Dillon v. Saul

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *

4 SHAUN ROY DILLON, Case No. 3:20-CV-00294-CLB

5 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 6 v. U.S.SC. § 406(b)

7 ANDREW SAUL, [ECF Nos. 28, 31] 8 Defendant. 9

10 This case involves the judicial review of an administrative action by the 11 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Shaun Dillon’s (“Dillon”) 12 application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant 13 to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. In this case, Dillon was represented by 14 counsel, Cyrus Safa of the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. Dillon entered a 15 contingent fee agreement with his counsel, which entitled counsel to an award of fees of 16 up to 25% of any award of benefits received by Dillon. (ECF No. 26-1.) On March 24, 17 2021, this Court granted Dillon’s motion for reversal of the Commissioner’s underlying 18 decision and granted Dillon’s request for an award of benefits. (ECF No. 24 at 9.) 19 Thereafter, the parties previously stipulated that Dillon receive an award of $3,914.00 in 20 attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), which the Court 21 granted. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) Ultimately, the Commissioner awarded Dillon $141,879.00 in 22 retroactive benefits. (ECF No. 28 at 7.) 23 Currently pending before the Court is Dillon’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the amendment thereto. (ECF Nos. 28, 31.) Pursuant to the 25 parties’ contingency fee agreement, Dillon requests the Court award attorneys’ fees in 26 the amount of $20,400 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) to his counsel, which is equal to 27 approximately 14.4% of the total benefit award. The Commissioner did not oppose the 1 30.) On January 19, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the motion and received remarks 2 from both parties on the proper analysis for the fees requested in this particular case. 3 Having reviewed the papers and considered the oral arguments provided by the parties, 4 the Court finds that the fees requested of $20,400 are reasonable pursuant to Section 5 406(b) and therefore grants Dillon’s motion for an award of fees in the amount of $20,400. 6 Specifically, in analyzing the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court must 7 apply the analysis and legal framework set forth in Gisbrecht v. Barnhard, 535 U.S. 789 8 (2002) and Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009). Based on these legal 9 authorities, in assessing the reasonableness of a request for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 10 § 406(b), the Court must first look to the fee agreement and then test it for reasonableness 11 by examining “whether the amount need be reduced.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149. The 12 Court may reduce fees if there is a finding of substandard performance by counsel, if 13 there is evidence that counsel caused unnecessary delay, or if the Court finds that the 14 amount of benefits awarded is not in proportion to the time spent on the case. Id. at 1151. 15 In this instance, the Court expressly finds that Dillon’s counsel’s performance in 16 this case was not substandard. To the contrary, Dillon’s counsel successfully argued for 17 a reversal of the Commissioner’s underlying decisions and for an award of benefits. In 18 addition, there is no evidence that Dillon’s counsel delayed this case in any way. Finally, 19 the Court finds that the benefits received are in proportion to the fees requested. 20 In this instance, the fees requested are only equal to 14.4% of the benefit awarded 21 to Dillon, which is far lower than the 25% agreed upon in the continency fee agreement. 22 In addition, Dillon’s counsel has provided supporting evidence to establish that he and his 23 office conducted 40.34 hours of work on this case and therefore the effective billing rate 24 is equal to approximately $506 per hour. (See ECF No. 28- 3; ECF No. 29.) Although the 25 billing rate alone is not controlling with respect to the determination of reasonableness in 26 this instance, the Court may utilize this calculation as an aid in assessing the 27 reasonableness of the fee. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. In considering these factors and 1 of counsel, the Court finds that the request of fees in the amount of $20,400 is reasonable 2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 3 However, as noted above, Dillon previously received fees in the amount of 4 $3,914.00 pursuant to EAJA. The Court finds that Dillon’s counsel must refund this 5 amount to his client from the fee awarded in this case. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 6 Therefore, 7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8 § 406(b), (ECF Nos. 28, 31), is GRANTED; 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount of $20,400 be paid to attorney Cyrus 10 Safa and the Law Firm Lawrence D. Rohlfing for attorneys’ fees; and, 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that attorney Cyrus Safa and the Law Firm Lawrence 12 D. Rohlfing shall refund Plaintiff Shaun Dillon $3,914.00 in the amount of previously 13 received attorneys’ fees pursuant to EAJA in this case. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 DATED: _J_a_n_u_a_ry_ _1_9_, _2_0_2_2___. 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27