17‐2812‐cv Disability Rights N.Y. v. New York et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2018
(Argued: August 16, 2018 Decided: February 15, 2019)
Docket No. 17‐2812‐cv
DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, JANET DIFIORE, as Chief Judge of the New York State Unified Court System, LAWRENCE K. MARKS, as Chief Administrative Judge of the New York State Unified Court System,
Defendants‐Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Before: CABRANES, LYNCH, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.) granting defendants‐
appelleesʹ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiff‐appellant Disability Rights New York (ʺDRNYʺ) alleges constitutional
and other deficiencies in the manner in which guardianship proceedings are
conducted in New York Surrogateʹs Court under Article 17A of the Surrogateʹs
Court Procedure Act. Relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and
OʹShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the district court determined that it was
required to abstain from hearing the case. On appeal, DRNY contends that the
district court erred in abstaining.
AFFIRMED.
JENNIFER J. MONTHIE (Lara H. Weissman, on the brief), Disability Rights New York, Albany, New York, for Plaintiff‐Appellant.
MARK S. GRUBE, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General for the State of New York, New York, New York, for Defendants‐ Appellants. ___________
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
Article 17A of the New York Surrogateʹs Court Procedure Act (the
ʺSCPAʺ) governs guardianship proceedings in New York State Surrogateʹs Court
for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. The statute was
enacted in 1969 to permit the appointment of parents or other interested persons
as guardians for individuals unable to care for themselves. Plaintiff‐appellant
Disability Rights New York (ʺDRNYʺ) brought this action below contending that
the statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide adequate protection
for these individuals, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel
defendants‐appellees ‐‐ the State of New York, its court system, and its Chief
Judge and Chief Administrative Judge (ʺDefendantsʺ) ‐‐ to alter the manner in
which guardianship proceedings are conducted.
The district court did not reach the merits of DRNYʹs claims as it
granted Defendantsʹ motion for judgment on the pleadings, abstaining pursuant
to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and OʹShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.1
1 As we affirm on abstention grounds, we do not reach the issue of standing raised by Defendants on appeal because we may ʺdecide a case under Younger without 3
BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
New York State utilizes two primary procedures related to legal
guardianships: Article 17A of the Surrogateʹs Court Procedure Act (the ʺSCPAʺ)
and Article 81 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law (the ʺMHLʺ).
1. Article 17A
Article 17A governs guardianship proceedings in New York State
Surrogateʹs Court for individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities. It was designed primarily to allow parents to serve as long‐term
guardians of children who cannot care for themselves. See In re Chaim A.K., 885
N.Y.S.2d 582, 586 (Sur. Ct. New York County 2009). Guardianships are not
limited, however, to parent‐child relationships, and guardianship can be
obtained by any ʺinterested person,ʺ including certain non‐profit organizations.
See SCPA §§ 1751, 1760.
addressing [DRNYʹs] constitutional standing to bring suit.ʺ Spargo v. N.Y. State Commʹn on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (reaffirming the inherent flexibility that federal courts exercise ʺto choose among threshold groundsʺ for disposing of a case without reaching the merits). 4
Article 17A guardianships, which allocate broad decision‐making
authority to the petitioner over the individual with alleged disabilities, are
obtained through judicial proceedings before the New York Surrogateʹs Court.
See In re Chaim A.K., 885 N.Y.S.2d at 585. These procedures are designed to be
accessible to lay people. See id. ʺVirtually allʺ Article 17A proceedings are
uncontested and devoid of controversy. See In re Derek, 821 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390
(Sur. Ct. Broome County 2006).
An Article 17A proceeding commences with service of notice by the
person seeking guardianship to a wide range of interested parties. See SCPA
§ 1753. The court then conducts a hearing at ʺwhich [the potential ward] shall
have the right to a jury trial.ʺ Id. § 1754(1). The court can dispense with a
hearing with the consent of both parents. Id. The individual with an alleged
disability shall be present at the hearing, unless the court is satisfied that such
person is ʺmedically incapable of being presentʺ or that her presence would not
be in her best interest. Id. § 1754(3). Though Article 17A does not provide for the
right to an attorney, courts have sometimes appointed attorneys in difficult
cases. See, e.g., In re Zhuo, 42 N.Y.S.3d 530, 532 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 2016). To
obtain an Article 17A guardianship, a petitioner must present proof that two
physicians (or a physician and a psychologist) have certified that (1) the
individual has an intellectual or developmental disability that makes managing
her own life impractical, (2) the situation is ʺpermanentʺ or ʺlikely to continue
indefinitely,ʺ and (3) guardianship is in the individualʹs best interests. See SCPA
§§ 1750, 1750‐a. Courts have recognized that the ʺbest interestsʺ standard is a
lower standard of proof than the clear and convincing evidence standard. In re
Mueller, 887 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 2009). Once a petition is
granted, the court retains jurisdiction over the guardianship and may modify it
at the request of the ward or anyone acting on her behalf. See SCPA §§ 1755,
1758.
2. Article 81
Article 81 governs guardianship proceedings in New York State
Supreme Court. Unlike Article 17A, Article 81 is designed primarily to deal with
elderly, disabled adults. In re Lavecchia, 170 Misc. 3d 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. Rockland
County 1996). Article 81 is not limited to individuals diagnosed with specific
disabilities, but instead is designed for adults with ʺfunctional limitationsʺ that
impede their ability to provide for their own personal needs. MHL § 81.02.
Article 81 has different requirements than Article 17A. For example,
under Article 81 the court must hold a hearing, at which the prospective ward
must be present. Id. § 81.11(a), (c). At the hearing, the petitioner has the burden
of establishing the need for guardianship by ʺclear and convincing evidence.ʺ Id.
§§ 81.02(b), 81.12(a). And once a petition has been granted, guardians have
ongoing disclosure requirements. See, e.g., id. § 81.31 (requiring the guardian to
file an annual report with the supervising court). In sum, Article 81 proceedings
contain more checks and oversight than Article 17A proceedings: They require
more detailed pleadings, proof, and notice, and they provide appointed counsel,
a hearing that the potential ward must attend, ongoing supervision and
reporting, and narrowly tailored guardianship powers. These more robust
standards form the basis for DRNYʹs argument on the merits.
B. Procedural Background
On September 21, 2016, DRNY brought this action to, inter alia,
enjoin defendants from appointing legal guardians pursuant to Article 17A.
DRNY alleges that Article 17A proceedings, as currently administered, do not
meet the standards of due process and equal protection. Rather than citing the
circumstances of specific individuals subject to Article 17A proceedings,
however, DRNYʹs complaint relies primarily on a comparison of the two New
York State guardianship schemes ‐‐ Article 71A of the SCPA and Article 81 of the
MHL.
DRNY brought suit pursuant to (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the ʺRehabilitation Actʺ), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and
(3) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ʺADAʺ), 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
DRNY asked for a declaration that Article 17A violates the Constitution, the
ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. It also sought an injunction requiring
defendants to take certain actions in Article 17A guardianship proceedings, such
as providing notice, applying a certain burden of proof, and providing
substantive and procedural rights equal to those provided in Article 81
proceedings. Appʹx at 41‐42.
Defendants answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the
pleadings. On August 16, 2017, the district court granted defendantsʹ motion on
abstention grounds pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and OʹShea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The district court held that DRNYʹs claims fell
ʺsquarelyʺ under the third of the three categories of cases in which Younger
principles require a federal court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in deference
to state courts. Disability Rights N.Y. v. New York, No. 16‐cv‐7363, 2017 WL
6388949, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017) (citing Sprint Commcʹns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69, 78 (2013)). The district court also relied on OʹShea, holding that the
proposed injunction would impose ʺstandards on state court proceedings that
ʹwould require for their enforcement the continuous supervision by the federal
court over the conduct ofʹ those proceedings.ʺ Id. (quoting OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 501
(alteration omitted)). DRNY timely appealed.2
DISCUSSION
DRNY argues that the district court erred in abstaining from
exercising its jurisdiction. In particular, DRNY argues that the district court
erred in holding that the third Younger category applies. It also argues that the
district courtʹs reliance on OʹShea is misplaced. For the reasons set forth below,
we conclude that the district court correctly abstained under OʹShea.
I. Applicable Law
We review de novo the ʺessentiallyʺ legal determination of whether
the requirements for abstention have been met. Diamond ʺDʺ Constr. Corp. v.
2 ʺ[A]n order of abstention is considered final for purposes of appeal, at least when the order applies to the entire complaint.ʺ Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). 9
McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197‐98 (2d Cir. 2002); accord Schlager v. Phillips, 166 F.3d
439, 441 (2d Cir. 1999).
In general, ʺfederal courts are obliged to decide cases within the
scope of federal jurisdiction.ʺ Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72. The Supreme Court,
however, has recognized ʺcertain instances in which the prospect of undue
interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief.ʺ Id.
Federal courts must abstain where a party seeks to enjoin an
ongoing, parallel state criminal proceeding, to preserve the ʺlongstanding public
policy against federal court interference with state court proceedingsʺ based on
principles of federalism and comity. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43‐44. The Younger
doctrine has been extended beyond ongoing criminal cases to include particular
state civil proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975), or that implicate a stateʹs interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). In Sprint,
the Supreme Court held that Youngerʹs scope is limited to these three
ʺexceptionalʺ categories ‐‐ ʺongoing state criminal prosecution,ʺ ʺcertain civil
enforcement proceedings,ʺ and ʺcivil proceedings involving certain orders
uniquely in furtherance of the state courtsʹ ability to perform their judicial
functions.ʺ Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78.
Here, only the third category is at issue: civil proceedings involving
certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courtsʹ ability to perform their
judicial functions. Civil contempt orders and orders requiring the posting of
bonds on appeal fall into this category. See NOPSI v. Council of City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977);
Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 13). In Juidice, the Supreme Court abstained from
interfering with the ability of New York state courts to issue contempt decrees
because ʺ[t]he contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a Stateʹs
judicial system,ʺ and ʺstands in aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that
its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory.ʺ 430 U.S. at 335, 336 n.12.
In Pennzoil, the Supreme Court abstained from interfering with the ability of
Texas state courts to require the posting of appeal bonds because of the
ʺimportance to the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts.ʺ
481 U.S. at 13. We recently followed this line of cases in finding that abstention
was appropriate in a case seeking to enjoin New York courts from ordering
attorneysʹ fees in child custody cases. See Falco v. Justices of Matrimonial Parts of
Supreme Court of Suffolk Cty., 805 F.3d 425, 428 (2d Cir. 2015).
Although Younger mandates abstention only when the plaintiff seeks
to enjoin ongoing state proceedings and only in the three instances identified in
Sprint, the Supreme Court has also held that even where no state proceedings are
pending, federal courts must abstain where failure to do so would result in ʺan
ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings.ʺ OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 500. In
OʹShea, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin state court judges from carrying out
allegedly unconstitutional policies and practices relating to bond setting,
sentencing, and jury fees in criminal cases. Id. at 491‐92. The Court held that ʺan
injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events
that might take place in the course of future state criminal trialsʺ would amount
to ʺnothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state . . . proceedings which
would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that [Younger] and related
cases sought to prevent.ʺ Id. at 500. Thus, to avoid effecting ʺa major continuing
intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of
state criminal proceedings,ʺ which is ʺantipathetic to established principles of
comity,ʺ id. at 501‐02, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the ʺspecial
delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and
State administration of its own law,ʺ id. at 500 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117, 120 (1951)). Hence, OʹShea is an extension of the principles set forth in
Younger, and although Younger does not apply in the absence of pending
proceedings, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (ʺAbsent any
pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts
of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.ʺ (emphasis in original)), the
considerations underlying Younger are still very much at play even when a suit is
filed prior to the onset of state proceedings, see OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 500; see also
Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2018) (ʺWhile this
case does not fit neatly into the Younger doctrine, it fits better into the Supreme
Courtʹs extension of the Younger principles in OʹShea . . . .ʺ).
Like Younger, OʹShea has also been applied in certain civil contexts
involving the operations of state courts. See Kaufman v. Kaye, 466 F.3d 83, 86 (2d
Cir. 2006) (abstaining under OʹShea from enjoining internal state court judicial
assignment procedures). Many of our sister circuits have abstained in similar
situations. See Courthouse News Serv., 908 F.3d at 1065‐66 (abstaining under
OʹShea, and the principles of federalism and comity that underly it, from
enjoining the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County to release newly filed
complaints at the moment of receipt); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603,
612 (8th Cir. 2018) (abstaining under OʹShea from enjoining allegedly
unconstitutional child custody proceedings because ʺ[t]he relief requested would
interfere with the state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to
comply with numerous procedural requirementsʺ and ʺfailure to comply with
the district court’s injunction would subject state officials to potential sanctionsʺ);
Miles v. Wesley, 801 F.3d 1060, 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015) (abstaining under OʹShea
from enjoining the Los Angeles Supreme Court from reducing the number of
courthouses used for unlawful detainer actions); Hall v. Valeska, 509 F. Appʹx 834,
835‐36 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (abstaining under OʹShea from enjoining
allegedly discriminatory jury selection procedures); Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8
& n.18 (6th Cir. 1980) (providing that OʹShea establishes a rule of ʺnear‐absolute
restraint . . . to situations where the relief sought would interfere with the day‐to‐
day conduct of state trialsʺ).3
3 While the Supreme Court in Sprint made clear that Youngerʹs scope should be limited to the three specified categories, 134 S. Ct. at 591, 594, the Court did not suggest that abstention under OʹShea should be circumscribed. Indeed, courts have continued to apply OʹShea even after Sprint. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv., 908 F.3d at 1072; Oglala Sioux Tribe, 904 F.3d at 612; Miles, 801 F.3d at 1064‐65.
II. Application
DRNY first argues that the third category of Younger does not apply
to this case because there is no pending, parallel state court action. Indeed,
DRNY is not seeking to enjoin any specific pending action, but it is instead
seeking to affect the manner in which all Article 17A proceedings ‐‐ present and
future ‐‐ are conducted.4 Mindful of the Supreme Courtʹs admonition that the
three ʺexceptionalʺ categories under Younger are to be narrowly construed,
Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73, 78, 82 (noting that the three categories ʺdefine Youngerʹs
scope,ʺ that Younger extends ʺno further,ʺ and that it has not ʺapplied Younger
outside these three ʹexceptionalʹ categoriesʺ), we do not decide whether this case
fits within the third Younger category, for we conclude that it falls squarely
within OʹSheaʹs abstention framework.
Our decision in Kaufman v. Kaye is instructive. There, we abstained
under OʹShea from declaring that New York Stateʹs system for assigning cases
4 We note that DRNYʹs complaint lacks nearly any specificity in its pleading. The complaint itself merely compares the aspects of two pieces of legislation and fails to mention a single individual by name. Indeed, DRNY ʺtenders ʹnaked assertionsʹ devoid of ʹfurther factual enhancement.ʹʺ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). As drafted, DRNYʹs pleading ʺgive[s] no indication of the circumstances that support the conclusory allegation of unlawfulness.ʺ Drimal v. Tai, 786 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 2015). 15
among panels of appellate judges violated the Constitution and we refused to
order the state legislature to establish a new procedure for assigning appeals.
Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 84‐85, 87. Doing so, we held, would ʺraise compliance
issues under the putative federal injunctionʺ as well as claims that ʺthe state
courtʹs chosen remedy violated the Constitution or the terms of that injunction,ʺ
which ʺwould inevitably lead to precisely the kind of piecemeal interruptions of
state proceedings condemned in OʹShea.ʺ Id. at 87 (internal quotation marks and
ellipsis omitted). A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit is also helpful. In Miles
v. Wesley, the Ninth Circuit abstained under OʹShea from enjoining the Los
Angeles Supreme Court from, inter alia, eliminating any courthouses that heard
unlawful detainer actions. 801 F.3d at 1064. The court held that the requested
injunction would result in ʺheavy federal interference in such sensitive state
activities as administration of the judicial system.ʺ Id. at 1063 (quoting L.A. Cty.
Bar Assʹn v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1992)).
In seeking the injunction in this case, DRNY asked the district court
(and asks this Court now) to direct the New York State Unified Court System, the
Chief Judge of the State of New York, and the Chief Administrative Judge for the
Courts of New York to (1) notify all current Article 17A wards of their right to
request modification or termination of their guardianship order, (2) hold
proceedings that provide augmented substantive and procedural rights ʺno less
thanʺ those of Article 81 proceedings, and (3) cease future Article 17A
adjudications ʺuntil defendants ensure that the proceedings provide substantive
and procedural rightsʺ on par with those of Article 81 proceedings. Appʹx at 42.
As in OʹShea, DRNYʹs requested relief would effect a continuing,
impermissible ʺauditʺ of New York Surrogateʹs Court proceedings, which would
offend the principles of comity and federalism. Simply put, DRNY seeks to
ʺcontrol[] or prevent[] the occurrence of specific events that might take place in
the court of future state [Article 17A proceedings.]ʺ OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 500. With
such an injunction in place, anyone seeking or objecting to Article 17A
guardianship in the future would be able to ʺraise compliance issues under the
putative federal injunction claiming that the state courtʹs chosen remedy violated
the Constitution or the terms of that injunction.ʺ Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 87; see also
id. (ʺ[A]ny remedy fashioned by the state would then be subject to future
challenges in the district court.ʺ). Ongoing, case‐by‐case oversight of state courts,
like the New York Surrogateʹs Court, is exactly the sort of interference OʹShea
seeks to avoid. Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 86 (ʺ[F]ederal courts may not entertain
actions . . . that seek to impose ʹan ongoing federal audit of state . . .
proceedings.ʹʺ (quoting OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 500)). Indeed, such ʺmonitoring of the
operation of state court functions . . . is antipathetic to established principles of
comity.ʺ OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 501‐02. Because this Court has ʺno power to
intervene in the internal procedures of the state courtsʺ and cannot ʺlegislate and
engraft new procedures upon existing state . . . practices,ʺ the district court
correctly abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. See Kaufman, 466
F.3d at 86 (quoting Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 404‐05 (2d Cir. 1975)).
DRNY argues that federal courts have often found state statutes
unconstitutional, including statutes resulting in the issuance of state court orders.
It cites landmark decisions such as Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(holding that Michiganʹs law prohibiting same‐sex marriage violated equal
protection and due process rights), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
(holding that Washingtonʹs sentencing law violates the Sixth Amendment). But
those cases did not implicate Younger. Plaintiffs in Obergefell challenged
substantive state statutes, and plaintiffs in Blakely simply appealed a final
judgment of the state courts. Here, DRNY seeks a far more substantial invasion
of state courtsʹ domain; it would have federal courts conduct a preemptive
review of state court procedure in guardianship proceedings, an area in which
states have an especially strong interest. See Falco, 805 F.3d at 427. Such review
would directly impede ʺthe normal course of . . . proceedings in the state courts.ʺ
OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 500; see also Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73 (noting that abstention is
proper where relief would impede ʺthe state courtsʹ ability to perform their
judicial functions.ʺ (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368)).
DRNY also seeks to have Article 17A declared unconstitutional and
violative of the Americans with Disability Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. DRNY argues that its request for declaratory relief is
not subject to abstention, as a declaratory judgment would not order the state
courts to take certain actions. We are not persuaded. In Samuels v. Mackell, the
Supreme Court held that ʺordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in
precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the
longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.ʺ 401 U.S. 66, 72
(1971); see also Miles, 801 F.3d at 1063‐64 (noting that where OʹShea is implicated,
even where plaintiffs narrow their request only to declaratory relief, abstention is
proper where the relief sought ʺwould inevitably set up the precise basis for
future intervention condemned in OʹSheaʺ because ʺthe question of defendantsʹ
compliance with any remedy imposed could be the subject of future court
challengesʺ (internal citations omitted)); Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 85 (abstaining
under OʹShea from hearing Kaufmanʹs complaint seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief). Thus, the district court properly abstained from exercising
jurisdiction even as to DRNYʹs request for declaratory relief.
We conclude by noting that abstention here is supported by the
ʺavailability of other avenues of relief.ʺ OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 504. DRNY may still
avail itself of the state courts to challenge the constitutionality of Article 17A
proceedings. See Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd.,
156 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1998) (ʺState courts are courts of general jurisdiction
and are accordingly presumed to have jurisdiction over federally‐created causes
of action unless Congress indicates otherwise.ʺ). DRNY and any aggrieved
individuals will be able to obtain sufficient review in state court and, if needed,
the Supreme Court of the United States. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105
(1980) (noting the Supreme Courtʹs confidence in state courts to adjudicate
constitutional issues); Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 87‐88. Indeed, New York state courts
have been diligent in reviewing the sufficiency of Article 17A proceedings, see,
e.g., In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 427 (Sur. Ct. New York County 2010); In re
D.D., 19 N.Y.S.3d 867, 869‐71 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 2015), and understand well
the differences between Article 17A proceedings and Article 81 proceedings, see
In re Chaim A.K., 885 N.Y.S.2d at 584‐90.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.