MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOYCE HENS GREEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Harbans L. Dhuria initiated this action against defendant Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia (“UDC”), alleging employment discrimination based on his national origin under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000
et seq.
Professor Dhuria subsequently amended his complaint to include separate claims of retaliation and violations of UDC’s rules and regulations. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment and plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint a second time. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated December 7, 1992, the Court,
inter alia,
granted Professor Dhuria’s motion to amend his complaint and dismissed Dhuria’s section 1981 claim. As a consequence, a bench trial was held in March 1993, and following its conclusion, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon consideration of the record and evidence introduced at the trial, including the testimony of witnesses whose credibility, demeanor, and behavior the Court has had the opportunity to evaluate, judgment is entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff for the reasons stated below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A.
Professor Dhuria’s Background
Professor Dhuria is a United States citizen, born in India. He has been employed at UDC since January 1979, when he was hired as a visiting professor by that institution.
Later that year, he was promoted to full-time assistant professor in the Department of Computer Information and Systems Science (“CISS”) of UDC’s College of Business and Public Management.
Then, in 1990, plaintiff was promoted to associate professor.
Before arriving at UDC, Professor Dhuria had earned two masters degrees in India, one in economics and one in mathematics, from Delhi University and Punjab University. Later, while at UDC, Professor Dhuria received a doctorate in Information Science from the Northern Virginia Community College (“NOVA”) on June 25, 1990.
Plaintiffs Exhibits 4, 5.
In 1985, plaintiff received a certificate from the Association for Systems Management which designates him as a “certified systems professional.” Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. In the same year, plaintiff was awarded a certificate from the Association of the Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. He has also benefitted from several grants. For example, in 1984, Professor Dhuria received a grant from the District of Columbia Energy Office which enabled him to hire two UDC students. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6. Then, in 1989, 1990, and 1991, he received grants from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(“NASA”). Plaintiffs Exhibits 7, 8, 9. The title of the first NASA grant was “the Analytical Study of the Effects of Various Types of Clouds on the Components of the Earth’s Radiation Budget.” The second title was similar: “The Study of the Effects of Clouds on the Earth Radiation Budget.” The third grant was captioned “the Study of the Effects of Clouds on the Earth’s Radiation Budget: Seasonal and Inter-annual Patterns.”
Although each NASA project contained the word “clouds,” Professor Dhuria testified convincingly that the projects were computer-based and dealt with computer programming and research. From 1987-89, plaintiff also published several articles in.the computer field. Plaintiffs Exhibit 49.
B.
The CISS and its Evaluation Procedures
At the time that the alleged discrimination occurred in 1990 and 1991, the CISS was made up of the following full-time individuals with diverse ethnic backgrounds: Dr. Hazzah (Egyptian); Professor Carl Friedman (American); Professor Eugene Dolan (American); Professor Judy Smith (African American); Professor Aan Truelove (British); Professor Kucera (Czechoslovakian); Professor Mehran Pooya (Iranian); Professor Vita Momenian (Bulgarian). Of the CISS faculty, only Dr. Hazzah, Professor Dhuria and Professor Truelove had received doctoral degrees.
At UDC, faculty evaluations are conducted every year.
See
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, at 23. Initially, the Department evaluates the individual through its Departmental Evaluation and Promotion Committee (“DEPC”) which consists of three, five, or seven members, depending upon the size of the particular department.
Id.
The members of the DEPC are elected annually by a majority vote of the CISS members. The DEPC then rates faculty members in its department through the use of four criteria, with respective weights to be awarded expressly set forth in the Fourth Master Agreement.
Id.
at 24. The faculty member may be rated “Less than satisfactory,” “Competent,” “Above average,” or “Excellent.” After the evaluation is conducted, the DEPC’s evaluation is submitted to the Department Chairperson who must also rate the faculty member, attaching an addendum if the chairperson’s rating is less favorable than the DEPC rating.
Id.
at 26. After review of the evaluation by the faculty member and the chairperson, the professor may appeal the evaluation within ten working days of meeting with that department chairperson.
Id.
at 27. The Dean is then required to meet with the faculty member (unless that member waives his or her right to a meeting), and the dean must issue a decision within thirty days of receipt of the appeal. Finally, if still unsatisfied with the evaluation, the faculty member may appeal to the Provost/Vice President for Academic Affairs within ten days. That individual has thirty days in which to issue a decision and the Provost/Vice President’s decision is final. The Fourth Master Agreement provides further that “a procedural defect in the evaluation process shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure of Article IX of this Agreement.”
Id.
at 29.
C.
Professor Dhuria’s Evaluations
In 1979, Professor Dhuria received a 96% score on his Faculty Evaluation Profile. Plaintiffs Exhibit 11. Several years later in 1982, the Chairperson of CISS, Professor Dolan commented that:
Students generally agree that Prof. Dhuria is an excellent teacher. He demonstrates a clear knowledge of his subject matter and lends an individual hand when such is needed by the student.... Professor Dhuria is highly respected by his colleagues who, like his students consider him an excellent teacher.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 13. In academic year 1983, he received a 92% score, an overall evaluation of “Excellent” and that evaluation was signed by Professor Friedman as Chairperson of the DEPC. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12. In 1984, Professor Dolan gave plaintiff the highest marks possible on a recommendation for plaintiffs admission to the NOVA doctorate program. Plaintiffs Exhibit 14. Several years later, in 1986, the Chairman’s Evaluation submitted by Professor Dolan commented that:
Professor Dhuria has an accent which though not as severe as some, causes problems in understanding. He is available to students outside of his posted officer hours_ Mr. Dhuria is a conscientious instructor but is involved in educational activities to earn a Ph.D which I believe interfere with his teaching.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. The evaluation submitted by the DEPC for the 1985-86 academic year gave plaintiff an 82% score which caused him to fall in the “Good” Category. Plaintiffs Exhibit 17.
That evaluation was signed by Professor Smith. The following year (1986-87), plaintiff received a 78% score and a “Satisfactory” rating. Plaintiffs Exhibit 18. Professor Dolan signed that evaluation. Dr. Hazzah, the Department Chairperson then raised the score to 81%. Plaintiffs Exhibit 19.
For the first time, in academic year 1989-90, Professor Dhuria received a “Less than Satisfactory”
rating of 54% from the DEPC, whose Chairperson was again Professor Dolan.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 22. As chair of the CISS, Dr. Hazzah approved that designation. Professor Dhuria appealed this evaluation to the Dean. Plaintiffs Exhibit 25. Dean Daljit Singh denied that appeal on May 29, 1990 and informed plaintiff of his right to appeal his decision to the Provost/Vice President for Academic Affairs. Professor Dhuria then filed that appeal. Plaintiffs Exhibit 28.
Professor Dhuria also received an “unsatisfactory” rating for academic year 1990-91.
The then three-person DEPC gave him a 20.9 score, noting that:
Mr. Dhuria did not comply with instructions relative to submission of materials. The DEPC declined to review submission (see attached). Scores are the result of independently available materials.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 29. Professor Friedman, then CISS chairperson, similarly rated plaintiff as “Less than Satisfactory” with a total score of 48 out of 100. Plaintiffs Exhibit 30. However, the Dean upheld plaintiffs appeal, stating that “it is my opinion that you were not provided ... due process and fair hearing. ...” The CISS’s rating was thereupon reversed with Dean Singh giving Professor Dhuria an 80% score and an “Above Average” rating. Plaintiffs Exhibits 31, 32. Pro
fessor Dhuria received a score of 63 out of 100, or a “Less than Satisfactory” rating for the 1991-92 evaluation period. Plaintiffs Exhibit 34. That rating was eventually changed by the Provost to “Above average.” Plaintiffs Exhibit 36.
As a result of his 1989-90 evaluation, Professor Dhuria did not receive a step increase worth $1,040 for the 1990-91 academic year and was prevented from applying for a promotion.
He complains further that he was not permitted to teach the number of summer school courses he should have been allowed in the summers of 1990 and 1991,
testifying that, as a general matter, other professors were given two classes while he was permitted to teach only one.
In addition to his dissatisfaction with his evaluations and summer schedules, plaintiff voiced concern that he had never served on the DEPC, because he says the DEPC members evaluate themselves and always give each other excellent evaluations, barring the opportunity for others to serve. Even accepting Dhuria’s premise of collegial favoritism, national origin discrimination was not evident. In contrast, Professor Friedman has either been department chairperson or served as a DEPC member every year plaintiff has been a professor at UDC. Likewise, Dr. Hazzah has held either of those two positions every year. Except for one year, Professor Dolan has served as a DEPC member or as the chairperson of the Department.
Plaintiff attributes his difficulties in the CISS.to discrimination against individuals of Asian Indian descent.
He testified that on November 14, 1990, while discussing a grievance with the dean, Professor Friedman called him “boy” and “guy” in front of the Dean. Professor Nicholas, the union representative, was also present at that meeting. In addition, plaintiff maintains that, on several occasions, in January 1991, Professor Friedman came to his office and called him “Indian cockroach.” He asserts further that on August 24, 1991, while he was teaching a Fortran class, Professor Friedman called him an “Indian cockroach” or “cockroach,” criticized him in front of the class, and followed him around the classroom. Similarly, plaintiff recalled that in departmental meetings, Professor Friedman would often criticize plaintiff. He states that, on at least seven other occasions, Professor Friedman has called him a “cockroach,” “dumb,” “incompetent” or told him he would “oust” him from UDC.
D.
Other Testimony
Professor Farooq Bashir, a non-CISS UDC professor, testified that during his arbitration with UDC on November 20, 1991 (he had been terminated), Professor Friedman
admitted that he had called plaintiff an “Indian cockroach” and a “boy.” Alan J. Truelove (“Truelove”), currently a computer consultant in private industry, also testified that Professor Friedman has called plaintiff an “Indian cockroach.” Truelove was a CISS professor for sixteen years until he was terminated in 1991 while working for a different department in UDC. During the time he was at CISS in 1985 or 1986, he was promoted to full professor and was the only full professor in the Department at that time. Truelove testified that, approximately four times a year, he spent time in Professor Dhuria’s classes and believed that Dhuria was very dedicated, knowledgeable, current and painstaking in his teaching.
Truelove was on the DEPC in 1987, and he evaluated the evaluation process as a “farce.” According to Truelove, there was no discussion of the materials submitted and the “non-doctoral” committee gave each other a 100% score, evaluating each other with the individual under evaluation remaining in the room.
In sum, Truelove deemed the evaluations racially motivated. Moreover, he reported that in 1987 or 1988, Professor Friedman made derogatory remarks to Truelove regarding plaintiff. For example, Professor Friedman reportedly stated that Professor Dhuria was “just an Indian” and he could be forced out of the Department. Also in 1988, Friedman allegedly described plaintiff as an “Indian” and “incompetent.” Truelove stated that Professors Friedman and Hazzah had tried to get rid of Professors Dhuria and Kucera because they were foreigners. No one overheard these conversations between himself and Professor Friedman or between himself and Dr. Hazzah.
Professor Samuel F. Carcione, an associate professor of mathematics at UDC and currently the president of the Faculty Association at UDC (the collective bargaining unit), provided highly credible testimony. On behalf of the Faculty Association, he represents all full-time permanent professors at UDC— in other words, those professors who are part of the collective bargaining arrangement. In his representative capacity, Professor Carcione testified that he had been fully involved with plaintiffs grievances since 1986. That year, because of irregularities in conducting student evaluations, the Faculty Association and the acting Provost, Dr. Samuel Sullivan, reached an agreement to reevaluate all CISS professors, and to do so using a neutral third-party in the College of Business. As a result of the second set of evaluations, plaintiff, Professor Kucera, and Truelove received new evaluations. The remaining six CISS professors declined to be reevaluated.
Professor Carcione related that almost every. year there were problems in the CISS Department. As example, in 1989, plaintiff met with Professor Carcione several times a semester to determine,
inter alia,
whether Friedman was allowed to come into Dhuria’s classroom while he was teaching. In addition, Professor Carcione saw several memoranda written by Professor Friedman to plaintiff, stating that plaintiff had given misinformation in his classes. Because of the frequent conflict between Dhuria and Friedman, Professor Carcione filed several grievances on behalf of Dhuria. As a result of his efforts, two reprimand memoranda written by Professor Friedman to plaintiff were later expunged from plaintiffs records.
In addition, Professor Carcione has heard Friedman in faculty senate and in union meetings talk about plaintiffs incompetence
, he has heard him “badger” Pro
fessor Dhuria and has even had to rule him out of order at these meetings. However, all of these comments by Professor Friedman came in the form of disparaging remarks, not epithets based on national origin. Professor Friedman would make remarks such as: “They need to get rid of you” or “You’re no good for this place.” Present at these meetings were sixty to eighty people.
Professor Lackland Nicholas, an associate professor at UDC and an attorney also testified, very credibly,
on plaintiffs behalf. He is currently chairman of the grievance committee and counsel for that committee, responsible for filing grievances on behalf of association members. He has represented Professor Dhuria several times a semester during the last four or five years, on the frequent occasions that plaintiff has charged Friedman with harassment. Professor Nicholas testified that every year, the same problems arise with Professors Friedman and Dhuria because Friedman simply does not like plaintiff. To illustrate, Professor Nicholas was present in meetings with the deans discussing grievances when Professor Friedman referred to plaintiff as “cockroach,” “boy,” and “asshole” and called Dhuria a lousy professor. Dean Singh reportedly cautioned Friedman and threatened to send him out of the meeting. Professor Friedman has allegedly made the same types of comments in front of both faculty and students. In another instance, Professor Friedman reassigned to another professor a class originally assigned to Professor Dhuria by Dean Singh. When Nicholas approached Friedman after class regarding the change, Friedman stated in front of the students that plaintiff was a “lousy professor.” Ultimately, Professor Dhuria prevailed on that grievance and was permitted to teach that course. Professor Friedman has also said in Nicholas’ presence that his goal was to get rid of plaintiff. Approximately one year ago, while Professor Nicholas was representing Professor Bashir in an arbitration, plaintiffs name came up in conversation and Professor Friedman referred to plaintiff as a cockroach. The previous semester, with Professor Nicholas’ assistance, Dhuria had a grievance successfully resolved by the acting Provost. The Provost determined that Professor Dhuria was to be given a step increase and recommended that the union and university establish a system by which Dhuria would not be evaluated by the DEPC.
Professor Friedman, the individual charged with making comments based on national origin, testified that he has worked in the CISS department since 1970. He denies ever calling plaintiff either an “Indian cockroach” or a “cockroach” and states further that an individual’s national origin is completely irrelevant to him. He did admit, however, that he has stated that if Dhuria’s performance does not improve, he must leave. Simply stated, Friedman fervently believes that plaintiff is incompetent. He also conceded that on one occasion, while talking to Professor Nicholas, he referred to plaintiff as “your boy.” He emphatically denies calling Dhuria a “boy.” According to Professor Friedman, there was no negative connotation to the phrase “your boy,” he just meant that Dhuria had “acted like an idiot.” In his mind, UDC owes a fiduciary responsibility to its students and it is his contention that Professor Dhuria’s students are being cheated by Dhuria’s poor teaching.
In discussing the DEPC’s evaluations of Professor Dhuria, Friedman stated that he was not on the DEPC in 1990. Furthermore, that year, he, too — like Professor Dhu-ria — received an unsatisfactory rating. In fact, plaintiff received higher ratings in 1990 when Friedman was on the DEPC than in 1991, when Friedman was not. Still, Friedman admitted that he, as Department Chairman, affirmed the DEPC’s 1991 rating, which rating was later reversed by Dean Singh.
Professor Friedman’s conduct toward Professor Dhuria was the subject of multiple memoranda in 1991. In March 1991, the Acting Provost directed Friedman to expunge two reprimands from Dhuria’s records on the ground that Friedman had lacked
authority to issue those reprimands. Plaintiffs Exhibits 47, 48. On June 28th, the Acting Provost wrote Dean Singh to inform him that Professor Friedman’s attempt to transfer plaintiff was void because Professor Friedman was no longer CISS’s Department Chairperson. Plaintiffs Exhibit 39. Several months later, in August, the three co-Deans wrote Professor Friedman directly in a memorandum entitled “Conduct. Unbecoming a Professional.” That memorandum addressed several actions Professor Friedman had tried to take concerning plaintiff and concluded: “Your failure to comply with the conditions described herein will result in appropriate acts being initiated against you.” Plaintiffs Exhibit 40.
DISCUSSION
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminating] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Disparate treatment occurs under Title VII when a plaintiff demonstrates that his “employer treats some people less favorably than others” because of an impermissible factor such as national origin.
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). The order and quantum of proof in disparate treatment cases was articulated by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. To succeed initially, a plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie
case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In this case, the
prima facie
case of discrimination requires proof that: (1) Professor Dhuria belongs to a protected group; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was adversely treated in spite of his qualifications; and (4) an individual not of the protected group was treated differently.
Once a
prima facie
case has been established, a presumption of unlawful discrimination arises,
see U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), and the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason” for the challenged action.
McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824;
see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 257, 101 S.Ct. at 1096 (defendant must produce evidence “which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.”). Whether this evidence is “ultimately persuasive or not,” defendants will have sustained their burden of production and “placed themselves in a ‘better position than if they had remained silent.’ ”
Saint Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
— U.S. ——, -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Once
the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the
McDonnell Douglas
framework with its presumptions and burdens is no longer relevant. To resurrect it later after the trier of fact has determined that what was “produced” to meet the burden of production is not credible, flies in the face of [the] holding in
Burdine
that to rebut the presumption “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture.
Id.
(citations omitted).
“The defendant’s ‘production’ (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question:,”
id.,
whether plaintiff has “demonstrate^] that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision [and] that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”
Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. To put it another way, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
Id.
at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. Thus, despite the shifting burdens of production, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.
St.
Mary’s Honor Center,
— U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2748-50;
Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 462-63.
In this ease, the Court assumes
arguendo
that Professor Dhuria has met his initial burden of proof and has established a
prima facie
case of discrimination. As an individual of Asian Indian descent, plaintiff does fall within a protected class and he did receive adverse personnel action. Although certainly not clear that others not within the protected class did not similarly receive adverse treatment (at least half of the CISS Department, of varying national origins, appear to have received at least one or more unsatisfactory evaluations), the Court will, nonetheless, further assume that others not within the protected class did not receive
as much
adverse personnel action as did Professor Dhuria.
As already observed Professor Friedman, the individual who allegedly carried an impermissibly discriminatory bias toward Asian Indians, received an unsatisfactory rating at the same time plaintiff did.
The justification advanced by defendant for plaintiffs poor evaluations is poor performance. Defendant contends that Dhuria received unsatisfactory evaluations because his work was unsatisfactory. To support this contention, several of Professor Dhuria’s former students — Washington, Professor Green and Professor Pooya — testified that Dhuria was an unorganized professor who was not sufficiently familiar with his course material to teach well. In addition, four professors— Professors Friedman, Dolan, Smith and Pooya — each testified that they ranked Professor Dhuria in the bottom of the CISS professors. In sum, six witnesses testified to deficiencies in Professor Dhuria’s performance. Whatever weight is attached to the individual testimony, defendant amply carried its burden of producing evidence of a nondiseriminatory reason for the adverse personnel action taken against plaintiff.
Professor Dhuria, in contrast, has not carried his ultimate burden of persuasion. As stated
supra,
although under the shifting burden scheme of
Burdine,
plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s proffered reason was not the true reason for the adverse employment action, plaintiff must also prove that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination. In other words, the burden of persuasion remains at all times on the plaintiff.
Attempting to carry this burden, plaintiff offered evidence to counter defendant’s contention that he was not a qualified teacher and should have received satisfactory ratings. As example, Professor Dhuria presented his various computer certificates, his grants, his research paper and his doctorate as proof of his eminent qualifications. In addition, Professor Bashir and Truelove testified that they had observed plaintiffs classes and found him a competent professor. Yet, testimony supporting the exact opposite conclusion was produced by defendant. Unfortunately, the murky and voluminous record, does not illuminate whether Dhuria should have received better evaluations — whether he was better qualified at his job than some of his evaluations reflect. At bottom, it was Professor Dhuria’s burden to persuade the Court by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason proposed by defendant was a pretext for discriminatory behavior. Professor Dhuria
has not met his burden; the Court was not so persuaded.
The witnesses provided by both parties shared credibility deficiencies. The Court found equally undeserving of credence Truelove, one of plaintiffs primary witnesses, and Professor Friedman, defendant’s principal witness. While it is unclear
why
Professor Friedman dislikes Professor Dhuria so intensely, there is no doubt that Friedman’s animus against Dhuria is personally motivated. It would be speculation to assume, as plaintiff and Truelove both suggested, that Professor Friedman, finding himself extraordinarily well qualified, was jealous of Professor Dhuria’s doctorate, a degree Professor Friedman did not possess. Nevertheless, Professor Friedman emphatically denied being motivated by plaintiffs national origin and plaintiff did not establish otherwise. It is impossible to discern whether Professor Friedman gave plaintiff poor evaluations because he believed Professor Dhuria merited them or because he disliked Dhuria. Even were the Court to find that Professor Friedman lied, and it does
not
so find, “to say that [UDC] which in good faith introduces such testimony, or even the testifyin employee himself becomes a liar and a perjurer when the testimony is not believed, is nothing short of absurd.”
St. Mary’s Honor Center,
— U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2754. As the Supreme Court recently stated, “Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury; we have other civil and criminal remedies for that.”
Id.
at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2754.
Nor were the remaining witnesses’ testimony dispositive of plaintiffs capabilities. Numerous UDC faculty members or employees testified that Dhuria was one of the worst professors in the CISS Department. Whether these evaluations were accurate or not, it is obvious that each of these professors/employees independently held that opinion. Even more significant is the fact that Professor Friedman, the only individual alleged to have referred to plaintiffs national origin,
was but one of a group of CISS professors charged with evaluating plaintiff. As stated
infra,
Professor Friedman did not have exclusive control over Professor Dhuria’s evaluations. In the evaluations in dispute, either a three or five-person committee gave the evaluation, which was then reviewed by another .individual. Absolutely nothing in the record supports a finding that these other professors were influenced by an improper Title VII motivation in evaluating Professor Dhuria’s work. It was their belief that plaintiff was not well qualified and they evaluated him accordingly.
In addition to failing to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, Professor Dhuria has not demonstrated reprisal.
A
prima facie
case of reprisal requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that he has engaged in a statutorily protected activity, that the employer took an adverse action and that there was a causal connection between the two.
Barnes v. Small,
840 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citing
McKenna v. Weinberger,
729 F.2d 783, 790 (D.C.Cir.1984)).
Here, Professor Dhuria has engaged in a statutorily protected activity, as was his absolute right — he protested what he believed to be illegal discrimination resulting in poor evaluations. However, for the reasons stated
supra,
he has not established a causal connection between filing the complaints and receiving poor evaluations. No evidence was presented that the DEPC members even knew that Dhuria had filed an EEOC complaint or initiated this case until after the fact. Nor did Professor Dhuria prove that adverse action occurred after he engaged in this statutorily protected activity. In sum, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was retaliated against after charging UDC with discrimination.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that judgment is entered on the accompanying judgment page in favor of defendant, Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia, and against plaintiff, Harbans L. Dhuria; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions and Other Relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.