{¶ 3} The parties entered into joint stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors and submitted eight stipulated exhibits. Based on the parties’ stipulations of fact and misconduct, Troller’s testimony, and additional evidence submitted at the hearing, the panel found that by continuing to perform his job duties as the chief legal officer for Clopay Corporation, Troller continued to practice law for six years after his license was suspended by this court. The parties also jointly recommended that Troller be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with six months stayed on conditions. The panel adopted the stipulated sanction but added one additional condition. The board adopted the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction of the panel, and no objections have been filed to the board’s report. We agree that Troller committed the charged misconduct and adopt the sanction recommended by the board.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} Troller was hired by the Clopay Corporation as senior corporate counsel in 1999 and had no other clients during his employment. From April 2002 to April 2012, he served as the chief legal officer and secretary of the company and used the title “chief legal officer” on his stationery and business cards. A January 16, 2012 document signed by Clopay’s board of directors designates Troller as vice president and secretary — deleting the board’s earlier reference to him as chief legal counsel — but Troller testified that he held the title of chief legal officer until April 2012.

{¶ 5} Troller failed to register as an attorney for the 2005-2007 biennium. Consequently, we suspended his license to practice law on December 2, 2005. See Troller I. The order of suspension prohibited him from giving legal advice or counsel, preparing legal instruments for others, or in any manner performing legal services for others. Id.; Gov.Bar R. VI(6)(C). On May 16, 2006, we imposed a second suspension for his failure to comply with CLE requirements for the 2003-2004 reporting period and his failure to comply with a previously ordered monetary sanction for his noncompliance in the 2001-2002 reporting *309 period. See Troller II; Gov.Bar R. X(5)(A)(4) and (6)(B). To date, Troller has not been reinstated to the practice of law.

{¶ 6} Although Troller never signed pleadings or appeared in court proceedings on behalf of Clopay, the parties have stipulated that after he was suspended, he held himself out as being authorized to practice law and actually engaged in the practice of law in at least three respects: (1) working with outside counsel on pending litigation matters, (2) negotiating and drafting contracts on behalf of the company, and (3) advising human-resources personnel regarding the termination of employees. During his cross-examination at the panel hearing, Troller was hesitant to admit that his work constituted the practice of law, but on further questioning, he admitted that he had been practicing law.

{¶ 7} Troller stipulated that during his suspension (and while he continued to hold himself out as chief legal counsel), he hired and managed outside legal counsel, talked to counsel about the progress of cases, discussed how to proceed, challenged outside counsel’s plans, and helped the company decide how to resolve cases. He admitted that he and the company’s outside counsel discussed discovery proceedings, issues that arose with answers or complaints that were to be filed in court, depositions, and settlements. He also testified that he had managed the company’s legal-department employees. In 2006 and 2007, Troller supervised another attorney who was a full-time employee of the corporation. Together they managed the corporation’s contracts, human-resources, and litigation issues. And from 2009 to 2012, he worked on the company’s legal issues with a part-time attorney who served as outside counsel.

{¶ 8} Troller also stipulated that his job duties included assisting with human-resources issues and testified that he had probably given legal advice regarding employee terminations and the risk that the company might be sued for wrongful discharge based on an employee’s age or health. Significantly, Troller admitted that negotiating and drafting contracts constituted 25 percent of his work for Clopay.

{¶ 9} The panel and board found that Troller had continued to practice law following the suspension of his license and that this conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), DR 3-101(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction), and Gov.Bar R. VI(5)(C) (prohibiting an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law for a registration violation from practicing law or holding himself out as authorized to practice law in Ohio). We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct.

*310 Sanction

{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.

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Bluebook (online)
2014 Ohio 60, 6 N.E.3d 1138, 138 Ohio St. 3d 307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/disciplinary-counsel-v-troller-ohio-2014.