Diprizio v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF BD. OF REV.

Utah Supreme Court

Diprizio v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF BD. OF REV.

572 P.2d 679, 1977 Utah LEXIS 1300

CourtUtah Supreme Court

DecidedNovember 11, 1977

Docket14698

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 572 P.2d 679 (Diprizio v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF BD. OF REV.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Diprizio v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF BD. OF REV., 572 P.2d 679, 1977 Utah LEXIS 1300 (Utah 1977).

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ELLETT, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff Vito Diprizio, seeks reversal of a decision of the Industrial Commission,¹ which denied his application for further unemployment benefits and required him to repay $1,217 which it found he had been paid without being entitled thereto, in that the Commission found that the plaintiff had knowingly withheld “material facts of his work and earnings to receive benefits to which he was not entitled,” in violation of 35-4-5(e), U.C.A.1953. He argues: (1) that the evidence does not justify a finding that he “knowingly” violated the statute; and (2) that the imposition of such a harsh and arbitrary remedy is contrary to and defea-[680]*680tive of the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act.

The plaintiff initially applied for unemployment benefits for the week of December 21, 1974. At that time, and on two other occasions, he accurately reported his earnings in submitting his claims for weekly benefits. However, he filed a claim asserting that he received no earnings for the week ending May 31, 1975, whereas he in fact received wages of $55 on May 30 for that week.

Upon the basis of the plaintiffs false claim for the week ending May 31, as just recited, the Commission entered the order he complains of that he was ineligible to receive benefits for the ensuing 51 weeks and could receive no further benefits until he has repaid the $1,217 he received subsequent to that violation. The statute upon which the Commission based its decision is Sec. 35-4-5, U.C.A.1953:

An individual shall be ineligible for benefits .

(e) For the week with respect to which he had willfully made a false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions, of this act, and for the 51-week period immediately following and until he has repaid to the fund all moneys he received by reason of his fraud and which he received during such following 51-week disqualification period, .

As a justification for his conduct the defendant argues that due to the fact that he is an Italian immigrant he has great difficulty with the English language; and that this resulted in his error in filing the false claim, wherefore, he asserts that it was a mistaken, rather than a wilful and knowing, filing of the false claim. However, from the transcript of his testimony it is apparent that he understood and responded to questions; that he knew in applying for and receiving unemployment compensation he was obliged to report his earnings when filing such claims. The hearing examiner (whose findings the Board of Review and the Commission adopted) was not obliged to believe in his explanation, and the standard rule of review is that such findings will not be overturned if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support them.² We are not persuaded that the finding in this case should be overturned.

Neither are we persuaded by the plaintiff’s further argument that because the order made is so severe and arbitrary that it runs contrary to and defeats the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act that it should be unconditionally reversed and no further consideration be given it. It is true of course that the general purpose of that act is to alleviate the burdens that result on individuals and upon the economy generally because of the hardships of unemployment But it is equally true that the act and the funding which supports it must be protected against unjustified claims of persons who would prefer unemployment benefits to employment,³ and who engage in various artifices including falsification and fraud to obtain benefits. In order to carry out the salutary purposes of the act, it is necessary not only that there is a means of obtaining reimbursement but also of penalizing those who would so offend.⁴

Neither the Commission nor this Court can change a statute that is as clear and unambiguous as is the one cited above. In fact, this Court has already passed upon this point by a unanimous decision wherein we said:

Plaintiff also complains that the deprivation of 52 weeks of benefits is a severe penalty. With this we are inclined to [681]*681agree. However, under the statute it does not appear that the fact finder or this court has the discretion to reduce or to forgive any part of the penalty. . . ⁵

If a discretion is to be given to the Commission to ignore or modify an unambiguous statute, then that should be done by the legislature and not by this Court.

The ruling by the Commission is affirmed. No costs are awarded.

WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.

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ELLETT, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff Vito Diprizio, seeks reversal of a decision of the Industrial Commission,¹ which denied his application for further unemployment benefits and required him to repay $1,217 which it found he had been paid without being entitled thereto, in that the Commission found that the plaintiff had knowingly withheld “material facts of his work and earnings to receive benefits to which he was not entitled,” in violation of 35-4-5(e), U.C.A.1953. He argues: (1) that the evidence does not justify a finding that he “knowingly” violated the statute; and (2) that the imposition of such a harsh and arbitrary remedy is contrary to and defea-[680]*680tive of the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act.

The plaintiff initially applied for unemployment benefits for the week of December 21, 1974. At that time, and on two other occasions, he accurately reported his earnings in submitting his claims for weekly benefits. However, he filed a claim asserting that he received no earnings for the week ending May 31, 1975, whereas he in fact received wages of $55 on May 30 for that week.

Upon the basis of the plaintiffs false claim for the week ending May 31, as just recited, the Commission entered the order he complains of that he was ineligible to receive benefits for the ensuing 51 weeks and could receive no further benefits until he has repaid the $1,217 he received subsequent to that violation. The statute upon which the Commission based its decision is Sec. 35-4-5, U.C.A.1953:

An individual shall be ineligible for benefits .

(e) For the week with respect to which he had willfully made a false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions, of this act, and for the 51-week period immediately following and until he has repaid to the fund all moneys he received by reason of his fraud and which he received during such following 51-week disqualification period, .

As a justification for his conduct the defendant argues that due to the fact that he is an Italian immigrant he has great difficulty with the English language; and that this resulted in his error in filing the false claim, wherefore, he asserts that it was a mistaken, rather than a wilful and knowing, filing of the false claim. However, from the transcript of his testimony it is apparent that he understood and responded to questions; that he knew in applying for and receiving unemployment compensation he was obliged to report his earnings when filing such claims. The hearing examiner (whose findings the Board of Review and the Commission adopted) was not obliged to believe in his explanation, and the standard rule of review is that such findings will not be overturned if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support them.² We are not persuaded that the finding in this case should be overturned.

Neither are we persuaded by the plaintiff’s further argument that because the order made is so severe and arbitrary that it runs contrary to and defeats the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act that it should be unconditionally reversed and no further consideration be given it. It is true of course that the general purpose of that act is to alleviate the burdens that result on individuals and upon the economy generally because of the hardships of unemployment But it is equally true that the act and the funding which supports it must be protected against unjustified claims of persons who would prefer unemployment benefits to employment,³ and who engage in various artifices including falsification and fraud to obtain benefits. In order to carry out the salutary purposes of the act, it is necessary not only that there is a means of obtaining reimbursement but also of penalizing those who would so offend.⁴

Neither the Commission nor this Court can change a statute that is as clear and unambiguous as is the one cited above. In fact, this Court has already passed upon this point by a unanimous decision wherein we said:

Plaintiff also complains that the deprivation of 52 weeks of benefits is a severe penalty. With this we are inclined to [681]*681agree. However, under the statute it does not appear that the fact finder or this court has the discretion to reduce or to forgive any part of the penalty. . . ⁵

If a discretion is to be given to the Commission to ignore or modify an unambiguous statute, then that should be done by the legislature and not by this Court.

The ruling by the Commission is affirmed. No costs are awarded.

WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.

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572 P.2d 679, 1977 Utah LEXIS 1300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diprizio-v-industrial-comn-of-bd-of-rev-utah-1977.

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