di Santo v. New York State Unified Court System
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Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PATRICK di SANTO, Plaintiff, 1:25-CV-6674 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Patrick di Santo, of Lenexa, Kansas, brings this pro se action asserting claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He sues the New York State Unified Court System and seeks damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff asserts that he sues the defendant “for systemic failure to provide reasonable accommodations during judicial proceedings in Ulster County,” New York. (ECF 1, at 1.) For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. DISCUSSION The appropriate venue provision for Plaintiff’s claims is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that, unless otherwise provided by law, a federal civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. § 1391(c)(1), (2). It is unclear whether the New York State Unified Court System, which appears to be an entity of the State of New York, is a suable entity; if Plaintiff meant to sue the State of New York, and to the extent that it is a suable entity, it resides within this judicial district1 and within the
Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of New York as well. See 28 U.S.C. 112(a)-(d). Thus, it would appear that this court, and the United States District Courts for those other abovementioned judicial districts, are each a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1). Plaintiff also alleges, however, that a substantial part, if not all of the alleged events that are the bases of his action occurred within Ulster County (ECF 1, at 1), within the Northern District of New York, see 28 U.S.C. § 112(a). Thus, while this court does not appear to be a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2), it is clear that the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York is a proper venue for this action under that
provision. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a civil action is filed in a federal district court where venue is proper, a court may transfer the action to any other federal district court where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of
1 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b). operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice,
based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate for this action. Because Plaintiff alleges that a substantial part, if not all of the events giving rise to his claims occurred within the Northern District of New York, it is reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would also be located within that judicial district. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, which is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1391(b)(2), therefore, appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to that court. See § 1404(a); D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d
95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this court. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 12, 2025 New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge
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