Dibble v. Augur

7 F. Cas. 642, 7 Blatchf. 86, 1869 U.S. App. LEXIS 1294
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York·Decided December 30, 1869·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

BLATCHFORD, District Judge.

On the facts in this case, it is contended, on the part of the defendant, that the right to recover for the profits derived from infringements of the patent, committed prior to February 20th. 186S. did not pass to Dibble by the two instruments of the 8th of May, 1868; that, when the bill was filed, the right to recover for such profits was in Robertson alone; that the proper remedy was by a suit at law. in the name of Robertson; that this bill will not lie in behalf of Robertson;, because he has a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and does not bring the bill for discovery, and was not, when it was filed, the owner of the patent; that it will not lie in behalf of the plaintiffs other than Robertson, because, when it was filed, they had no interest in the claim for such profits; that, whatever may have been the rights of Robertson when the bill was filed, he, after that, conveyed to Dibble, as trustee, all right to collect such profits; and that the enforcement of the claim for such profits in behalf of the three companies, is a violation of the provisions of the license of February 20th, 1868.

' The b'ill ls'-filed in the name Of the thrée companies, and of Robertson, and of Dibble, as trustee of the three companies and Robertson. I think that the purport and effect of the two papers of the 8th of May, 186S, were, to vest in Dibble, as trustee for the three companies, all Robertson’s interest in the patent, and to vest in Dibble, as trustee for Robertson, all interest in. all claims for past infringements of the patent against others than the three companies, and all interest in all claims for future infringements of the patent against others than the three companies and their licensees, agents or customers. The two papers of the 8th of May, 1868, must be construed in connection with each other. By the naked assignment of that date, Robertson did not transfer to Dibble his claims for past infringements of the patent There are no words therein looking to the past. The language is wholly future in its scope. In conveying all of Robertson’s “right, title, interest, claim or demand whatsoever, in, to or under” the patent, it conveys only the right to claims for infringements which should be committed after such assignment. Moore v. Marsh, 7 Wall. [74 U. S.] 515. The words “claim or demand whatsoever, in, to or under” the patent, are not sufficient to cover claims for past infringements. Besides, the other paper of the same date clearly shows that Robertson did not intend to convey to Dibble individually, or otherwise thau as trustee for him, Robertson, any claim for any past infringement of the patent against others than ■ the .three companies. When the bill in this case was filed, it ought, properly, so far as the claim in respect to the alleged infringements covered by the • admission before referred to is concerned, to have been filed in the name of Dibble, as trustee for Robertson, joining Robertson as the owner of the equitable interest, the legal interest of ■which was represented by Dibble, as trustee. It was so brought, adding, as plaintiffs, Dibble, as trustee for the three companies, and the three companies themselves. Such addition was surplusage; but, as the objection thereto was not raised until the hearing, and as, by the paper of the 16th of June, 1868, the title to the claim in respect to the alleged infringements covered by such admission, was transferred by Robertson to Dibble. as trustee for the three companies, and for Robertson, and as the bill is brought'in the name of such trustee and of the cestuis quo trust, it will be allowed to stand. The defendant, if compelled to respond in this suit to such plaintiffs, in respect to the alleged infringements covered by such admission, will be responding to every person who can possibly make a claim against him in respect to such alleged infringements. The suit, being for an account of profits, is properly bi'ought in equity.

The license of the 20th of February. 1808, can apply only to machines -made or sold by [645] the licensees after .that date. It.'therefore, has no application to the alleged infringements covered by. the admission before referred to.

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Dibble v. Augur, 7 F. Cas. 642, 7 Blatchf. 86, 1869 U.S. App. LEXIS 1294 (circtsdny 1869).

7 F. Cas. 642 (Dibble v. Augur) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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