Dina Karamoy v. Merrick Garland
This text of Dina Karamoy v. Merrick Garland (Dina Karamoy v. Merrick Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 24 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DINA KARAMOY; et al., No. 15-71860
Petitioners, Agency Nos. A095-315-677 A095-315-678 v. A095-315-679 A095-315-680 MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 17, 2022**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, PAEZ, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Dina Karamoy and her three adult children, natives and citizens of
Indonesia, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We
deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion
to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed over ten years after
the final removal order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (one motion to reopen
permitted; must be filed within ninety days of the final removal order), and
petitioners have not established changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify
for an exception to the filing requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008)
(movant must produce material evidence that conditions in country of nationality
had changed); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be
“qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); cf. Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823,
831-33 (9th Cir. 2021) (changed country circumstances shown where there were
both changed circumstances in India of a personal nature and a relevant, material
increase in violence against women generally in India).
In light of this dispositive determination, we need not reach petitioners’
remaining contentions. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir.
2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the
results they reach).
2 15-71860 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the issuance of the
mandate. All other pending motions are denied as moot.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 15-71860
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