Dickerson v. Campbell

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedOctober 30, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-03203
StatusUnknown

This text of Dickerson v. Campbell (Dickerson v. Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dickerson v. Campbell, (C.D. Ill. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SAMUEL DICKERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 23-3203 ) JACK CAMPBELL, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, files a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his constitutional rights were violated at the Sangamon County Jail. (Doc. 1). The case is now before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint, and through such process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoted cite omitted). Plaintiff names six Defendants, including Sheriff Jack Campbell, Lieutenants B. Loftus, William Smith, and Tracy Brigae, Correctional Officer Mike Ward, and Sangamon County State’s Attorney Dan Wright. Plaintiff lists eleven counts in his Complaint. In Count 1, Plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against for filing three other lawsuits under § 1983 against Springfield, Illinois police officers. See Case Nos. 22-3184, 23-3144, and 23-3150. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a

motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff does not include any allegations regarding who retaliated against him, what actions constituted retaliation, or when the retaliation occurred. Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations are insufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges that his legal and religious materials were confiscated, he was denied adequate healthcare and hygiene supplies, and lawbooks he ordered from the publisher were sent back. He does not specify who was involved or when these events occurred. “Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff states that Jail administrative staff, including Defendants Smith, Loftus, and Ward, report directly to Defendant Sheriff Campbell. It appears that Plaintiff is attempting hold Defendant Campbell liable for the alleged constitutional violations because he is in a supervisory position. However, liability under § 1983 is based on personal responsibility, and Defendant Campbell cannot be held liable for the misdeeds of Jail staff members simply because of his supervisory role. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). In Count 3, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wright, the Sangamon County State’s Attorney, prosecuted him without probable cause, used fraudulent evidence, and misrepresented the facts during court proceedings. “Prosecutors are absolutely immune for actions they undertake in their capacities as prosecutors, even including malicious prosecution unsupported by probable cause.” Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2017); Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 647

(7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that indicting a person without probable cause, acting maliciously, refusing to consider exonerating evidence, presenting false evidence to a grand jury, and delaying trial “encompass prosecutorial acts or omissions for which . . . prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Wright are dismissed. Plaintiff also includes seven additional counts which are devoid of any supporting factual allegations. For instance, Count 10 simply states: “Indemnification (State Law).” (Doc. 1 at p. 4). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 states complaints must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at (d)(1). Plaintiff’s Complaint does

not meet this requirement. The Seventh Circuit has consistently noted that “the essential function of a complaint under the civil rules...is to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiff’s claim.” Ross Bros. Const. Co. v. Int’l Steel Servs., Inc., 283 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not provide the Court or the potential Defendants with adequate notice of his claims. While Plaintiff named Defendant Lieutenant Tracy Brigae as a Defendant, he did not include any allegations pertaining to Defendant Brigae in his Complaint. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833-34 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.). Finally, it appears that Plaintiff’s allegations might not be properly joined in one lawsuit. Plaintiff is advised that unrelated claims against the same defendant may be joined in one action, but different defendants can be joined in one action only if the claims against them arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20; Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2013) (court “can require the plaintiff ‘to file separate complaints, each confined to

one group of injuries and defendants.’”) (quoted cite omitted); Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.

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Related

Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
689 F.3d 680 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Jurijus Kadamovas v. Michael Stevens
706 F.3d 843 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Minix v. Canarecci
597 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Burks v. Raemisch
555 F.3d 592 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
William Hawkins v. Rodney Mitchell
756 F.3d 983 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Michael Alexander v. United States
721 F.3d 418 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Sherry Katz-Crank v. Kimberly Haskett
843 F.3d 641 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Cynthia Archer v. John Chisholm
870 F.3d 603 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Roy Mitchell, Jr. v. Kevin Kallas
895 F.3d 492 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Dickerson v. Campbell, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickerson-v-campbell-ilcd-2023.