United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 12-1859
DÍAZ AVIATION CORPORATION, d/b/a Borinquen Air,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
SIXTO DÍAZ-SALDAÑA
Plaintiff,
v.
AIRPORT AVIATION SERVICES, INC.; JOSÉ ALGARÍN; RAFAEL MATOS; PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY; FERNANDO BONILLA; FEDERICO SOSA- ROMÁN, a/k/a Fred Sosa-Román; EDWIN SANTANA-DE LA ROSA; ARNALDO DELEO; EDGAR SIERRA; ERIC GARCÍA; ALVARO PILAR,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Camille L. Vélez-Rivé, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge, Torruella and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Sixto M. Díaz-Saldaña, on brief for appellant. Guillermo De Guzmán-Vendrell and De Guzmán Law Offices, on brief for appellees Airport Aviation Services, Inc. and Edwin Santana-de la Rosa. Arturo Díaz-Angueira and Cancio, Nadal, Rivera & Díaz, P.S.C., on brief for appellees José Algarín and Rafael Matos. Margarita Mercado-Echegaray, Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on brief for appellees Fernando Bonilla and Federico Sosa-Román. Myra M. Vélez-Plumey and Fernández, Collins Cuyar & Plá, on brief for non-appellees Puerto Rico Ports Authority, Alvaro Pilar, Arnaldo Deleo, Edgar Sierra and Eric García.
June 14, 2013
-2- TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. A company that sells aviation
fuel at a Puerto Rico airport brought suit against a rival company,
the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, and employees of those entities,
claiming that the defendants wrongfully interfered with its
business. The district court dismissed the claims against some
defendants before trial, and granted judgment for the remaining
defendants after a bench trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
The plaintiff-appellant is Díaz Aviation Corporation
("Díaz Aviation"), a company that also does business under the
trade names Borinquen Air and Amber Service. Díaz Aviation has
provided aviation services at the Luis Muñoz Marín International
Airport ("LMMIA") in Carolina, Puerto Rico, since 1960. Although
the business began as an airline, in 1985 it began selling aviation
fuel. By 2005, Díaz Aviation was selling around $2 million of fuel
per year, and its main customer was the United States military.
Sixto Díaz-Saldaña ("Díaz") is the founder, sole
shareholder, and general manager of Díaz Aviation. He is also a
licensed attorney, and has chosen to represent his corporation
throughout this litigation, in the district court and on appeal.
One group of defendants consists of Airport Aviation
Services, Inc. ("AAS") and some current and former employees of
AAS. AAS is a Puerto Rico corporation that sells aviation fuel at
LMMIA; it was formerly part of a consortium of Puerto Rican
-3- companies known as "Empresas Santana." Edwin Santana de la Rosa
was formerly a stockholder, director, and officer of AAS; however,
he sold his stock in AAS and resigned from all positions at AAS in
March 2008. José Algarín is the president and CEO of AAS. Rafael
Matos is the Director of Fuel Sales and Operations Manager of AAS.
The second group of defendants is the Puerto Rico Ports
Authority ("PRPA") and various PRPA employees. The PRPA is a
corporation owned by the Puerto Rico government that ran LMMIA
during the relevant time frame. Fernando Bonilla is a former
Executive Director of the PRPA. Federico Sosa-Román is a former
manager of LMMIA. Alvaro Pilar is the Executive Director of the
PRPA. Arnaldo Deleo is the Director of Aviation of PRPA and
manager of LMMIA. Edgar Sierra is the Director of Operations at
LMMIA. Eric Gracia is the Assistant Director of Operations at
LMMIA.
Díaz Aviation filed a complaint in the federal district
court on June 26, 2009, and filed an amended complaint on
February 17, 2010. Broadly speaking, the amended complaint alleges
that a corrupt relationship existed between AAS and PRPA, and that
both organizations and their employees took improper actions in
order to drive Díaz Aviation out of business. Díaz Aviation
alleges that Santana has paid bribes to the governing political
party of Puerto Rico, and that as a result, the PRPA has
systematically favored AAS and discriminated against Díaz Aviation.
-4- The complaint points to several specific actions and incidents,
including:
-In March 2005, the PRPA brought an eviction action against Díaz Aviation in Puerto Rico court. This action ultimately failed because Díaz Aviation had paid rent and the PRPA had accepted it.
-In 2009, AAS won a contract to supply the military with fuel at LMMIA. Díaz Aviation alleges that AAS has wrongfully claimed that this is an exclusive contract, and has interfered with Díaz Aviation's fuel sales to the Air Force.
-On October 23, 2009, Algarín complained to a PRPA employee about Díaz Aviation; the next day, the PRPA removed Díaz Aviation's fueling permits and expelled Díaz Aviation's trucks from the fueling ramps for approximately two weeks.
-On January 20, 2010, PRPA employees removed a military airplane that Díaz Aviation was fueling, claiming that the airplane was illegally parked; AAS then sold fuel to the airplane.
The complaint does not include headings for separate
counts or causes of action, but it references numerous federal and
Puerto Rico statutes in a scattered fashion. This lack of
organization makes it difficult to determine what causes of action
Díaz Aviation is pursuing. The causes of action referenced most
prominently in the complaint are Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., based on
bribery and fraud. The complaint also mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983
-5- (civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (the False Claims Act); 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (conspiracy against federal rights); Article 1803 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5142;1 P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 3, § 1822 et seq. (Puerto Rico ethics law); and P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 33, § 4883 (criminal statute barring public employees
from using their position for the benefit of a third party).
All defendants filed motions to dismiss, and the district
court granted the motions filed by the PRPA and individual PRPA
defendants Bonilla, Pilar, Sosa, Deleo, Sierra, and Gracia. The
district court dismissed these claims under the Local Government
Antitrust Act ("LGAA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 35, 36, which immunizes local
governments and local government employees from federal antitrust
damages. See Díaz Aviation Corp. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 2010 WL
2991251, at *4-5 (D.P.R. July 27, 2010). The district court's
ruling did not mention or discuss any non-antitrust claims.
Following discovery, Díaz Aviation and the remaining
defendants (AAS, Santana, Algarín, and Matos) filed cross motions
for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions of
Díaz Aviation, AAS, Algarín, and Matos, finding that disputed
factual issues remained. See Díaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport
Aviation Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 5335519, at *8, 12-13 (D.P.R.
1 The complaint cites "Articles 1803 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code." This is apparently a typographical error for Articles 1802 and 1803. Article 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141, is a general negligence and tort statute, and Article 1803 provides for supervisory liability for violations of Article 1802.
-6- Nov. 7, 2011). The district court granted Santana's motion for
summary judgment because he had already left AAS when the disputes
about fueling occurred. Id. at *11.
In February 2012, a bench trial occurred between Díaz
Aviation and AAS, Algarín, and Matos. By that time, the claims had
been narrowed to the Sherman Act and Article 1802 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code ("Article 1802"). In spite of the district court's
advice that Díaz Aviation should retain outside counsel, Díaz chose
to represent his corporation while also serving as a witness.
Díaz Aviation's case consisted of testimony from
employees of the Puerto Rico Police, PRPA, AAS, and Díaz Aviation
(including Díaz himself), along with several documentary exhibits.
The testimony focused mostly on incidents between Díaz Aviation,
PRPA, and AAS in 2009 and 2010 relating to fueling activities, and
particularly fueling of military airplanes. Where necessary, we
will describe the evidence in greater detail below.
After Díaz Aviation concluded its case, the defendants
filed for a judgment on partial findings in their favor, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). The district court granted the motion,
finding that Díaz Aviation had failed to meet its burden of proof
on all claims. See Díaz Aviation Corp. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 2012
WL 706119 (D.P.R. Mar. 5, 2012). The district court's factual
findings and legal reasoning are described below.
-7- Díaz Aviation moved for a new trial or for
reconsideration of the district court's previous decision. The
district court denied the motion, saying that its earlier decision
was supported by the evidence at trial. Díaz Aviation filed a
timely appeal.
II
Díaz Aviation's notice of appeal and original docketing
statement have led to a dispute about the scope of the appeal.
Díaz Aviation's notice of appeal stated that it:
hereby appeal[s] to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from the ORDER, Docket 346, dated June 12, 2012, denying a motion, filed on March 21, 2012, Dockets 342 and 343, seeking a new trial or the modification of the OPINION AND ORDER entered on March 5, 2012, Dockets 339 and 340 (Judgement).
In other words, the notice of appeal listed as the subject of
appeal the denial of reconsideration of the final judgment, but not
the judgment itself. Further, the original docketing statement
listed only three appellees: AAS, Matos, and Algarín. Yet Díaz
Aviation's appellate brief urged reversal not just of the denial of
reconsideration, but of the final judgment after trial, and the
earlier judgments dismissing the claims against the PRPA defendants
and Santana.
After Díaz Aviation filed its brief, Sosa wrote to this
court asking us to disregard any arguments against him because he
was not listed as an appellee in the docketing statement, and the
-8- notice of appeal did not encompass the orders dismissing him from
the case. We allowed Díaz Aviation to amend its docketing
statement to include additional appellees if it wished, and invited
the parties to address the scope of the notice of appeal in their
briefs. Díaz Aviation then filed an amended docketing statement
listing every defendant except Pilar as an appellee. In their
brief, Sosa and Bonilla renewed the argument that the orders
dismissing the case as to them were not included in the notice of
appeal.
Under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
a notice of appeal must "designate the judgment, order, or part
thereof being appealed." Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Although
"[c]ourts will liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3,"
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248; accord Blockel v. J.C. Penney
Co., 337 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2003), "Rule 3's dictates are
jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite
to appellate review," Smith, 502 U.S. at 248. These twin commands
from the Supreme Court -- that Rule 3 is jurisdictional, but that
it should be construed liberally -- inherently give courts some
flexibility about when to apply Rule 3's jurisdictional bar and
when to use liberal construction to rescue a facially deficient
notice of appeal.
We are convinced that Díaz Aviation's notice of appeal
should be construed liberally to include the final judgment. It is
-9- well settled law that when a notice of appeal addresses only the
order denying reconsideration and not the underlying judgment,
"courts have some latitude to consider other grounds originally
urged against the underlying dismissal, especially where the issues
on original dismissal and the reconsideration order overlap or are
intertwined." McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 213
(1st Cir. 2012); see also Rojas-Velázquez v. Figueroa-Sancha, 676
F.3d 206, 209 (1st Cir. 2012); Alstom Caribe, Inc. v. Geo. P.
Reintjes Co., 484 F.3d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 2007). Díaz Aviation's
motion for reconsideration largely rehashed the arguments it made
in opposition to the original judgment. As we have often done when
the issues are intertwined, we will treat the appeal of the denial
of reconsideration as also including an appeal of the final
judgment.
Yet construing Díaz Aviation's appeal to encompass the
earlier orders from nearly two years earlier dismissing the PRPA
defendants from the case would go a step too far. Where a notice
of appeal does not mention certain interlocutory orders or
defendants, the touchstone is whether the appellant has indicated
an intent to seek review of those orders through his notice of
appeal and accompanying documents. See United States v. Dowell,
257 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n error in designating the
judgment will not result in a loss of appeal if the intent to
-10- appeal from the contested judgment may be inferred from the notice
and if the appellee has not been misled by the defect.").
Two peculiar facts of this case convince us that Díaz
Aviation has not indicated a sufficiently clear intent to appeal
the judgments dismissing the PRPA defendants from the case. First,
while Díaz Aviation's appellate brief contains occasional glancing
arguments related to those judgments, it also asserts that the PRPA
defendants are "not denominated as appellees." Thus, the brief is
at best equivocal about the intent to appeal as to the PRPA
defendants. Second, although the amended docketing statement adds
most of the PRPA defendants as appellees, it still lists only the
denial of reconsideration as the subject of appeal, and does not
mention any earlier interlocutory orders. On the specific facts of
this case, we conclude that Díaz Aviation has not provided
sufficient notice of intent to appeal the judgments in favor of the
PRPA defendants. We have some flexibility in our construction of
Rule 3, but we see no reason to exercise special flexibility in
favor of a corporation in a business tort case that is represented
by counsel.
For Santana, although Díaz Aviation has asked this court
to reverse the summary judgment in Santana's favor, Díaz Aviation
has not provided any developed argument about why we should do so.
We therefore conclude that Díaz Aviation has waived his perfunctory
challenge to the district court's grant of summary judgment to
-11- Santana. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 19 (1st Cir.
1990).
All that remains of the appeal are Díaz Aviation's
challenges to the judgments in favor of the trial defendants AAS,
Algarín, and Matos.
III
Díaz Aviation appeals the district court's grant of a
motion for non-suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) in favor of AAS,
Algarín, and Matos after Díaz Aviation presented its case at the
bench trial. Most of Díaz Aviation's arguments challenge
credibility determinations and factual inferences the district
court drew from the evidence. For example, Díaz Aviation contends
that the district court should not have credited the testimony of
a PRPA employee who said that he removed a military plane from Díaz
Aviation's ramp because it was illegally parked in an unsafe area.
Díaz Aviation also argues that the court should have inferred that
a conspiracy between PRPA and AAS existed from an email chain
between PRPA and AAS employees, despite Deleo's testimony denying
a conspiracy.
This type of argument is unavailing. When serving as
factfinder, the trial judge is entitled to draw reasonable
inferences and make credibility determinations. We defer to the
trial judge's factual findings and set them aside only if "clearly
erroneous." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). Díaz Aviation has made no
-12- showing to leave us with "the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." Jackson v. United States, 708 F.3d
23, 30 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We now turn to each cause of action to show why the district court
was correct (or at the very least, not clearly erroneous) in
concluding that Díaz Aviation had not met its burden of proof.
Sherman Act Section 1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars
"[e]very contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1. A Section 1 violation requires
an agreement, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007),
and this agreement must be between separate economic entities
rather than members of the same economic enterprise, see Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-71 (1984);
González-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 249 (1st
Cir. 2012). Most agreements are judged by the "rule of reason,"
under which they are declared illegal only if unreasonable or
anticompetitive. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007).2
2 A narrow class of agreements such as horizontal price fixing "that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output" are declared unlawful per se, which obviates the need to determine the reasonableness of a specific agreement. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)). Díaz Aviation makes no claim that any agreement in this case falls under the per se category.
-13- The district court's ruling can be sustained on either of
two grounds. First, Díaz Aviation did not prove the existence of
concerted action. An agreement between AAS and its employees
Algarín and Matos would not qualify as concerted action under
Section 1. The only potential agreement of which Díaz Aviation
presented any evidence was an agreement between AAS and PRPA. As
evidence of such a conspiracy, Díaz Aviation pointed to an email
exchange between AAS and PRPA employees that took place before PRPA
employees removed Díaz Aviation's fueling permits and expelled its
fueling trucks from the airport ramps.
On October 23, 2009, Algarín received an email from
another AAS employee stating that Díaz Aviation had caused an
"imminent security risk" through its conduct in fueling military
planes; it enclosed a police report of an incident involving Díaz
Aviation and noted that Díaz Aviation's employees "are becoming
very upset." Algarín then forwarded the email to a PRPA employee,
saying: "The important thing is to prevent any personal incident
actions, apart from any type of accident while fuel is being
supplied. I would appreciate your intervening in the matter."
That PRPA employee forwarded the email to Deleo, his supervisor.
The next day, Deleo forwarded this email chain to Díaz,
noting that Díaz Aviation fueled an airplane "which should have
been serviced by [AAS]." Deleo said that AAS had a contract to
fuel military planes, but Díaz Aviation did not have a fuel permit
-14- with the PRPA. Deleo stated, "Based on said communication and at
the request of [AAS], you are requested to immediately cease to
interfere with this or other duly authorized companies with fuel
permits in effect." That same day, PRPA employees removed the fuel
permits from Díaz Aviation's trucks and escorted the trucks outside
the fueling area. Díaz Aviation's trucks were kept from the
fueling area for about fifteen days until Díaz Aviation obtained an
injunction in Puerto Rico court allowing it to return, on the basis
that although its fueling permit was expired, it had become
permanent.
Díaz Aviation argues that the email exchange confirms the
existence of an unlawful conspiracy between AAS and PRPA, but the
testimony at trial told a different story. Algarín testified that
he sent the email to PRPA to deal with potential security issues
and that while he hoped PRPA would take appropriate action, he was
not demanding or expecting that PRPA take any specific action.
Deleo testified that he ordered Díaz Aviation's trucks removed
because Díaz Aviation's interference with fueling operations was
causing safety and security issues, and he believed at the time
that Díaz Aviation did not have a valid contract to sell fuel at
LMMIA; he denied a conspiracy with AAS or its employees. The
contention that Díaz Aviation's actions caused security issues was
further supported by testimony from two AAS employees that Díaz had
used aggressive and threatening language toward them on the airport
-15- ramps. This evidence plausibly supported the conclusion that AAS
and PRPA were taking reasonable security measures rather than
engaging in a conspiracy to restrain trade, and the district court
did not clearly err in finding no such conspiracy.
Second, Díaz Aviation has not shown that the defendants'
actions were unreasonable or anticompetitive. Rule of reason
analysis typically requires a plaintiff to show that the
defendants' actions enhanced market power -- i.e., the power to
raise prices or exclude competition -- which in turn requires some
economic analysis of the relevant market. See E. Food Servs., Inc.
v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Assoc., Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2004). But Díaz Aviation put forward no evidence about
market definition, market share, the effect on pricing or output,
or other relevant economic variables. Further, the evidence at
trial demonstrated a legitimate procompetitive justification for
many of the actions taken against Díaz: maintaining safety and
security at LMMIA. We affirm the district court's determination
that Díaz Aviation did not meet its burden under the rule of
reason.
Sherman Act Section 2.3 Section 2 makes it illegal to
"monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade
3 It is not clear that a Section 2 claim ever should have been in the case. The amended complaint refers only to Section 1. But the district court treated the complaint as including a Section 2 claim "in an abundance of caution," Díaz Aviation Corp., 2012 WL 706119, at *2, and we will do the same.
-16- or commerce among the several States . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2. The
elements of monopolization are "(1) possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966). The elements of attempted monopolization are "(1) that the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with
(2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability
of achieving monopoly power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). Absent direct proof of supracompetitive
prices, monopoly power is typically proven by defining a relevant
market and showing that the defendant has a dominant share of that
market. See Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum
Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 196-97 (1st Cir. 1996).
The district court correctly concluded that Díaz Aviation
failed to proffer evidence of the sort necessary to prove monopoly
power or dangerous probability of monopoly, including evidence of
market definition, market share, barriers to entry, or any other
economic evidence of monopoly power. The only evidence that Díaz
Aviation did put forward cut against its position. Multiple
witnesses testified that although AAS employees would approach
military pilots with a copy of their military contract and offer to
provide fuel, the military pilots remained free to purchase fuel
-17- from a competitor. Several weeks before the trial, two military
pilots decided to purchase fuel from Díaz Aviation even after AAS
had approached and offered its services. The district court
committed no error in dismissing the Section 2 claim.
Article 1802. Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code
is a general negligence and tort statute, which reads: "A person
who by act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. The elements of an Article 1802 claim
are a physical or emotional injury, a negligent or intentional act
or omission (i.e., a wrongful act), and a causal connection between
the injury and the defendant's wrongful conduct. See Vázquez-
Filippetti v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st
Cir. 2007).
As the district court noted, Díaz Aviation's proof is
deficient on all three elements. Díaz Aviation elicited much
testimony about AAS' military fueling contract. The evidence
showed that AAS had a requirements contract with the Defense Energy
Support Center to provide aviation fuel to military planes at
LMMIA. AAS obtained this contract through competitive bidding, and
Díaz Aviation chose not to bid. The contract obligated AAS to
supply the military planes with their required fuel needs and
obligated the military to accept and pay for such fuel. AAS would
approach military planes at LMMIA with a copy of the contract and
-18- offer to sell fuel. The military pilots could choose to buy fuel
from either AAS or a competitor, but if they chose a competitor,
AAS could submit a claim for payment of the profits AAS would have
gained from the sale.
None of this evidence showed that the defendants were
negligent or otherwise acted wrongfully in fulfilling their
contract. Díaz Aviation provided no evidence that AAS misled
pilots about the contents of the contract, or excluded Díaz
Aviation from competing for fuel sales in any way. To the
contrary, the evidence showed that Díaz himself was sometimes
belligerent or aggressive in interfering with AAS' operations. For
example, on one occasion, Díaz blocked the way of an AAS employee
who was attempting to offer his services to a military pilot and
said, "You can go [to] hell. Do you come here to be screwing
around?". On another occasion, after both Díaz and an AAS employee
had offered to fuel a military plane, Díaz put his hand on the AAS
employee's back and said, "you and your wife will remember me,"
which the AAS employee perceived as a threat.
Many of the actions proven at trial were committed by
PRPA employees, not by the defendants. For example, PRPA employees
filed eviction actions against Díaz in Puerto Rico court, expelled
Díaz Aviation's trucks from the airport ramps in October 2009, and
on January 20, 2010, ordered a military airplane to relocate from
Díaz Aviation's ramp, purportedly because of safety concerns. Not
-19- only did Díaz Aviation fail to prove that these actions were
wrongful or negligent, but it also failed to prove that the AAS
defendants bore any causal responsibility for them. As described
earlier, Díaz Aviation could not prove that AAS conspired with PRPA
to induce PRPA to take these actions.
Finally, Díaz Aviation provided no reliable evidence of
damages. Díaz and his son offered some testimony about Díaz
Aviation's finances, but this testimony was unsupported by any
financial documentation. Díaz Aviation now admits that it has yet
to quantify the damages and demands an additional evidentiary
hearing to quantify damages. But it was Díaz Aviation's burden to
prove damages at trial, and the district court was entitled to find
that Díaz Aviation had failed to meet its burden.
Affirmed.
-20-