Dikes 150334 v. Shinn

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedOctober 9, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01670
StatusUnknown

This text of Dikes 150334 v. Shinn (Dikes 150334 v. Shinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dikes 150334 v. Shinn, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 WO ASH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Dennis LaPrell Dikes, II, No. CV 20-01670-PHX-JAT (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 David Shinn, 13 Defendant.

14 15 Plaintiff Dennis LaPrell Dikes, II, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 16 Complex-Eyman, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). Plaintiff has 18 also filed a Motion for Class Action Certification and Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 6). 19 The Court will dismiss this action. 20 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 22 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 24 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 25 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 26 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 27 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 1 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 2 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 3 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 5 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 8 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 9 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 10 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 11 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 12 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 13 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 14 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 15 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 16 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 17 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 18 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 19 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 20 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 21 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend 23 because the defects cannot be corrected. 24 II. Complaint 25 In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) 26 Director David Shinn as the sole Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that he “and thousands of 27 other similarly situated Arizona men and women” are illegally incarcerated beyond the 28 expiration of their criminal sentences and “are being denied their rights to be released from 1 custody” because ADC’s Time Computation Unit “re-sentence[d] them to an increased 2 sentence and embezzle[d] prison funding from the federal government and tax-paying 3 citizens of Arizona by subjecting them to an administrative re-sentencing.” 4 III. Failure to State a Claim 5 Civil rights actions pursuant to § 1983 are meant to challenge the violation of civil 6 rights secured by federal law.1 By comparison, habeas corpus actions are meant to 7 challenge the validity or length of a criminal conviction or sentence, and the custody 8 imposed as a result. The “core of habeas corpus” is relief that terminates custody, 9 accelerates the future date of release from custody, or reduces the level of custody. Nettles 10 v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 11 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Put another way, habeas corpus actions challenge the 12 fact of confinement, while civil rights actions challenge the conditions of confinement. 13 Here, Plaintiff’s claims squarely implicate the fact of his confinement, rather than 14 the conditions of it, and thus implicate the “core of habeas corpus” and are not properly 15 brought in this civil rights action. As such, the Complaint will be dismissed for failure to 16 state a claim for which relief could be granted. 17 Should Plaintiff wish to challenge the length of his incarceration, he must do so in 18 a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 2254. Petitioner is cautioned, however, that before any federal court can consider a 20 petition brought pursuant to § 2254, the petitioner must exhaust his available state 21 remedies. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). The federal court will not entertain a 22 petition for writ of habeas corpus unless each and every issue has been exhausted. Id. at 23 521-22. Exhaustion requires that a petitioner’s claims be fairly presented to the highest 24 state court to provide that court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of a petitioner=s 25 federal claims. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985) (1986); McQuown 26

27 1 Further, a non-attorney litigant may represent himself, but he has no authority to appear on behalf of others. C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 28 (9th Cir. 1987); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (plain error to permit an prisoner proceeding pro se to represent fellow prisoners in a class action). v. McCartney, 795 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1986). “To exhaust one’s state court remedies 2| in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 [Arizona Rules of 4} Criminal Procedure].” Roettgen vy.

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Related

Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Wilkinson v. Dotson
544 U.S. 74 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Kevin Dale McQuown v. D.J. McCartney Warden
795 F.2d 807 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
John David Roettgen v. Dale Copeland, Warden
33 F.3d 36 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Furlong
18 U.S. 86 (Supreme Court, 1820)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Oxendine v. Williams
509 F.2d 1405 (Fourth Circuit, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
Dikes 150334 v. Shinn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dikes-150334-v-shinn-azd-2020.