Di Biasi v. City of New York

19 A.D.2d 323, 242 N.Y.S.2d 942, 1963 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3321
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 8, 1963
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 19 A.D.2d 323 (Di Biasi v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Di Biasi v. City of New York, 19 A.D.2d 323, 242 N.Y.S.2d 942, 1963 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3321 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

Ughetta, Acting P. J.

The corporate plaintiff owns property abutting Donley Avenue in Staten Island, Richmond County of the City of New York. The city has refused it a building permit upon the ground that11 Street giving access [Donley Avenue] is not on the official map.” There were other objections which do not concern us since the city admits that they have been satisfied. The premises, including the subject portion of Donley Avenue, are set forth on a subdivision map which has been approved by the Chief Engineer of the city’s Board of Estimate and filed in the Register’s office since September, 1926. However, the city maintains that that map does not suffice and that issuance of the building permit is banned by section 36 of the General City Law which reads in part as follows:. “ No permit for the erection of any building shall be issued unless a street or highway giving access to such proposed structure has been duly placed on the official map or plan, which street or highway shall have been suitably improved to the satisfaction of the planning [325]*325board in accordance with standards and specifications approved by the appropriate city departments as adequate in respect to the public health, safety and general welfare for the special circumstances of the particular street or highway ’ \ Section 36 goes on to provide relief in cases of “ practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship ” by appeal to a Board of Appeals or other similar body empowered to pass upon application for zoning-variances or exceptions. That section is part of article 3 of the General City Law (elf. April 30, 1926), which article offers a comprehensive scheme of establishing “official” maps and enforcing conformity of construction to such maps.

It is conceded that the City of New York has not prepared ‘ ‘ official ’ ’ maps of many areas in Richmond County, including the subject premises, in which there are existing streets. Moreover, the city had not invoked article 3 to deny permits to build next to such streets until July, 1960.

An important feature of the “ official map ” insisted upon by the city is that it set forth grade and elevation lines in fine detail. That refinement is lacking on the filed subdivision map of the subject premises. Thus, if the city were to alter the grade of Donley Avenue (and presumably that of other streets) the abutting structures might suffer detriment and their owners might seek “ change in grade ” damages. The city.proposes in such cases to forestall the damages by refusing building permits and by suggesting two alternative remedies for those who wish to build. One remedy is for the builder to prepare, at his own expense, a map setting forth grade and elevation lines and to donate it to the city for approval and incorporation in the “ official map ” (also called the “ final ” map). He may then build in conformity with it. The other remedy is an appeal to the Board of Appeals. The inference is that on such appeal the permit shall eventually be issued but only after the city obtains a waiver of any damage attributable to a subsequent change in the street grade due to “ final ” or “ official ” mapping.

That approach presupposes that the city may invoke the restrictions of article 3, including section 36. The supposition is challenged by respondent corporation, which points to section 26, the first section of article 3. It is the section that authorizes a city to establish an “ official ” map under article 3. However, it also provides that that is to be accomplished by an ordinance or resolution which will make it the duty of an appropriate official to file with the appropriate Register a certificate showing thát the city has established “ an official map or plan,” It is stipulated that no such resolution has been passed and that no such certificate has been filed.

[326]*326Nevertheless, the city maintains that it has substantially .complied with the requirements for making such an election by reason of its enactment of section C26-2.G of the Administrative Code. It also relies on its having established “ official ”■ maps for many years prior to the passage of article 3. Section C26-2.0 sets down the applicability of the City Building Code to private property and expressly does not provide “ presumptively ” for matters that are contained in the City Charter, and in the General City Law as well as in various other State and local laws. That is, it shows obeisance to the General City Law with respect to buildings in general. We fail to see how it demonstrates that the city has specifically chosen to accept the'benefits and responsibilities of the “ official ” map provisions of article 3.

As to the city’s practice of “official” map establishment, that practice shows that the city has endeavoréd through the years to fulfill responsibilities vested in it by mapping provisions of the New York City Charter (also referred to in § C26-2.0). As we shall see, those provisions rather than article 3 of the General City Law, provide the applicable and dispositive law of this action.

We also note that “ official ” map laws have been subjected to vigorous attack in the courts upon claims that they deprive persons of property without due process of law (see, e.g., Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N. Y. 197; Junius Constr. Corp. v. Cohen, 257 N. Y. 393). Adoption of such laws is a grave step with respect to the property rights of the freeholders of a municipality. It is essential that the scheme be comprehensive and scrupulously followed. Even if one were to accept a principle of “ substantial ” compliance, there must be evidence by way of legislation albeit defective. A possible example of- “ substantial compliance ” by defective legislation is provided by the facts of Village of Lynbrook v. Cadoo (252 N. Y. 308). There is no similar proof in this record.

Moreover, the applicable sections of the charters enacted by the Legislature and adopted by the City of New York since the original Charter of 1898 lead only to the conclusion that the city has continued to have its own statutory scheme of map establishment.

Preparation of the “ map or plan of the City of New York ” has been entrusted by the Charter to various city officials since 1898 (see L. 1897, ch. 378, §§ 432-443; L.'1901, ch. 466; 1938 New York City Charter, §§ 197, 198; L. 1962, ch. 998,. § 21). Since 19Í6, ultimate approval of changes and additions has-remained vested in the Board Of-Estimate. • The most recent Charter has [327]*327apparently- shortened the term map or plan of the city of New York ’ ’ to that of ‘ ‘ city map. ”

■ Furthermore, since 1901, the Charter has also dealt with the problem-of privately prepared subdivision maps. Section 1540 of the Charter required approval by -the Board of Public Improvements before the streets set forth in such maps were deemed dedicated. In 1916 (L. 1916, ch. 513), section 1540 was changed to provide that no subdivision map would be accepted for filing in the Register of Deeds, unless it had been approved by the Borough President and transmitted to the Board of Estimate for approval. The subdivision map was to be either approved or disapproved by the Board of Estimate in 21 days, and its Chief Engineer might be authorized by resolution to approve or disapprove on behalf of the board.

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Bluebook (online)
19 A.D.2d 323, 242 N.Y.S.2d 942, 1963 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/di-biasi-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1963.