Dickman v. Moore

Ohio Court of Appeals

Dickman v. Moore

176 N.E.2d 604, 114 Ohio App. 243, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 113, 1961 Ohio App. LEXIS 652

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedAugust 28, 1961

Docket8964

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 176 N.E.2d 604 (Dickman v. Moore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dickman v. Moore, 176 N.E.2d 604, 114 Ohio App. 243, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 113, 1961 Ohio App. LEXIS 652 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).

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Opinion

*244 Long, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, wherein a jury set aside the will of the testatrix. Without setting out all the facts, there is subtsantial evidence in this record to indicate that the jury was justified in returning the verdict which it did.

The testatrix, a woman seventy-four years of age, was dying of cancer. The will in question was executed on March 7,1960. Twelve days later, the testatrix lapsed into a coma and, eight days after that, died, never having regained consciousness.

The record in this case discloses circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will, from which the jury was justified in finding that the instrument did not result from the exercise of the free will of the testatrix but, rather, from the undue influence of others. It is not necessary that the undue influence result in mental incapacity; if there is substantial evidence that the undue influence amounted to a substitution of the will of those exercising the undue influence for the free will of the testatrix, then the will must be set aside.

As stated in 41 Ohio Jurisprudence, 510, Section 373, “Where there are facts sufficient to raise a question of undue influence and the jury has resolved the facts against the validity of the will, an appellate court will not disturb the verdict and judgment on the weight of the evidence.”

See Raymond v. Hearon, 30 Ohio App., 184, decided by this court.

Judgment affirmed.

O’Connell and Hildebrant, JJ., concur.

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*244 Long, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, wherein a jury set aside the will of the testatrix. Without setting out all the facts, there is subtsantial evidence in this record to indicate that the jury was justified in returning the verdict which it did.

The testatrix, a woman seventy-four years of age, was dying of cancer. The will in question was executed on March 7,1960. Twelve days later, the testatrix lapsed into a coma and, eight days after that, died, never having regained consciousness.

The record in this case discloses circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will, from which the jury was justified in finding that the instrument did not result from the exercise of the free will of the testatrix but, rather, from the undue influence of others. It is not necessary that the undue influence result in mental incapacity; if there is substantial evidence that the undue influence amounted to a substitution of the will of those exercising the undue influence for the free will of the testatrix, then the will must be set aside.

As stated in 41 Ohio Jurisprudence, 510, Section 373, “Where there are facts sufficient to raise a question of undue influence and the jury has resolved the facts against the validity of the will, an appellate court will not disturb the verdict and judgment on the weight of the evidence.”

See Raymond v. Hearon, 30 Ohio App., 184, decided by this court.

Judgment affirmed.

O’Connell and Hildebrant, JJ., concur.

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176 N.E.2d 604, 114 Ohio App. 243, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 113, 1961 Ohio App. LEXIS 652, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickman-v-moore-ohioctapp-1961.

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