Dillon v. Monroe Cotton Mills

187 N.C. 812
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedMay 31, 1924
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 187 N.C. 812 (Dillon v. Monroe Cotton Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dillon v. Monroe Cotton Mills, 187 N.C. 812 (N.C. 1924).

Opinion

Hoke, J.

Tbe property in question was owned by H. M. Houston, who died in 1901, baying made disposition of tbe same by bis last will and testament in terms as follows:

“It is my will tbat all tbe remainder or residue of my property, of whatsoever nature or kind it may consist, shall be divided into three equal parts by my children, R. Y. Houston, Ellen E. Fitzgerald and Martha M..Turner, if they can agree or if they prefer it to be done by others or if they cannot agree on a division, then they shall select three disinterested and intelligent freeholders who shall divide the said property as near as possible into three equal parts; one of which said parts I devise and bequeath to Martha M. Turner in trust for herself and children, R. E. Turner, Daisy Youngblood, Charlie Turner and Callie Turner, using so much thereof during her natural life as shall be necessary for her comfortable maintenance and support and the support and education of her children above named, and my daughter, Martha M. Turner, is authorized to give R. E. Turner, Daisy Youngblood, Charlie Turner and Callie Turner, as her judgment may dictate, such part or parts of the property devised and bequeathed in this item as will be for the interests and advancement of such child, provided the sums given shall not be more than the share to which the one advanced shall be entitled. If any of said children, R. E. Turner, Daisy Young-blood, Charlie Turner or Callie Turner should die without children, the share of such one shall be given to the survivors or survivor of them, and if any of said children should die leaving children, then the children of the deceased child shall be entitled to and receive such part of my estate herein devised or bequeathed as their parents would have been entitled to if living.
“I also devise' and bequeath to R. Y. Houston in trust one-third of the property divided by my children or freeholders as hereinbefore directed; to have and to hold the same for the use and benefit of himself and children, so that he shall use the rents, issues, profits and interests as they may be needed for the proper maintenance of himself and family; and for the purpose of advancing his children and starting them in life, he is authorized and empowered to advance and deliver to any or all of his children such money or property as he may deem proper for their best interest: Provided, in the advancement or delivery of money or property to any one of them he shall make an equitable and just division or distribution among his children so that there shall be no undue preference except that he may discriminate as to the time of making the advancements; and if any of R. Y. Houston’s children [814]*814shall die leaving children, the child or children of such a deceased child or children shall represent the deceased child or children and be entitled to such part of the property herein devised and bequeathed as such deceased child or children would have been entitled to receive if living.”

Pursuant to the directions in this item of the will, the property embraced therein, consisting of both real and personal estate, choses in action, etc., was in 1902 divided by the three named children of the testator, and a written deed of partition of the same was formally executed and signed by the three and by L. A. W. Turner, the husband of M. M. Turner, and the land in controversy was embraced in .the portion assigned to R. Y. Houston, the son, who was also executor of the will.

No privy examination of M. M. Turner was taken as to the execution of this instrument of partition, but it appears that R. Y. Houston and his children and assignees have been in the open and notorious possession of the property assigned to him, asserting ownership since the date of said partition.

The particular property in controversy here consisted of a tract of 3.05 acres, and was embraced in a deed made in December, 1905, by R. Y. Houston, commissioner, conveying same to the Monroe Cotton Mills, the deed purporting to be made under a decree of the Superior Court for purposes of reinvestment, and this interest so conveyed has been passed by mesne conveyances to the Bear Skin Cotton Mills, and is the title offered by plaintiff as to that portion of the land bargained to defendant. Also a tract of thirty-five acres, part of the land assigned to R. Y. Houston in the partition of H. M. Houston's property and after the death of R. Y. Houston, in January, 1914, was divided by his children and grandchildren in court proceedings, the thirty-five acres in question being awarded and assigned to three of R. Y. Houston's children, to wit, Margaret Payne, R. S. Houston and Octavia Houston, and later these three instituted proceedings for partition by sale; J. C. M. Yann being commissioner, who regularly sold and conveyed same to Charles F. Helms, and this interest has passed by proper mesne conveyances to the Bear Skin Mills, and is held and offered as a proper title by plaintiff in this cause.

It is objected that the title offered as to both of these tracts is defective by reason of the fact that M. M. Turner, one of the children of H. M. Houston, was a married woman at the timé of the alleged partition and same is void as to her for want of her privy examination taken. But this partition was pursuant to a power to that end expressly conferred by the will of the father, and it is fully recognized here and elsewhere that in the execution of a power by a married woman, whether .collateral or appendant and appurtenant or in gross, the joinder of the husband is not necessary unless it should be so re[815]*815quired. by tbe instrument conferring tbe power. Taylor v. Eatman, 92 N. C., 601-607; Ladd v. Ladd, 8th Howard, p. 10; 21 R. C. L., p. 791, title Powers, sec. 23; 31 Cyc., p. 1097. And as to limitations contained in a deed by wbicb sucb a power is created, see Cameron v. Hides, 141 N. C., 26; Kirby v. Boyette, 116 N. C., 167; Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. C., 667.

Tbe original partition, therefore, being valid and tbe property thereunder having been thereby allotted to R. Y. Houston, tbe title to tbe 3.05 acres will depend upon tbe proper construction of tbe last clause, in item nine of tbe will, and tbe validity of tbe deed from R. Y. Houston, commissioner, to tbe Monroe Cotton Mills, made in 1905, and passed by mesne conveyances to tbe Bear Skin Cotton Mills.

Tbe property covered by this clause, as heretofore stated, consisted of both real and personal property, etc., and is herein devised to R. Y. Houston in trust for himself and children, etc., with a limitation also in favor of tbe children of sucb as should die,- and considering tbe terms and purpose of tbe devise and tbe broad and inclusive powers conferred upon tbe trustee, we are of opinion that whether tbe interest passed to tbe children be vested or contingent, tbe trustee bad tbe implied power to make sale and conveyance of any of tbe property in furtherance of tbe trust imposed upon him, and tbe proceeds to be held by him subject to tbe limitations under wbicb be received and held tbe fund. An interpretation that is fully supported by tbe well-considered case of Foil v. Newsome, 138 N. C., 115-123, and in wbicb Associate Justice Connor, delivering tbe opinion, said:

“We are also of opinion that tbe trustee has by implication tbe power to sell land for tbe purpose of converting it into income-producing property.

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Bluebook (online)
187 N.C. 812, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dillon-v-monroe-cotton-mills-nc-1924.