Dickerson v. New York City

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 2, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-06387
StatusUnknown

This text of Dickerson v. New York City (Dickerson v. New York City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dickerson v. New York City, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JASON DICKERSON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-6387 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NEW YORK CITY, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under state law. By order dated July 7, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts

make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against the City of New York, the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), and unidentified individuals. He asserts claims arising from events that occurred at AMKC from April 2022 to August 2022, and from December 2022 to July 2023. Plaintiff seeks money damages. The following information is taken from the complaint. After Plaintiff heard that Andre Antrobus, another detainee, was getting people out of jail, he witnessed several DOC employees “threaten Andre Antrobus with imminent serious injury” and “opening and blocking mail.” (ECF 1, at 4.)2 Corrections officers took Antrobus’ documents, including his court documents and evidence, his birth certificate, and his mother’s death certificate. Plaintiff claims that, because he assisted Antrobus, he is being subjected to unconstitutional conduct. The alleged violations include: (1) getting “punch[ed] and gang assaulted”; (2) being “punched and stomped by D.O.C.

boot (dangerous instruments) on to the floor in [his] head several times”; (3) getting hit in the eye with a mop stick; (4) opening and holding his mail relating to “Article 78s, writs, petitions, motions and grievances”; (5) taking his “evidence for liberty and freedom”; and (6) denying him medical care. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also asserts that someone said that “they won’t press charges, and weeks later, “30 envelopes for freedom” were returned. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff cannot bring claims on behalf of Andre Antrobus The statutory provision governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.” Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he is an attorney. Therefore, he cannot assert any claims on behalf of Antrobus, and the Court dismisses any claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of that individual.

2 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the amended complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. B. Plaintiff does not allege viable claims on his own behalf Interference with mail claims The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claims that correction staff opened interfered with his mail as arising under the First Amendment. A prisoner’s First Amendment rights encompass the right to “adequate, effective and meaningful” access to the courts and to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Davis v.

Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). “[C]ourts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail, as well as greater protection to outgoing mail than to incoming mail.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)). Plaintiff’ s allegations concerning his legal mail implicate both an access-to-courts claim and a general mail tampering claim. a.

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Bluebook (online)
Dickerson v. New York City, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickerson-v-new-york-city-nysd-2024.