Diaz v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 13

474 F.3d 1202, 181 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2299, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2297, 2007 WL 291531
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 2, 2007
Docket04-56957
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 474 F.3d 1202 (Diaz v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 13) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diaz v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 181 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2299, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2297, 2007 WL 291531 (9th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, longshoremen formerly employed through the International Long-shore and Warehouse Union Local 13, Allied Division (“Allied”), allege that International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 13 (“Local 13”) breached its duty of fair representation by failing to transfer Appellants to another bargaining unit, failing to inquire about available work, refusing to place Appellants on hiring hall lists, and failing to address Appellants’ grievances. Appellants appeal the district court’s order granting Local 13’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) with prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Local 13 is a labor union that acts as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees who work in ports along the Pacific Coast of the United States. Members of Local 13 are employed as longshoremen whose duties include moving cargo on vessels, handling freight on docks, and the performance of associated clerical functions. As alleged, Local 13 includes two separate divisions, Allied and the Longshoremen’s Division (“Longshoremen’s”).

Appellants are nine longshoremen who, following their layoff from Allied, sought and were denied transfer to Longshoremen’s. Appellants allege that Local 13 unfairly excluded them from its hiring hall and that Local 13 did not ask its affiliated employers whether positions were available for Appellants. Appellants further claim that they submitted grievances to Local 13 about the transfer and hiring hall issues and that Local 13 improperly handled these grievances.

Appellants initially filed a complaint alleging breach of their collective bargaining agreement and breach of the duty of fair representation. Following the filing of two subsequent amended complaints, the district court determined that Appellants could not prove any set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief, and accordingly dismissed the SAC with prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and presently assert only a claim of breach of duty of fair representation against Local 13.

*1205 STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. McNamara-Blad v. Assoc. of Prof. Flight Attendants, 275 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2000)). We accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir.2000). The court may not dismiss the complaint unless the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle them to relief. Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1149.

“Generally, the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is limited to the contents of the complaint.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006). Under the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules, plaintiffs are only required to give a “short and plain statement” of their claims in the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “Thus, ‘[w]hen a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint ... [our] task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’ ” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (alterations in Hydrick)).

DISCUSSION

“[B]eeause the national labor policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with their employer ... this Court found it necessary to fashion the duty of fair representation.” NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). “Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent’s statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). As Justice White explained in Vaca:

The statutory duty of fair representation was developed ... in a series of cases involving alleged racial discrimination by unions certified as exclusive bargaining representatives under the Railway Labor Act, see Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 [(1944)], and was soon extended to unions certified under the [National Labor Relations Act].

Id. (additional citations omitted). To protect the interests of minority members of a bargaining unit, the duty of fair representation “has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct.” Id. at 182, 87 S.Ct. 903.

Because the duty arises out of “the union’s exclusive power to represent all employees in a particular bargaining unit,” Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 87, 110 S.Ct. 424, 107 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), there are two natural limitations to its scope. First, the duty of fair representation “does not extend to persons who are not employees in the bargaining unit.” Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass’n, 762 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that a nonemployee of the bargaining unit “lacks standing to sue for breach of [the duty of fair representation]”). See also McNamara-Blad,

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474 F.3d 1202, 181 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2299, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2297, 2007 WL 291531, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diaz-v-international-longshore-warehouse-union-local-13-ca9-2007.