Dickson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided February 5, 2019·No. 16-1370·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 16-1370V (not to be published)

************************* Special Master Corcoran * JACQUELINE DICKSON * a/k/a JACQUELINE BARKER, * * Filed: January 11, 2019 Petitioner, * v. * Attorney’s Fees and Costs; * Reasonable Basis; Dismissed SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Case. AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * *************************

Kathy A. Brown, Kathy Brown Law, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

Mallori B. Openchowski, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS DECISION1

On October 20, 2016, Jacqueline Dickson filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“Vaccine Program”).2 In it, Ms. Dickson alleged that the influenza (“flu”) vaccine she received on October 22, 2013, caused her to develop Guillain- Barré syndrome (“GBS”). Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report (filed August 11, 2017 (ECF No. 23)) proposed that in fact Petitioner had not experienced GBS, and/or that it was diagnosed far too long after the vaccine’s administration to be deemed causal. See Sections

1 Although this Decision has been formally designated “not to be published,” it will nevertheless be posted on the Court of Federal Claims’s website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012)). This means that the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. As provided by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- 12(d)(4)(B), however, the parties may object to the Decision’s inclusion of certain kinds of confidential information. Specifically, under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public. Id.

2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act. 11(c)(1)(D), 13(a)(1). Although Petitioner was provided an opportunity to file an expert report, she was unable to secure an expert to support her claim, and instead filed a Motion for Ruling on the Record, dated October 31, 2017 (ECF No. 24). Respondent thereafter opposed Petitioner’s entitlement to a damages award by response dated November 14, 2017 (ECF No. 25) (“Opp.”). I dismissed the case by decision dated April 17, 2018 (ECF No. 27), and my determination was not appealed.

Petitioner has now filed a motion for a final award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion, dated November 20, 2018 (ECF No. 31) (“Motion”). In it, she requests fees in the total amount of $12,670.00, reflecting the work of attorney Kathy Brown, Esq., on this matter from February 2017 (after she appeared on behalf of Petitioner, who initiated the matter as a pro se litigant) until the filing of the present fees request (36.2 hours billed at a rate of $350 per hour). See Fees Invoice, appended to Motion as ECF 31-1. She also requests a costs award of $4,322.51, reflecting copying, postage, and the costs of an expert consultation,3 plus $58.00 to be awarded directly to the Petitioner herself, for copying costs she incurred while she was pro se. ECF Nos. 31-1 and 31-2.

Respondent reacted to the present fees request on December 4, 2018 (ECF No. 32). He indicated his view that “the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case,” but left determining the reasonable amount of such an award to my discretion. ECF No. 32 at 2-3.

Vaccine Program attorneys are not automatically entitled to a fees award in unsuccessful cases like this one. Rather, such a claim must possess “reasonable basis” – meaning that it had some amount of objective basis upon which to proceed, in light of the “totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Chuisano v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 286 (2014) (citing McKellar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 101 Fed. Cl. 303, 303 (2011)); Allicock v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-485V, 2016 WL 3571906, at *4-5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 26, 2016), aff'd on other grounds, 128 Fed. Cl. 724 (2016); Gonzalez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-1072V, 2015 WL 10435023, at *5-6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 10, 2015).

3 Petitioner has not provided a specific invoice detailing the expert’s hourly rate or the specific tasks performed. Because the total amount for this expert assistance was modest ($3,000.00), and likely assisted Petitioner in determining that her claim was not viable, I will reimburse the requested sum in this case – but counsel is admonished in the future to file supporting invoices and documentation for expert work if she wishes reimbursement for it.

2 Here, I find Petitioner’s claim had sufficient objective basis to entitle her to a fee award under the applicable reasonable basis analyses. Claims that the flu vaccine caused GBS are common enough in the Program (and successful enough) to have at least superficial credibility – although that is of course not the standard for reasonable basis. However, in this case, although the claim was unsuccessful, it was based on evidence of some injury that resembled GBS. There was enough evidence in the record to support bringing the claim, and Respondent for his part does not otherwise contest reasonable basis.

Determining the appropriate amount of the fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of the lodestar method – “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended4 on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). The second part involves adjusting the lodestar calculation up or down to take relevant factors into consideration. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. This standard for calculating a fee award is considered applicable in most cases where a fee award is authorized by federal statute. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-37 (1983).

In this case, Petitioner requests $350 per hour for Ms. Brown for work performed in 2017 and 2018. ECF No. 31-1 at 1-2. The hourly rate is reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and will therefore be awarded as requested.5 I also find that the work performed on the matter was

4 An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is more precisely understood to be the “prevailing market rate” in the relevant forum. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349; Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06-559V, 2009 WL 2568468, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 27, 2009), mot. for rev. denied, 91 Fed. Cl. 453 (2010), aff’d, 632 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

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