Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority

800 A.2d 686, 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 307, 2002 WL 1065905

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 30, 2002

Docket99-CV-79, 99-CV-80

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 800 A.2d 686 (Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority, 800 A.2d 686, 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 307, 2002 WL 1065905 (D.C. 2002).

Pincite

Opinions

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Opinion of the court

PER CURIAM.

On February 15, 2001, in Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 766 A.2d 974 (D.C.2001) (Dingwall I), a division of this court held, inter alia, that in an action for negligence against the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), appellant Carolyn A. Dingwall' was not required by D.C.Code § 12-309 (1995) to provide pre-suit notice to the Mayor.' Id. at 977-79. The division further held that D.C.Code § 43-1672(b) [687]*687(1998), which provides in pertinent part, with exceptions not here applicable, that WASA shall be “subject to all laws applicable to offices, agencies, [and] departments of the District government,” does not confer upon WASA the protections provided to the District by § 12-309. Id. at 979-80.

On June 7, 2001, we granted WASA’s petition for rehearing en banc with respect to the foregoing issues and vacated the decision in Dingwall I. Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 773 A.2d 423, 424 (D.C.2001) (per curiam) (Dingwall II)- The en banc court now reinstates and adopts the division opinion in Dingwall I, with some brief elaboration as set forth below.

WASA points out that § 12-309 is in derogation of the common law principle of sovereign immunity, that the statute must be construed narrowly against claimants, see, e.g., Gross v. District of Columbia, 734 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C.1999), and that § 12-309 therefore applies to suits against agencies that are “within” the District government, whether or not those agencies are sui juris. WASA also argues that the division’s construction of the words “subject to” in § 43-1672(b) is too narrow. According to WASA, the two statutes, when considered together, confer upon WASA the right to pre-suit notice which is provided in tort actions against the District by § 12-309.

We do not agree. Section 12-309 applies, by its terms, only to actions against the District of Columbia.¹ By contrast, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) contains a pre-suit notice provision for claims against a “Federal Agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Congress has expressly defined “Federal Agency” to include “the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States.” Id. § 2671 (emphasis added). Congress could have written, but did not write, a similarly broad notice provision into § 12-309.

According the language of § 43-1672(b) its common everyday meaning, we conclude, as did the division, that this statute simply requires WASA to comply with all of the laws, regulations, and other obligations applicable to other agencies and instrumentalities of the District of Columbia. In our view, the construction of § 43-1672(b) for which WASA contends goes far beyond the natural import of the words used by the legislature. Accord, United States ex rel Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 351 U.S.App.D.C. 30, -, 286 F.3d 542, 547 (2002) (“an entity is subject to a particular legal regime when it is regulated by, or made answerable under, that regime”)² (■rev’g 139 F.Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C.2001)); see also Downs v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the District of Columbia, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rptk. 493, 498 (Super.Ct.D.C.1984) (“the extension of § 12-309 by judicial construction to suits not reached by its terms would, in the court’s view, deprive plaintiffs of the right to reasonable notice [of what they must do to have their cases heard on the merits”]) (quoted in Dingwall 1, 766 A.2d at 979).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and opinion in Dingwall I are reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for [688]*688further proceedings, consistent with this opinion and with Dingwall I, with respect to Count II of the complaint.

So ordered.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Opinion of the court

PER CURIAM.

On February 15, 2001, in Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 766 A.2d 974 (D.C.2001) (Dingwall I), a division of this court held, inter alia, that in an action for negligence against the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), appellant Carolyn A. Dingwall' was not required by D.C.Code § 12-309 (1995) to provide pre-suit notice to the Mayor.' Id. at 977-79. The division further held that D.C.Code § 43-1672(b) [687]*687(1998), which provides in pertinent part, with exceptions not here applicable, that WASA shall be “subject to all laws applicable to offices, agencies, [and] departments of the District government,” does not confer upon WASA the protections provided to the District by § 12-309. Id. at 979-80.

On June 7, 2001, we granted WASA’s petition for rehearing en banc with respect to the foregoing issues and vacated the decision in Dingwall I. Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 773 A.2d 423, 424 (D.C.2001) (per curiam) (Dingwall II)- The en banc court now reinstates and adopts the division opinion in Dingwall I, with some brief elaboration as set forth below.

WASA points out that § 12-309 is in derogation of the common law principle of sovereign immunity, that the statute must be construed narrowly against claimants, see, e.g., Gross v. District of Columbia, 734 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C.1999), and that § 12-309 therefore applies to suits against agencies that are “within” the District government, whether or not those agencies are sui juris. WASA also argues that the division’s construction of the words “subject to” in § 43-1672(b) is too narrow. According to WASA, the two statutes, when considered together, confer upon WASA the right to pre-suit notice which is provided in tort actions against the District by § 12-309.

We do not agree. Section 12-309 applies, by its terms, only to actions against the District of Columbia.¹ By contrast, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) contains a pre-suit notice provision for claims against a “Federal Agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Congress has expressly defined “Federal Agency” to include “the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States.” Id. § 2671 (emphasis added). Congress could have written, but did not write, a similarly broad notice provision into § 12-309.

According the language of § 43-1672(b) its common everyday meaning, we conclude, as did the division, that this statute simply requires WASA to comply with all of the laws, regulations, and other obligations applicable to other agencies and instrumentalities of the District of Columbia. In our view, the construction of § 43-1672(b) for which WASA contends goes far beyond the natural import of the words used by the legislature. Accord, United States ex rel Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 351 U.S.App.D.C. 30, -, 286 F.3d 542, 547 (2002) (“an entity is subject to a particular legal regime when it is regulated by, or made answerable under, that regime”)² (■rev’g 139 F.Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C.2001)); see also Downs v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the District of Columbia, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rptk. 493, 498 (Super.Ct.D.C.1984) (“the extension of § 12-309 by judicial construction to suits not reached by its terms would, in the court’s view, deprive plaintiffs of the right to reasonable notice [of what they must do to have their cases heard on the merits”]) (quoted in Dingwall 1, 766 A.2d at 979).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and opinion in Dingwall I are reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for [688]*688further proceedings, consistent with this opinion and with Dingwall I, with respect to Count II of the complaint.

So ordered.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

800 A.2d 686, 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 307, 2002 WL 1065905, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dingwall-v-district-of-columbia-water-and-sewer-authority-dc-2002.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack