DiManno v. Such

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in DiManno v. Such. Read the opinion of the Court — 30 F.3d 126
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided July 25, 1994·No. 93-2336·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 93-2336

CARL M. DIMANNO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JAY O. SUCH AND THROTONICS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Torruella, Selya and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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___________________

Carl M. DiManno on brief pro se.
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John O. Mirick, Charles B. Straus, III, and Mirick,
________________ _________________________ _______
O'Connell, DeMallie & Lougee, on brief for appellees.
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__________________
July 22, 1994
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Per Curiam. Carl M. DiManno appeals pro se from
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the district court's dismissal of his patent case on the

ground of res judicata. This court lacks appellate
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jurisdiction. We decline to transfer the case to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where the

appeal should have been brought originally, however, because

such a transfer would not be "in the interest of justice"

under 28 U.S.C. 1631.

Background
__________

DiManno was issued U.S. Letter Patent No. 4,339,138 on

July 13, 1982 ("the Patent") for a "throwing device" known as

the Throton. DiManno and appellee Jay O. Such together

incorporated appellee Throtonics Corporation ("Throtonics")

to manufacture and market the Throton. Such became President

and Chief Operating Officer of Throtonics. DiManno was an

officer and director until June, 1988, when he resigned and

entered into an Exclusive License Agreement ("the License

Agreement") and an Assignment of Proprietary Patent Rights

("the Assignment") with Throtonics.

The License Agreement gave Throtonics the exclusive

right to manufacture and sell the Throton. The Assignment

transferred ownership of the Patent to Throtonics.

Throtonics failed to record the Assignment with the Patent

and Trademark Office ("PTO") until November 24, 1989.

Meanwhile, on September 28, 1989, DiManno assigned the Patent

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to another party, Kozmos, Inc. ("Kozmos"). Kozmos recorded

that assignment with the PTO on September 29, 1989, two

months before Throtonics' recording of the Assignment to it.

In January, 1991, DiManno filed a suit in United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming

patent infringement and breach of contract. The complaint

sought a declaration that he was the sole owner of the

Patent. DiManno invoked 35 U.S.C. 261 in support of his

claim that the Assignment was void. There was no diversity

of citizenship between the parties and the sole basis

asserted for jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. 1338(a). The

district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, ruling that "[n]o claims raised by the

plaintiff raise issues of patent law. At most, the plaintiff

has challenged the validity of the assignment of his patent

to the defendants and the outfall of that assignment. That

is a contractual dispute which does not implicate any rights

under the patent itself." DiManno v. Jay Such and Throtonics,
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No. 91-10099-MA (citations omitted). DiManno appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which

affirmed the dismissal.

DiManno also filed suit in Middlesex County Superior

Court against appellees, alleging breach of contract,

negligence and violation of G.L. c. 93A and seeking a

declaration that the License Agreement was void. In an

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opinion dated August 11, 1993, following a three-day jury-

waived trial at which DiManno appeared pro se, the state
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court ruled against DiManno on all of his claims and in favor

of Such and Throtonics on all of their counterclaims,

including breach of the Assignment and License Agreement.

The state court concluded that DiManno had effectively

conveyed his interest in the Patent in return for

consideration.

While the state case was pending, DiManno initiated this

second federal court action. The complaint sought a

declaration that the License Agreement and Assignment were

invalid and, therefore, could not be the basis for a patent

infringement suit by Such and Throtonics. It argued that,

pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 261, the assignment to Kozmos voided

any claim Throtonics might have had to a patent assignment.

Again, there was no diversity of citizenship claimed between

the parties and the sole basis of jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C.

1338. The district court granted appellees' motion to

dismiss on the grounds that, under the doctrine of res

judicata, the prior federal and state court decisions barred

the continuance of the second federal action.

Discussion

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