Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

119 F.2d 978, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 762, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 3898
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedMay 9, 1941
DocketNo. 7495
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 119 F.2d 978 (Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 119 F.2d 978, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 762, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 3898 (7th Cir. 1941).

Opinion

BRIGGLE, District Judge.

Upon charges preferred by International Union, United Automobile Workers of [979]*979America (hereinafter called United), the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the Board) issued its complaint on October 11, 1938, against the Diamond T Motor Car Company (hereinafter called the Company), charging that the company had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1, 2, and 3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Statute 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1, 2, and 3). The decision below was favorable to respondent. The company filed its petition for review. The Board answered, requesting enforcement of its order. Jurisdiction is conceded.

The complaint charges, inter alia, that the company had engaged in unfair labor practices, had dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of the Automotive Workers Industrial Union (hereinafter called Industrial) and that the company had discriminatorily discharged and refused to reinstate one C. R. Cahill. The trial examiner who heard the evidence found that the company had not dominated or interfered with Industrial or discrimina-torily discharged Cahill, but found that the Company had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(1). Upon review, the Board sustained the examiner with reference to employee Cahill and with reference to his finding of unfair labor practices, but overruled the examiner as to domination and found that the Company had dominated or interfered with the formation or administration of Industrial.

Pursuant to these findings the Board ordered the Company to cease and desist from (a) in any manner dominating or interfering with Industrial or any other labor organization of its employees and from contributing financial or other support thereto; (b) giving effect to an agreement between the Company and Industrial; (c) interfering with its employees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.

The Board further ordered the Company to take the following affirmative action: (a) Withdraw all recognition of Industrial as the representative of any of its employees; (b) post notices of compliance; (c) notify the regional director of compliance. Petitioner asserts that the decision of the Board is not supported by substantial evidence, nor by the facts found by the Board and that the inferences of fact drawn by the Board from evidentiary facts are unreasonable. Respondent asserts that its findings and order are amply supported by the evidence. The decision turns upon the company’s relation with Industrial.

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the Board: In March, 1937, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, affiliate of C. I. O., initiated a campaign among the Company’s employees, looking to the ultimate organization of United. Shortly thereafter, C. A. Peirce who was Vice-president of the Company in charge of production, asked Frank Koci, a production employee if he had seen any C. I. O. cards passed around in the shop. Later, one Courval, a Superintendent, asked one Joseph Tishcovske, an employee, whether he knew anything about C. I. O. organizers having C. I. O. cards passed around the shop. Upon a negative reply by Tish-covske, Courval then said: “Joe, it’s like this. Mr. Tilt the owner of this Company, will not stand for any Company union, outside union. * * * If Mr. Tilt finds out organization is going on here, I am going to lose my job; Mr. Peirce will lose his job, because Mr. Tilt will close this plant down * * *. He will have to move down to Georgia. That means all of the boys and you will be out of work.” It does not appear that Tishcovske gave any heed to this or ever mentioned it until the hearing.

On March 24, 1937, a Chicago newspaper carried a news item to the effect that C. I. O. contemplated invading the company’s plant with a campaign for unionization. Peirce soon thereafter summoned all of the employees to a meeting in thp assembly room of the plant and addressed them at length. After stressing that an absence of strikes and the existence of friendly feelings had characterized the relations between the Company and the men in the past, he told the men that he did not want any strikes if he could help it. Fie told the employees that he had been reviewing the question of their pay and that they would receive a raise in pay the first of the following month and that he had under consideration the question of vacations. He then used the following language which the Board appears to have relied upon: “I hear there is a movement to organize our plant; I read it in the papers. * * * I have read the Wagner Act, and while I don’t pose as any authority on it, I can say that you have a perfect right to or[980]*980ganize in any way you see fit a union in our plant. * * * There are three forms of union that I know of. There is the Federation of Labor, there is the C. I. O. and there is an independent union form of organization and any of those are acceptable to me. However, personally, since I am going to conduct the negotiations probably with the representatives of whatever union is formed, naturally I would like to talk and deal with a man or men who know our business in our plant, understand our peculiar working conditions and can talk intelligently about them.” Later, on cross-examination by the Board’s attorney and in reviewing the foregoing incident he used this language: “If you are going to organize, I would prefer to deal with men who are working in a plant and know our business and our style of operation of a plant rather than someone from outside who doesn’t understand it.”

Peirce testified that fear in his mind that a strike was imminent was the reason which prompted him to call the meeting. He said his sole object was to preserve continuity of work in the plant. The President of United testified that Peirce told the men at the meeting that it was up to them to decide what they wanted to do, that it was their choice and that the responsibility was on them.

■ Upon conclusion of Peirce’s talk and at the request of the employees he left their presence and they were free. to discuss matters of organization among themselves. A witness Schultz testified that later Peirce returned and suggested that the employees might take a vote to determine whether their orgar^zation would be an outside organization or one of their own. It is to be noted that this testimony was sharply disputed and the Board in its findings of fact recited: “Later in the afternoon the assembled employees decided to resolve the question by secret ballot. Cahill (an employee who favored C. I. O.) suggested that they vote either for the C. I. O. or for an inside union.” The trial examiner stated in his report that the evidence was clear that after Peirce left, it became an open meeting for all employees with no supervisory agent present. Apparently the Board did not accept Schultz’ statement in this respect. The vote was later taken, and the ballots deposited at the time clock as the employees left the plant for the day. Upon request of the employees and with Peirce’s permission the votes were counted in his office. The vote showed that a substantial majority favored the formation of what has been termed an “inside” organization.

Pursuant to the decision of the employees two men were chosen by the employees in each department for the purpose of forming such an organization. The day following the meeting referred to, some thirty representatives so chosen met during working hours in the shipping office of the plant and selected temporary officers.

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119 F.2d 978, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 762, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 3898, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diamond-t-motor-car-co-v-national-labor-relations-board-ca7-1941.