Dilling Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

107 F.3d 521, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2552, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3241
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 21, 1997
Docket95-3407 and 95-3641
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 107 F.3d 521 (Dilling Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dilling Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 107 F.3d 521, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2552, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3241 (7th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Dilling Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (“Dill-ing”) petitions this court for a review of the National Labor Relations Board’s (“the Board”) finding that Dilling violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (a)(3). The Board determined that Dilling committed § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) violations by failing to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers after they had made an unconditional offer to return to work. Dilling appeals the Board’s order. In turn, the Board cross-petitions for enforcement of its order. We deny Dining’s appeal and enforce the Board’s order.

*-1061 I. History

DiUing is an industrial contractor that employs about 100 people and has its main office in Logansport, Indiana. The bulk of Dilling’s business is divided between electrical contract work and mechanical work— which includes all of Dilling’s other construction trades.

Beginning in 1992, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union (“IBEW”) was successful in organizing many of Dilling’s electrical contract workers. In the later part of 1992, Dilling performed work on the Essex Wire facility, located in Franklin, Indiana, more than 50 miles from Dilling’s main office in Logansport. After the work at Essex Wire began, Dilling transferred virtually all IBEW supporters to that job site. Dilling then employed Roger Seely, an ex-Navy Seal with no electrical work experience, to serve as the Essex Wire job site “expeditor.” As the expeditor, Seely’s duties included the enforcement of company rules and insuring that the workers performed their duties in a manner that was satisfactory to Dilling’s management. In short, the record readily demonstrates that Dilling brought in Seely to intimidate and berate employees who supported the IBEW.

In response to Dilling’s heavy-handed tactics, on April 12, 1993, five of Dilling’s employees, all of whom were members of the IBEW, ceased work in a concerted effort at the Essex Wire job site and engaged in an unfair labor practice strike. Those employees were: Robert Guinn, Gene Kaufman, Donna Serna, Michael Boatman, Sr. and Michael Boatman, Jr. After approximately one week of picketing, however, the strikers collectively decided to return to work. On April 20, 1993, three of the strikers-Guinn, Serna and Kaufman — went to speak with Dilling’s supervisor at the Essex Wire job site to inquire about returning to work. When Guinn asked if all the strikers could return to work, the job site supervisor, Glenn Click, told Guinn and the others that they would have to speak with company president, Dick Dilling, because as far as the company was concerned, the strikers were “considered to have quit.” Following Click’s response, the strikers resumed picketing outside the Essex Wire job site. Additionally, the strikers began picketing at Dilling’s headquarters in Logansport.

On the same day that Guinn spoke with supervisor Click, the union, on behalf of the strikers, faxed a letter to Dick Dilling at the company’s headquarters making an unconditional offer to return to work. Dilling did not respond. Although Dilling’s management was aware that the strikers were picketing outside their headquarters, nothing was said to the strikers about returning to work.

Three months later, on July 27, 1993, the strikers, through the IBEW, sent a second letter to Dilling, reaffirming their unconditional offer to return to work. Dilling did respond to this letter on August 4, 1993, indicating that the company had no record of the strikers’ previous unconditional offer to return to work. Furthermore, DiUing’s response stated that the strikers had been given, but subsequently refused, an opportunity to return to work for Dilling.

The workers sent yet another letter to Dilling on April 20, 1994, asking again for reinstatement to their old jobs. Dilling did not respond and the IBEW eventually filed unfair labor practice charges against Dilling for failing to reinstate the strikers. After extensive hearings, the ALJ determined that Dining’s refusal to reinstate the strikers violated § 8(a)(1) 1 and (a)(3) 2 of the National Labor Relations Act. In turn, the Board adopted the AL J’s recommended order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We will uphold the Board’s order if “substantial evidence on the record as a *-1060 whole supports its factual findings and if its conclusions have a reasonable basis in the law.” Carry Cos. of Illinois v. NLRB, 30 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir.1992)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). While it is not our job to engage in fact finding or to replace the Board’s reasonable conclusions, a mere cursory review of the record is insufficient. Instead, we must take into account the entire record — which would include any evidence contrary to the Board’s view. See Chicago Tribune, 962 F.2d at 716. Nonetheless, “an ALJ’s credibility determinations are entitled to considerable deference and will be overturned by a reviewing court only when extraordinary circumstances so require.” Carry Cos., 30 F.3d at 926; accord NLRB v. Advance Transportation Co., 979 F.2d 569, 573 (7th Cir.1992).

III. Analysis

We begin with the well-settled principle that “unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement upon making an unconditional offer to return to work.” Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1180, 1188 (7th Cir.1990); accord Richmond Recording Corp. v. NLRB, 836 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir.1987). Accordingly, an employer violates § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Act when he fails to offer immediate reinstatement to unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional offer to return to work. Richmond Recording Corp., 836 F.2d at 293-94.

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107 F.3d 521, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2552, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3241, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dilling-mechanical-contractors-inc-v-national-labor-relations-board-ca7-1997.